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Tutkielmani tavoite on määrittää, miten Kiinan kansallisen valuutan (renminbi) 
kansainvälistäminen vaikuttaa Itä-Aasiassa tapahtuvaan valuuttayhteistyöhön. 
Tutkimuksessani sovellan neorealistista teoriaa arvioidessani, mitkä asiat motivoivat 
valuuttojen kansainvälistämistä ja kansainvälistä valuuttayhteistyötä. Ensisijaisena lähteenä 
tutkielmani teoriaosuudelle käytän William Grimesin kehittämää neorealistista analyysia Itä-
Aasian taloudellisesta ja monetaarisesta regionalismista. Lisäksi määritän ja esittelen kolme 
alueen historiallista tekijää (Aasian talouskriisi, “ASEAN Way” ja Kiina-Japani -suhteet), jotka 
määrittelevät rajat, joiden puitteissa alueellinen valuuttayhteistyö on mahdollista. Hypoteesini 
on, että Kiinan päätös kansainvälistää valuuttansa on pysyvästi muuttanut alueellisen 
valuuttayhteistyön peruslähtökohtia ja että renminbin kansainvälistämisen taustalla vaikuttavien
motivaatioiden ymmärtäminen on välttämätöntä vastaisuudessa tehtäville alueellisen 
valuuttayhteistyölle.
Itä-Aasian valuuttayhteistyötä on tutkittu aina Aasian talouskriisistä (1997–1998) lähtien niin 
akateemisesti kuin valtiollisillakin tahoilla, mutta toistaiseksi julkaistussa tutkimuksessa ei ole 
otettu huomioon Kiinan renminbin kansainvälistämisen vaikutuksia Itä-Aasian 
valuuttayhteistyöhön. Tutkimuksessani teen kirjallisuuskatsauksen siihen, mitä valuuttojen 
kansainvälistämisestä, renminbin kansainvälistämisestä ja Itä-Aasian valuuttayhteistyöstä on 
kirjoitettu. Määritelmäni kansainvälisestä valuutasta ja kansainvälistämisprosessista 
noudattavat standardisoituja määritelmiä, kun taas arvioni valuutan kansainvälistämisen 
motivaatioista ammentavat Chey'n, Cohenin ja Grimesin tutkimuksesta valtapolitiikan ja 
kansainvälisten valuuttojen yhteyksistä. Esiteltyäni yleisen teorian valuuttojen 
kansainvälistämisestä esittelen Kiinan renminbin tapauksen soveltaen siihen neorealistista 
teoriaa ja valuutan kansainvälistämisen teoriaa arvioidakseni, mikä on motivoinut Kiinan 
johtajia kansainvälistämään valuuttaansa. Tämän jälkeen esittelen alueen 
valuuttakurssiregiimejä ja sitä, millaisia ehdotuksia alueelliselle valuuttayhteistyölle on tarjottu. 
Lopulta pohdin, miten renminbin kansaivälistäminen on vaikuttanut alueellisen 
valuuttayhteistyön tulevaisuuden näkymiin.
Päättelen, että alueellisen valuuttayhteistyön sijaan Kiina tulee keskittymään renminbin 
kansainvälistämisteen kotialueellaan Itä-Aasiassa. Tulevan Itä-Aasian valuuttayhteistyötä 
käsittelevän tutkimuksen tulisikin huomioida renminbin nouseva rooli keskeisenä alueellisessa 
käytössä olevana valuuttana, joka toimii vähintäänkin osalle alueen valtioista pääasiallisena 
ankkurivaluuttana. Renminbin kansainvälistäminen on Kiinan johdolle ensisijaista ja alueellinen
yhteistyö toissijaista. Alueellisen valuuttayhteistyön keskiöön voisivat nousta ne viisi valtiota, 
joiden kansallisten valuuttojen valuuttakurssi on kytketty renminbin valuuttakurssiin 
huomattavasti tiukemmin kuin muihin kansainvälisiin valuuttoihin. 
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Foreword
It goes without saying that there is something inherently sexy about power, but most
people become perplexed when presented with the idea that there is something alluring
in currencies – after all, it is just money, right? Perhaps this is due to the fact that we
take the existence of currencies for granted and do not inquire too deeply into their
essence  leaving the details for experts, satisfied with the fact they continue to lubricate
our daily lives. But there is more to currencies than meets the eye. Suppose we likened
the international economy to a coral reef and the numerous national and international
currencies inhabiting it to the fauna and flora of a coral reef and we would have the
ingredients for an Attenborough document entitled 'The Interesting Lives of Currencies'.
Taking it a bit further, let us suppose that all of those currencies in the coral reef are
manipulated by external powers with ulterior motives, and what we have is a veritable
thriller.
Perhaps  I'm stretching  the  analogy  a  bit  too  far,  but  the  fact  is  that  currencies  are
inherently tied to power and in the present world order where advanced economies wage
their  wars  not  on  actual  frontiers  but  on  economic,  financial  and  monetary  ones,
currencies act as their proxies and even avatars in the international struggle for power. It
is with some embarrassment that I have to admit, that I've always found the intricacies
of international currencies – the plots, the twists and the drama – a fascinating subject. It
is  out of this  fascination that I  have dedicated this  work to studying the life of one
among them in the coral reef called 'East Asia'.
11. Introduction
It is no exaggeration to say, that prior to the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997 –
1998 East Asian financial and monetary regionalism was virtually non-existent. It was
only through the painful and eye-opening experience of the crisis, that the East Asian
nations1 came  to  understand  how  much  there  was  need  for  regional  financial  and
monetary cooperation. In the wake of the crisis a number of ambitious initiatives for
regional monetary cooperation were forwarded. Although the most ambitious project,
the Asian Monetary Fund, was rejected by USA and China2,  Japan's New Miyazawa
initiative3 struck gold and acted as a platform for the creation of Chiang Mai Initiative
(upgraded to Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralized, CMIM, in 2010), which up to this
day  still  is  the  pinnacle  of  East  Asian  financial  and  monetary  cooperation.  These
developments  sparked also academic  interest  into the hitherto dormant  field of  East
Asian financial and monetary studies, and the first decade of 2000s was marked by a
profusion  of  studies  consecrated  to  different  forms  of  financial  and  monetary
cooperation in East Asia. A distinct topic of research within this field has been regional
exchange rate cooperation, a topic which gained prominence during the interim period
between the Asian Financial Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007 –
2008.  A  central  theme  for  the  majority  of  proposals  for  regional  exchange  rate
cooperation was the promotion of intra-regional trade and the consolidation of regional
economic,  financial and monetary cooperation with some researchers going as far as
sketching road-maps for the eventual creation of East Asian monetary union or even a
single currency à la euro. Much of this research was inspired by the birth of regional
financial and monetary regionalism and was characterized by firm belief in the regional
countries' will to cooperate among themselves and adopt regional strategies to global
problems. At the time the so-called 'global imbalances problem'4 was perceived to be the
greatest  threat  to  global  economic  stability  and  the  East  Asian  countries  with  their
undervalued currencies and burgeoning trade balance surpluses as the key to solving the
problem. Hence, most of the proposals dating from that period take the fostering if intra-
1 This study defines East Asia as the ASEAN nations plus China, Japan and South Korea. Admittedly 
North Korea and Taiwan, too, are integral parts of East Asia, but due to their situation in regional 
politics they have been counted out from financial and monetary regionalism.
2 For a good summation of this see for example Amyx (2002).
3 A short-term financing facility established by the Japanese government to support credit-extending 
schemes and to help provide liquidity to crisis struck East Asian countries.
4 In this study global imbalances are defined as a shorthand for the large current account deficits of the 
United States and massive accumulation of foreign assets, mainly dollar assets, by Asian economies.
2regional  trade,  the  consolidation  of  regional  economic,  financial  and  monetary
cooperation and/or the solving of global imbalances issue as their main goals.
The onset of GFC has significantly changed the basic premises of East Asian financial
and monetary regionalism. Whereas AFC had a unifying effect on the region, GFC has
had the very opposite impact: the countries have resorted to national responses to global
crisis and have avoided even tapping into their allotted funds in CMIM raising doubts
about the future of East Asian financial and monetary regionalism. At the very least it
has shown just how brittle cooperation in the region still is. At the same time the region
has experienced a tectonic shift in the monetary field: the internationalization of China's
national currency, the renminbi (RMB), has begun in earnest after the crisis.  Up to now
the potential emergence of RMB as a regional key currency has had only a very limited
effect  on  the  regional  monetary  affairs,  but  its  rise  to  become  the  regional  major
currency  looms  large  in  the  horizon  and  will  inevitably  shape  the  field  of  regional
monetary and exchange rate cooperation.
Due to the fundamental changes in circumstances new research is required. The existing
body of research has so far omitted the internationalization of RMB. In order to better
understand  where  East  Asian  monetary  regionalism  is  heading,  it  is  essential  to
understand  what  has  prompted  the  Chinese  leaders  to  proceed  with  RMB's
internationalization,  what is  the current state of RMB's internationalization and what
future has in store for it.
Research predating GFC was facilitated by the fact that the region was effectively using
the US dollar as a region-wide anchor currency, making regional exchange rate regimes
and  exchange  rate  policies  reasonably  convergent.  In  the  wake  of  RMB's
internationalization,  however,  the  situation  has  changed  as  China  has  allowed  more
flexibility in RMB's exchange rate. Given China's importance as a major trade partner
for  nearly all  of  the East  Asian nations  and the slowly spreading use of  RMB as a
currency  of  settlement,  invoicing  and  denomination,  some  have  started  to  question
whether there now exists an RMB bloc in East Asia or has RMB at least started to gain
relative  importance  in  the  currency  baskets  of  other  countries  in  the  region.  When
assessing the current situation of regional exchange rate cooperation, it is important to
take into account to what degree RMB has become an anchor currency in the region and,
more importantly, whether there exists a nascent RMB bloc in the region as these are
factors that will have a big impact on exchange rate cooperation in East Asia.
Another problem plaguing previous research on East Asian exchange rate cooperation
3has been the distinct underestimation of how the legacy of regional politics, or their
modus operandi, as embodied in the so-called 'ASEAN Way' will affect the feasibility of
proposals for exchange rate cooperation in the region. True, none of the researchers have
ever claimed that exchange rate cooperation in the region will be easy to realize, but it
still seems that the constraining nature of the ASEAN Way and the states' aversion to
hand over national sovereignty to supra-national institutions and organizations even in
economic or financial surveillance has been underestimated this far.
Another problem with most of the proposals for East Asian exchange rate cooperation is
that they are, if not explicitly, then at least implicitly based on neoliberalist assumptions
about  cooperation  in  international  relations.  In  practice  this  means  an  emphasis  on
mutual gains5 and a tendency to offer solutions that are based on creation of suitable
institutions  to  carry  out  the  required  operations  and arrangements  for  exchange rate
cooperation. Hence they tend to overlook power relations within East Asia and how they
affect financial and monetary regionalism.
The  object  of  this  study  is  three-fold:  First,  to  assess  what  is  the  state  of  RMB's
internationalization, where it is heading for the foreseeable future and what is motivating
it.  Second,  to  assess  how  RMB's  internationalization  has  altered  the  prospects  for
exchange rate cooperation in East Asia and what could RMB's role be in East Asian
exchange  rate  cooperation  in  the  future.  Third,  at  the  end  of  this  study  a  proposal
factoring  in  East  Asian  regional  politics  and  RMB's  internationalization  will  be
sketched.
This is done by first presenting the neorealistic theory-framework and its basic premises
in  chapter  2.  This  chapter  explains  how  currency  and  monetary  power  have  been
conceived  of  in  neorealistic  International  Political  Economy  (IPE)  studies.  The
neorealistic  theory-framework  is  then  complemented  with  a  presentation  of  region-
specific  factors  that  are  vital  to  understanding the  limitations  within  which  regional
exchange rate cooperation must take place. The factors include the aforementioned two
financial  crises  and their  effect  on financial  and monetary regionalism,  the 'ASEAN
Way's' legacy and Sino-Japanese rivalry.
Before  proceeding  to  RMB's  internationalization,  the  theory  behind  currency
internationalization  is  presented  in  chapter  3.  The  chapter  is  divided  into  sections
presenting  the  definition  and  taxonomy of  international  currencies  (3.1.),  presenting
what are the benefits and costs of currency internationalization (3.2.) and what are the
5 Growth in intra-regional trade gained from exchange rate stability being a very frequent example.
4technical  requirements  and  the  correct  sequencing  in  internationalizing  a  national
currency (3.3.). The last section (3.4.) of the chapter deals with the relationship of power
in internal relations and currency internationalization.
The internationalization of RMB presented in chapter 4 is divided into four sections.
First section  (4.1.) assesses the current state of RMB internationalization. The following
sections will first present what are the biggest challenges for further internationalization
of RMB (4.2.) and what are its future prospects (4.3.). The last section of this chapter
brings together all that has been presented in chapters 3 and 4 and makes an appraisal of
the motivations behind RMB's internationalization.
Chapter 5 deals with East Asian exchange rate regimes and exchange rate cooperation.
The  chapter  opens  up  presenting  what  has  been  so  far  conceived  of  as  the  main
motivations  for  East  Asian  exchange rate  and currency cooperation  (5.1.).  The  next
section  (5.2.)  examines  what  are  the  prevailing  exchange rate  regimes  in  all  of  the
respective East Asian nations.  As most of the nations have an exchange rate regime
based on a currency basket,  the section will  then analyze whether there exists  some
convergence in the relative weights they assign to the major currencies in their baskets.
This is done by examining whether there exists a nascent currency bloc centered around
RMB or whether the region is still on a dollar standard. The following section (5.3.) will
make a thorough analysis  of the proposals for East Asian exchange rate cooperation
appraising the proposals' feasibility. Finally, in section 5.4. an overall assessment of how
RMB's  internationalization  has  changed  the  prospects  of  East  Asian  exchange  rate
cooperation and what is the likeliest way to achieve exchange rate cooperation in the
current situation.  Chapter 6 concludes this study by summarizing all of the previous
chapters' findings and making concluding remarks for future research.
The  theoretical  background  for  this  study  is  mainly  derived  from  William  Grimes'
seminal study into East Asian financial and monetary regionalism in his book Currency
and contest in East Asia: the great power politics of financial regionalism published in
2009. Even after 6 years of its publication it is still, to the author's best knowledge, the
most extensive and lucid analysis of East Asian financial and monetary cooperation. As
Grimes' analysis is based on an exclusive neorealistic approach, this study, too, adopts a
neorealistic  approach  to  East  Asian  financial  and  monetary  regionalism  and,  in
extension, to exchange rate cooperation. This is done in order to keep this study in line
with  Grimes'  original  analysis  and  to  provide  a  neorealistic  reading  of  exchange
cooperation – something which has so far  been lacking from the proposals for East
5Asian exchange rate cooperation. As for currencies and monetary power, in addition to
Grimes'  research this  study draws on Jonathan Kirshner's  classic  study on monetary
power, Currency and Coercion, and Benjamin Cohen's research on monetary power and
international currencies6. Of the region-specific background information the two crises
and  their  effects  on  East  Asian  regionalism  are  well  researched  and  documented
phenomenons and this study draws on a wide variety studies to establish their impact
and importance to regional financial and monetary cooperation. On the other hand, the
ASEAN Way and Sino-Japanese rivalry are both well-known phenomenons, but their
impact on financial and monetary cooperation have not been systematically researched,
so this study will draw from various studies to form a picture of how they are likely to
affect cooperation in East Asia in general.
The taxonomy for the roles of an international currency presented in section 3.1. of
chapter  3  draws  on  a  standard  taxonomy  of  the  roles  of  a  currency.  Because  all
international  currencies  are  not  equal  and  do  not  fulfill  same  roles  in  international
economy,  this  taxonomy  is  further  elaborated  by  adding  to  it  Benjamin  Cohen's
taxonomy of the hierarchy of international currencies to bring more conceptual clarity to
the  definitions  employed in  this  study.  The theory for  the  economical  rationales  for
currency internationalization and the process of currency internationalization is drawn
from mainstream studies on currency internationalization and studies used in this the
chapter are taken as representatives of a broad mainstream consensus among researchers
of what what are the pros and cons of internationalizing a national currency and how to
sequence the process of currency internationalization. This view is complemented with
studies by Benjamin Cohen and Hyoung-kyu Chey who have expressly researched the
subject  of  international  currencies,  currency internationalization  and their  relation  to
monetary power.7 
Ever since Chinese officials' decision to allow RMB more exchange rate flexibility in
2010, there has been a flurry of research into RMB's internationalization. As this study's
main aim is not to research exclusively RMB's internationalization, it will draw on the
existing body of research and to form a clear picture through a meta-analysis of what is
the current situation, what are the major challenges and what the future holds for the
internationalization of RMB. Because the internationalization of RMB is an ongoing
process, some of the latest plot twists have not yet made it into academic studies. Due to
this fact some of the latest developments have been derived from international press.
6 Cohen (2011) and (2012).
7 Chey (2012).
6As was already mentioned, during the interim years between the two crises, there was a
profusion of proposals and schemes for East Asian exchange rate cooperation. Some of
the proposals are more intellectual exercises than real proposals. This applies especially
to proposals for creating an East Asian monetary union or a single currency. On the other
hand, most of the other proposals can be clearly attributed to individual researchers or
groups of researchers. The parallel-currency approach is singularly advocated by Barry
Eichengreen, a currency basket with an internal anchor has been advocated by Ogawa &
Shimizu and Ryou & Wang and research on a currency basket with an external anchor
has centered around Masahiro Kawai and John Williamsson. The research concerning
free exchange rates with inflation targeting is a wide-spread approach and is not clearly
centered around any single researcher or a group of researchers. It is due to this reason
that this study draws on a variety of sources when presenting the aforesaid approach. In
addition there are meta-studies such as made by Kenen & Meade and Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa, that have made broad generalizations about the different approaches. These
works,  too,  have  been  used  as  reference  material.  The  rationale  for  exchange  rate
operation,  too,  comes  from these  studies  as  all  of  the  studies  begin  by providing a
rationale for exchange rate cooperation in general and/or in East Asian in particular.8
The  country-by-country  exchange  rate  regimes  are  taken  from  either  International
Monetary  Fund,  Asian  Development  Bank  or  Bank  for  International  Settlement
researchers' studies as they are authoritative in the field. As this study does not take the
hypothetical existence of an East Asian RMB bloc as its research object, the existence of
a currency bloc in East Asia is based on a meta-study of studies on the existence of an
RMB bloc in East Asia. As this topic has only surfaced only rather recently, there are
only a handful studies to draw on: those claiming that there exists an RMB bloc already
include Henning and Subramanian & Kessler whereas Kawai & Pontines dispute the
existence of RMB.9
8 Eichengreen (2006 and 2007), Kawai (2007b and 2008), Kenen & Meade (2007), Ogawa & Shimizu  
(2006), Padoa-Schioppa (2004), Ryou & Wang (2004) and Williamsson (2005),   
9 Henning (2012), Kawai & Pontines (2014a and 2014b) and Subramanien & Kessler (2013). 
72. Theory and Background
In  this  chapter  the  theoretical  approach  of  this  study  and  background  information
relevant  to  this  study are  introduced.  As  this  study builds  primarily  on  William W.
Grimes' seminal work, Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power Politics of
Financial Regionalism (Ithaca, 2009), on East Asian financial regionalism and the great
power  politics  behind  it,  this  study  will  inherit  Grimes'  theoretical  approach,  the
neorealist approach, to keep this study's approach consistent with the observations made
earlier by Grimes.
2.1. Neorealist Theory Framework
The  main  premises  inherited  from  Grimes'  theoretical  framework  are  the  staple  of
theories drawing on neorealism: 1) power and material capacities matter, 2) states are
the principal actors and, consequently, the level of analysis is kept at a systemic level
and  3)  what  motivates  the  nation  states  are  their  national  interests,  which  in  the
anarchical international system are the provision of national security and relative gains
over others. When these principles are applied to International Political Economy (IPE)
and financial & monetary regionalism we obtain the following set of hypotheses: the
process  of  creating  regional  financial  or  monetary  institutions  and  the  created
institutions will reflect the power balance and capacities of regional major powers and
their ability to realize their goals or national interests. Furthermore, in a regional system
where there is no clear single leader, cooperation and, by extension, regional integration
is hard to come by as all the states concerned are primarily interested in making relative
gains over others and/or nullifying other states' efforts at taking the leading or dominant
position.10
2.1.1. Currency and Power
Drawing on neorealist research by writers such as Benjamin Cohen, Eric Helleiner and
Jonathan Kirshner  on currency and power in international relations, Grimes identifies
three  different  strategies  to  exercise  power  in  monetary  and  financial  affairs  in
international relations: commitment, hedging and leverage. According to Grimes “Both
10 Grimes (2009) pp. 13 – 20.
8commitment and hedging are strategies, which aim to cope with the uncertainties that
pervade  international  politics.  With  commitment  and  hedging  state  actors  seek  to
diminish the uncertainties over current and future power interests of other actors, future
patterns of economic changes and sources of future political and economic crises.”11
To elaborate: commitment is a means of “trying to reduce uncertainty by locking oneself
and  one's  partner(s)  into  a  prescribed  set  of  behaviors.”12 The  aim  is  to  reduce
uncertainty about the motivations and future actions of other actors. Most notable forms
of  commitment  for  financial  and  monetary  affairs  are  regimes,  treaties  and
organizations. Also such forms as alliances and band-wagoning can be used to balance
power compositions of a given setting.  Hedging, on the other hand,  is  a strategy of
managing uncertainties by reducing one's vulnerability and exposure to changes in the
environment by creating viable exit options and plan Bs. The multiplicity of options
creates policy alternatives which can be activated if the environment or national interests
shift in such a way as to render the previous policy obsolete or even counterproductive.13
Combining strategies of commitment and hedging we arrive to the final direct strategy:
leverage.  Commitments  provide  leverage  in  the  form  of  alliances:  tight  alliances,
regimes etc. provide the actors the option of 'tightening their ranks' to make a possible
adversary back away. Hedges, on the other hand, provide leverage against actors who
might  seek  to  exert  power  through  asymmetric  dependence  –  be  it  military  or
economic.14
Moving  on  to  monetary  systems,  Jonathan  Kirshner  –  whose  work  on  international
relations and currencies Grimes draws on heavily – argues that there are three main
ways in which the system can be exploited by states to achieve foreign policy goals:
currency manipulation, monetary dependence and systemic disruption.15
Currency manipulation can be used as either defensive or offensive strategy:  an actor
may either attack another currency or support a currency (including its own).16 Attacking
other currencies' exchange-rates is a relatively flexible and easily deployed “weapon”,
which can be used against both major and minor economies.17 The effectiveness of a
currency weapon depends on how sensitive the currency is to exchange rate changes,
11 Grimes (2009) pp. 22 – 23.
12 Ibid. p. 22.
13 Grimes (2009) pp. 22 – 23.
14 Ibid. pp. 22 – 23.
15 Kirshner: Currency and Coercion  (1995). Each means is given a chapter of their own.
16 Grimes (2009) p. 24.
17 Grimes (2009) p. 24, Henning (2006) pp. 121 – 123 and Kirshner (1995) p. 111.
9what  kind  of  role  it  has  for  domestic  policies,  on  trade  structures,  current  account
positions and the composition of the issuers' foreign exchange reserves.18
Monetary  dependence  is  a  more  systemic  form  of  financial  statecraft:  the  most
conspicuous form of it  is  the aforementioned form of monetary power,  'entrapment'.
When a country becomes dependent on another country's currency, that country's private
sector's  and  state's  preferences  are  transformed  by  their  dependence;  they  become
dependent on the other state's monetary stability and on their goodwill to maintain the
value of their currency.19
Grimes goes a bit further and points out that regional arrangements such as currency
regimes, regional currencies etc. that seek to stabilize currencies are a form of monetary
dependence  – or,  conversely,  commitment  – and pose a  threat  of  entrapment  to  the
participants.20
The final form of monetary power is systemic disruption. Systemic disruption is more of
a threat than an actual weapon; it is mainly utilized by a middle-ranking power to create
disarray in a monetary system without offering any alternatives to the system.21 The
objective of this strategy is to force the hand of the leading power to make change in its
policies.22 A good example of systemic disruption would be, for example, if China or
Japan started to sell their US dollar assets en masse. Doing so wouldn't only have an
adverse effect on  the US, but also on the instigator. In this sense it is a monetary version
of a doomsday device and no rational actor is likely to use it.
A more subtle mode of systemic power,  but one which is  not directly  derived from
having an international currency, is having the ability set financial market standards.
Having  open,  deep  and  well-functioning  markets  is  a  necessary  prerequisite  for  a
currency to achieve full internationalization – or at least regionalization. This also means
having  a  world-class  financial  institutions,  regulations  etc.  Since  the  issuer  of  an
international currency is likely to posses a world-class financial center, it follows that
they also are likely to have a say on the financial market standards. The US is a perfect
example: through being the financial hub of world economy, the US has always had the
ability to set the standards to financial markets all over the world (an ability enhanced
through US influence in the IMF) to its liking.23
18 Grimes (2009) p. 24, Henning (2006) pp. 121 – 123 and Kirshner (1995) p. 111.
19 Kirshner (1995) pp. 117 – 119.
20 Grimes (2009) pp. 23 – 26.
21 Grimes (2009) pp. 25 – 26 and Kirshner (1995) pp. 170 – 218.
22 Grimes (2009) pp. 25 – 26 and Kirshner (1995) pp. 170 – 218.
23 Grimes (2009) pp. 20 – 22.
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Some writers point  out that  having an international  currency confers the issuer  'soft
power'. Chey describes it as “ability to get others to do what it [the currency's issuer]
wants  through  attraction  rather  than  use  of  coercion  or  payment  –  through  the
heightening of its structural power”.24 Cohen, on the other hand, describes soft power as
“a source of status and prestige, a visible sign of elevated rank in the community of
nations.”25 Whichever definition of soft power is adopted, it  will be hard to pinpoint
empirically the soft power benefits of an international currency. Still, it is worth keeping
in mind that such a dimension does exist and that it is relevant in the big picture.
While most of the scholars stress the importance of systemic power, or the 'second face
of  power',  in  the  relationship  of  currencies  and  international  politics,  Henning  and
Katada & Henning have questioned the primacy of systemic power over actors internal
preference  determination.26 Examining  East  Asian  nations'  choice  of  exchange  rate
regime over  time,  they  argue  that  the  choices  of  the  actors  are  better  explained by
examining  their  internal  preference  determinations  than  by  conceptualizations  of
systemic power – whether it be systemic power of the US dollar or Chinese renminbi.27
Following Moravcsik's research28 they argue that an analysis of power relations should
be preceded by an analysis  of the actors'  preferences. Only after the relevant actors'
preferences have been identified and specified can they be used in conjunction with an
analysis of structural power in building multi-causal explanations.29
2.2. East Asian Financial and Monetary Cooperation
This study asserts that there are three major components in the history of East Asian
regionalism,  that  are  essential  to  understanding the past  of  East  Asian financial  and
monetary regionalism and the future of it. They are 1) the effects of two financial crises
(the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of late 1990s and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of
late 2000s) have had on the region, 2) the legacy of the 'ASEAN Way', which still forms
the modus operandi of regional cooperation and 3) the Sino-Japanese rivalry. These are
all historical factors that the regional actors share, and they will inevitably shape future
developments in regional currency cooperation as well.
24 Chey (2012) p. 57.
25 Cohen (2011) p. 10.
26 Henning (2012) and Katada & Henning  (2014).
27 Henning (2012) pp. 12 – 13, Katada & Henning  (2014) pp. 317 – 319.
28 Moravcsik (1997) and Moravcsik (2008).
29 Henning (2012) pp. 12 – 13 and Katada & Henning (2014) pp. 317 – 319.
11
2.2.1. From Asian Financial Crisis to Global Financial Crisis
Researchers agree that the traumatic experience of AFC acted as a major catalyst for the
regionalist drive witnessed in East Asia during late 1990s and early 2000s.30 Moreover,
if  AFC acted  as  a  catalyst  for  East  Asian  regionalism  in  general  then  it  could  be
justifiably said that it was a veritable big bang for East Asian financial and monetary
regionalism: due to the financial nature of the crisis itself it was only appropriate that the
regional response to it was to enhance regional financial and monetary cooperation.
The crisis made the East Asian economies painfully aware of just how inter-connected
their markets had become and, in the same process, how well they had been connected
to the global financial system.31 Also, IMF's high-handed way of dealing with the crisis
left the affected countries resentful and distrustful towards international organizations,
such as IMF, which were more or less equated with US' global financial hegemony.32
Furthermore, the crisis made it very clear just how much say the emerging East Asian
nations had in those global organizations. The crisis also underlined just how dependent
East Asian economies were on their exports and of the global reserve currency, the US
dollar.33
There  are  two main  lessons  the  East  Asian  leaders  drew from this  crisis,  that  have
affected regional monetary and financial cooperation and will do so for the foreseeable
future.  First,  as  the  region  had  become  economically  and  financially  deeply  inter-
connected and exposed to the vagaries of global financial markets, there was an acute
need to create regional institutions and arrangements to insulate and protect the regional
economies from shocks caused by global financial markets.34 Second, the reason why
currency speculators decided to attack the Thai baht in the first place (and Hong Kong a
little later on) was that the Thai government was committed to uphold their currency peg
to the US dollar at all costs.35 The problem with that strategy was that they had only very
limited foreign exchange reserves available and when those were exhausted collapse
became  imminent.36 Thus  hoarding  excessive  amounts  of  foreign  exchange  reserves
30 Amyx (2005) pp. 2 -3,  Dent (2008) pp. 155 – 156, Dieter (2008) pp. 492 - 494, Grimes (2009) pp. 
122 – 124, Katada (2011) pp. 277 – 278, Terada (2003) pp. 264 – 266 and Yu (2007) pp. 49 – 53.
31 Beeson (2007) pp. 203 – 213.
32 Allen & Hong (2011) pp. 10 -12, Beeson (2007) pp. 203 – 213, Grimes (2009) pp. 64 – 66, Stubbs 
(2002) pp. 448 – 450 and Yu (2007) pp. 49 – 50.
33 Beeson (2007) pp. 203 – 213, Ciorciari (2011) pp. 928 - 932, Dent (2008) pp. 155 - 156, Grimes 
(2009) pp. 49 - 54 and Katada (2011) pp. 276 – 280, Yu (2007) pp. 49 – 53.
34 Amyx (2005) pp. 2 – 4, Choi (2013) pp. 411 – 413 and Grimes (2009) pp. 68 – 70. 
35 Beeson (2007) pp. 206 – 213, Corsini, Pesenti & Roubini (1999) pp. 348 – 351, Krugman (2009) pp. 
84 - 88  and Radelet & Sachs (1998) pp. 17 - 23
36 Corsini, Pesenti & Roubini (1999) pp. 349, Krugman (2009) pp. 84 – 88 and Radelet & Sachs (1998) 
pp. 15 – 17.
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(mainly US dollars)  gained from running current  account  surpluses became a policy
imperative.37
Out  of  these  factors  was born  Chiang Mai  Initiative  (CMI),  which  is  a  multilateral
currency-swap  network  and  arguably  the  culmination  of  East  Asian  financial  and
monetary regionalism. The initiative was started by APT countries in Chiang Mai in
2000  and  was  finalized  in  2003 before  it  was  upgraded  into  Chiang  Mai  Initiative
Multilateralized (CMIM) in 2010.38 The initiative is based solely around a network of
bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) which initially totaled $36 billion in 2003 composed
of 14 individual BSAs39. By October 2007 there were 16 individual BSAs composing a
total  of $87.5 billion.40 The purpose of CMI is that in a time of need a crisis afflicted
country can actualize its BSAs and draw funds from the foreign exchange reserves of its
swap partners to fend off, for example, a run on its currency.41
In 2010 the arrangement was upgraded into CMIM, which brought about the following
changes into the arrangement: 1) the total amount of funds committed was increased to
$120  billion,  2)  participants  were  assigned  specific  financial  commitments,  3)
institutionalization of drawing rights (reminiscent of the IMF quota system) whereby
participants are allowed to draw funds equivalent of their  contribution multiplied by
their borrowing multiple, 4) a weighed voting system for the disbursement of the funds
where  contributions  correspond  with  voting  rights  and  5)  the  establishment  of
ASEAN+3  Macroeconomic  Research  Office  (AMRO)  to  monitor  and  survey  the
participants.42
Where  as  AFC acted  as  a  catalyst  to  strengthen  financial  and  monetary  regionalist
tendencies in East Asia GFC has had an opposite effect on East Asian financial  and
monetary regionalism.
While it is true that the GFC acted as a catalyst to further enhance CMI's bilateral swap
network into CMIM (and the establishment of AMRO), during the crisis none of the
participant countries decided to activate their bilateral swaps or, later, draw any of their
allotted funds.43 That is not to say that none of the nations were in need of funds during
37 Allen & Hong (2011) pp. 12 – 16, Grimes (2009) pp. 135 – 138, Lee & Aizenman (2006) pp. 3 – 6 
and Yoshitomi (2007) pp. 23 – 27.
38 Ciorciari (2011) pp. 927 – 935, Grimes (2009) pp. 82 - 85
39 Dent (2008) pp. 156 – 157.
40 For a detailed chart of the BSA network see for example Dent (2008) p. 158 , Grimes (2009) p. 83 or 
Ciorciari (2011) p. 930.
41 Amyx (2005) pp. 3 – 4, Dent (2008) p. 159 and Grimes (2009) pp. 82 – 85.
42 Carciari (2011) pp. 935 – 948 and Grimes (2011) pp. 296 – 299.
43 Emmers & Ravenhill (2011) pp. 140 – 142 and Grimes (2011) pp. 303 – 304.
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the crisis; in fact both South Korea and Singapore did negotiate a dollar swap agreement
with US Federal Reserve.44 Yet they did not tap into their  CMI BSAs. According to
Grimes this is due to the fact that CMI – and later on CMIM – had never been intended
for  the  more  open  and  developed  economies  of  APT,  but  rather  for  the  ASEAN-4
countries.45 South  Korea,  for  example,  was  in  a  dire  need  of  dollar  liquidity,  but
activating the BSAs would have entailed negotiations with IMF, which, in turn, could
have provoked a disastrous loss of market confidence.46
Even  though this  time  the  crisis  highlighted  the  shortcomings  of  regional  monetary
institutions, it was not, however, the biggest change brought about by GFC. The changes
on a more general level would have a greater impact on further financial and monetary
regionalism. These changes include a greater representation of the East Asian countries
in global organizations, the calling into question of the neoliberal orthodoxy espoused
by US officials and IMF – or the Washington Consensus – and China's rise into global
economical prominence.47
The first two changes compound to have an overall effect on the regional countries to
channel their policy efforts towards global and national levels. A better representation in
global organizations addresses the problem that acted as a catalyst in AFC taking some
steam out of regional cooperation in financial and monetary matters. 
With GFC the much vilified IMF orthodoxy prevalent during AFC, too, has become
discredited, which in turn has given the East Asian governments more freedom to handle
their economic and financial crises to their liking – something they had wanted already
during  AFC.  Indeed,  the  East  Asian  countries'  response  to  GFC was  the  complete
opposite of IMF's handling of AFC as regional governments turned to fiscal stimulus
instead of austerity to extricate themselves out from the crisis.48
The  overall  effect  has  been  a  decrease  of  pace  in  regional  financial  and  monetary
cooperation as the regional governments have been pulled “in the direction of global and
nation-centric recovery instead of a regional one.”49
2.2.2. The ASEAN Way
The modus operandi of East Asian regional politics is best captured in the so called
44 Chung (2010) pp. 259 and Grimes (2011) pp. 294 - 296
45 Grimes (2011) pp. 294 – 296.
46 Grimes (2011) pp. 303 – 304 and Katada (2011) p. 282.
47 Beeson (2011) pp. 370 - 371 and Katada (2011) pp. 283 – 285.
48 Grimes (2011) pp. 294 and Katada (2011) pp. 283 – 285.
49 Katada (2011), p. 284.
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'ASEAN Way', an informal collection of principles that have governed regional politics
ever since the establishment of ASEAN itself. Although there is no official definition for
this  mode of politics,  most scholars agree that the following four elements form the
nucleus of the ASEAN Way: 1) non-interference in internal affairs, 2) non-use of force,
3) consensus-based decision making and 4) informal diplomacy.50
The way has its origins in the genesis of ASEAN itself: founded in 1967 by Indonesia,
Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Singapore  and  Thailand51,  ASEAN  was  composed  of  a
heterogeneous  group of  countries  possessing  varying political  regimes and levels  of
economic development. In order to accommodate this level of heterogeneity a certain
degree of political discreetness was needed to prevent the association from falling into
internal quarreling and eventual falling apart.52 In a sense, then, these principles formed
a mechanism to both facilitate joint decision-making and at the same time to diffuse
conflicts between the participants.53
The principles were further strengthened with the conclusion of the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 197654. When the association expanded with the
inclusion  of  Brunei,  Cambodia,  Laos,  Myanmar  and Vietnam,  these  principles  were
undoubtedly a key element in luring them to join the organization.
Although there have been frequent calls to alter the founding principles of the ASEAN
to ameliorate regional governance and to instill more democratic values in the region, in
practical terms very little has changed fundamentally even despite of the much lauded
ASEAN Charter of 200555.56 Hence, the principles of non-interference, non-use of force,
consensus-based decision making and informal diplomacy are still the norms in regional
politics.
Due  to  the  informal  and  non-binding  nature  of  the  ASEAN Way,  there  is  a  strong
disinclination against legalistic, rule-based regionalism57, as most of the regional actors
are loath to commit themselves to binding treaties, which they might find inconvenient
and/or meddlesome later on. Also, committing oneself to a legally binding treaties, the
50 Beeson (2007) pp. 219, Guan (2004) pp. 73 – 74, Koga (2010a) pp. 81 – 82, Stubbs (2014) p. 534, 
Weissmann (2012) pp. 33 – 34 and Yahuda (2011) p. 213.
51 http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/history/
52 Koga (2010a) p. 82, Narine (2012) pp. 157 – 160,  Weissmann (2012) pp. 32 – 33.
53 Koga (2010a) pp. 81 – 82.
54 Weissmann (2012) pp. 33 – 34.
55 For more detailed information on the ASEAN Charter, see ASEAN Secretariat (2007).
56 Koga (2010b) p. 13.
57 Söderbaum (2012) p. 19.
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actors would inevitably breach the principle of non-interference as legal treaties entail
both  some form of  surveillance  or  monitoring  and a  system of  enforcement  to  see
through  that  the  actors  stick  to  the  rules.  As  a  consequence  all  of  the  regional
organizations  have  relatively  weak  mandates  when  compared  to,  for  example,  the
European Union, which yields considerable supra-national power over its constituent
nations.58 Even regional forums such as ASEAN+3 (APT), East Asian Caucus (EAC)
and Asian Regional Forum (ARF), which are the pinnacles of East Asian regionalism,
remain only as forums to initiate and facilitate dialogue within the region.
All this has severe implications for future East Asian regionalism and cooperation: it
will  most  likely  be  founded  on  informal  policy  dialogue,  will  be  incremental  and
minimalist in nature and preferably will work its way from bottom to top, meaning that
private actors, not state, are likely to take the lead in early stages.59
Perhaps the most important implication for regional currency cooperation, that can be
drawn from the ASEAN Way and practical experience, is that implementing surveillance
and enforcement in the region is extremely hard. This is due to a variety of reasons. To
begin with, there is the principle of non-interference; it is unlikely that the actors are
willing to hand over sensitive information about their economic and financial systems
over to other actors or even to a dis-interested third party.60 This could be potentially
overcome, if the actors themselves did the job of gathering the relevant data, analyzing it
and making it public to other actors. But this, too, is unlikely to happen: even if the
actors could be persuaded to monitor themselves and keep others informed, there would
be no guarantees that their data is valid as standards and implementation capacities vary
depending on the country and due to lack of transparency there would be no way to
verify whether the data has been distorted or not.61 Another option is the creation of a
dis-interested  third  party,  a  regional  organization  specializing  in  surveillance  and
monitoring  –  something  that  ASEAN  Macroeconomic  Research  Office  (AMRO),
established in 2011, is trying to accomplish.62
If surveillance is hard,  then enforcement is even harder to implement,  as this would
again entail the creation of a supra-national entity that has power over regional states to
either force them to comply or to give them sanctions in case of non-compliance. And
58 Guan (2004) p. 79 and Söderbaum (2012) p. 19.
59 Liu (2003) pp. 20 – 22.
60 Jung (2009) pp. 383
61 Ibid. pp. 394 – 395.
62 For a more detailed account of AMRO's mandate, see AMRO's homepage at http://www.amro-
asia.org/what-we-do/ (Accessed on 25th of January, 2016).
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given the governance culture in East Asia, or the ASEAN Way', it is very unlikely that
the regional actors are willing to cede national power over to a supra-national institution
or organization. And even if they did, there might be a heavy incentive not to punish
wrongdoers as this could have negative repercussions in other fields of cooperation.63
A good example of just how hard surveillance and enforcement are to implement in the
region can be witnessed in the creation of CMI and in its later upgrade into CMIM.
Originally, the inherent moral hazard problems of a BSA network were by-passed by
linking the BSAs to IMF conditionality.64 The participants could only tap up to 10% of
their quota before they would have to sign up to IMF conditionalities to receive more
liquidity.65 At the time this was seen as an expedient mean, since the participants were
unable to agree among themselves on how to carry out surveillance and monitoring to
prevent moral hazard problems.66
The threshold was upgraded only to 20% when CMI was upgraded into CMIM and was
retained  at  20%  even  after  the  creation  of  AMRO67 in  2011,  which  should  have
supposedly  addressed  at  least  some  surveillance  and  monitoring  problems  and,  by
extension, moral hazard problems inherent to CMIM.68
Although AMRO was established in 2011, the question of how to turn it into a credible
regional surveillance institution remains open to this day: whose criteria will be used in
assessing  data  and  compiling  reports,  how  will  the  organization's  impartiality  and
independence be guaranteed and that its research is of the highest quality.69 All this goes
to underline just how entrenched the principles of the ASEAN Way and the norms it
engenders are in the region.
2.2.3. Sino-Japanese Rivalry
A central theme in all discussion on East Asian regionalism and regional leadership is
the  Sino-Japanese  rivalry  and how it  affects  regional  cooperation  all  the  way from
regional security cooperation (high politics) to economic cooperation (low politics).70
63 Jung (2009) pp. 394 – 395.
64 Amyx (2005) pp. 6 -7, Grimes (2009) pp. 85 – 87 and Henning (2009) pp. 2 – 4.
65 Ciorciari (2011) pp. 941 – 944, Dent (2008) pp. 156 – 161, Grimes (2009) pp. 82 – 94 and Kim & 
Yang (2011) pp. 577 – 578.
66 Grimes (2009) pp. 85 – 89.
67 Ciorciari (2011) pp. 941 – 944, Dent (2008) pp. 156 – 161, Grimes (2009) pp. 82 – 94 and Kim & 
Yang (2011) pp. 577 – 578.
68 Ciorciari (2011) pp. 941 – 944, Grimes (2011) pp. 299 – 302 and Kim & Yang (2011) pp. 577 – 578.
69 Ciorcari, (2011) pp. 951 – 952  and Grimes (2011) pp. 298 - 299.
70 Beeson (2007) pp. 232 – 236, Dent (2012) p. 264, Dieter (2006) pp. 50 – 53, Grimes (2009) pp. 68 
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The main components of this rivalry are unresolved historical differences (i.e. the legacy
of WWII) and great power politics.71The main theater for this rivalry is undoubtedly the
geopolitical dimension, or security regionalism, but the spillovers from security issues
can potentially also affect financial and monetary regionalism.
According  to  Grimes  in  order  for  any  regional  initiative  to  be  more  than  modestly
successful it requires robust leadership. And, to be a bit more specific only two countries
in the region, Japan and China, have the capacities and means to provide the needed
public goods and leadership to carry through the more ambitious regional projects in the
financial and monetary domain. Although it is possible for the smaller states to take the
initiative and even the leading role on single ad hoc issues, for any region-wide project
such as the creation of a regional exchange rate regime to be successful, the participation
and at least partial consensus between the two regional major powers is a requirement.72
As things stand, all ambitious regional financial and/or monetary initiatives have to be
shelved until either of the two major powers manages to gain an upper hand or they
manage to reconcile their differences. This does not, of course, mean that all cooperation
in the region is impossible: rather, there are just very strict limitations to it.
This neorealist reading of the Sino-Japanese rivalry and its effect on East Asian financial
and monetary regionalism in general has two major implications for future cooperation: 
1) Neither of the two countries, China and Japan, are likely to cede any power to the
other in regional financial and/or monetary cooperation initiatives.73 Furthermore, they
will not join an initiative or organization that does not grant them the ability to veto
major decisions that might go against their national interests and, thus, they prefer weak
institutions where meaningful progress can be made if and only if  they manage to reach
a consensus between themselves.74 As neither cannot grasp the preeminent position, the
system is left without definite leadership.
2) Neither of them are willing to commit themselves into an arrangement that might
effectively curb their macroeconomic policymaking room.75 This argument can be made
from a neorealist position, as  Grimes does, by arguing that they do not wish to commit
themselves into arrangements that they might later on find unfavorable.76 On the other
-70 and Hughes (2008) pp. 37 – 40.
71 Dent (2008) pp. 172 – 176, Grimes (2009) p. 8, Higgott (2006) pp. 93 – 98. and Hughes (2008) pp. 37
– 47.
72 Grimes (2009) pp. 102 – 103 and 206 – 207.
73 Grimes (2009) pp. 26 – 30 and Hassdorf (2011) pp. 130 – 133.
74 Grimes (2011) p. 298 Hassdorf (2011) pp. 130 – 133.
75 Hassdorf (2011) p. 135.
76 Grimes (2009) pp. 155 – 158.
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hand,  it  can  be  alternatively  made  from  a  liberal  intergovernmentalist  position  as
Hassdorf  does.  The  only  difference  is  that  according  to  the  neorealist  reading  the
participants are unwilling to commit themselves if they are not sure that the arrangement
benefits them later on or if it  contradicts their national interests. Seen from a liberal
intergovernmentalist  perspective  it  is  more  about  incompatibility  between  the  two
participants financial and economic models that might lead to solutions that satisfy only
one participant – or a compromise that satisfies neither participant.77
The same rules apply to regional exchange rate cooperation. Neither Japan nor China are
likely to commit themselves into serious exchange rate arrangements as there is  the
possibility that the other party is capable of imposing its policy preferences on the other.
Thus, they would be willing to commit themselves only into a regional exchange rate
regime that is institutionally weak and ineffective. The guiding line for both China and
Japan in seeking a regional exchange rate arrangement is to secure the highest possible
degree of domestic policy autonomy while at the same time promoting their domestic
currency as a regional anchor currency over their rival's currency.78
2.2.4. The changing dynamics of Sino-Japanese rivalry
Both China's and Japan's quest for regional leadership (and, thus, quest for a position of
power)  do  not  take  place  in  a  static  setting:  the  capacities  of  both  contenders  are
dynamically changing relative to each other over time. This change and how predictions
over it shape the contenders motives and strategies have been well captured by William
Grimes.
When Grimes' work was published in 2009 Japan still held the preeminent position in
financial and monetary terms despite its perpetual economical downturn that began with
the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s; it is the richest and and most
technologically  advanced  economy  in  East  Asia,  has  the  deepest  and  most  reliable
financial markets in the region and its financial institutions have substantially penetrated
the region. From the perspective of foreign policy Japan holds a unique position as a
balancer: it is the closest ally of the US in the region with decades of experience in
participating in global financial and economic regimes.79
The main motivation for Japan to  take an active position,  or  exercise leadership,  in
77 Hassdorf (2011) pp. 133 – 137.
78 Hassdorf (2011) pp. 136 – 137.
79 Grimes (2009) pp. 7 – 8.
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regional currency cooperation and exchange rate regime formation comes from simple
power  considerations:  it  is  highly  advisable  to  lock  China  into  mutually  established
formal institutions before China gains the material capacities and means to dictate the
form of future regional projects to its liking.80 Though it seems Japan has missed its best
chance to forge regional financial or monetary projects to best suit her interests there is
still a good deal of damage limitation to be done. The beginning of the 21st century may
be  final  chance  for  Japan  to  establish  regional  arrangements  that  will  benefit  it
politically  and economically  in  the  face  of  the  changing global  and  regional  power
structure.
The other aspect of Japan's stance towards regional currency cooperation and exchange
rate formation is the troublesome Japan-US relationship. Since the Japanese economy is
heavily dependent on its exports to US markets it has for quite a long time been deeply
affected by dollar politics; the exposure of Japanese economy to US policy vagaries
gives the Japanese leaders a serious incentive to reduce their economy's exposure to
dollar politics and hedge against it by implementing regional mechanisms for currency
cooperation  or  even  an  exchange  rate  regime.  On  the  other  hand,  Japan  is  heavily
dependent on the US-Japan military alliance and overtly defying its  strategic partner
runs the risk of causing a rupture in security policy.81
While Japan's star is waning, China's star is waxing. Though the inevitable ascension of
China into the preeminent regional leader is a foregone conclusion, for the time being it
seems that China's economic, financial and strategic influence over regional matters will
keep  on  accumulating  in  the  absence  of  some  unforeseen  crisis.82 However,  from
financial and monetary point of view China is still  considerably less developed than
Japan: its financial markets are lacking in depth and quality, from international investors
point of view Chinese style of governance is lacking multiple aspects and the Chinese
markets are as of yet still underdeveloped.83 It will still take a considerable amount of
time, a decade or more, before China will have financial markets that begin to compare
with Japanese financial markets in terms of quality and quantity.84
While  there  are  enormous  benefits  China  could  reap  by  asserting  her  will  more
aggressively the Chinese leaders have so far been reticent to do so and have instead
chosen to bide their time as it is not yet clear what kind of framework would be most
80 Grimes (2009) pp. 26 – 30.
81 Grimes (2009) pp. 26 – 30 and 155 – 156.
82 Grimes (2009) pp. 26 – 30, Subramanian (2011) and Yu (2007) pp. 62 – 64.
83 Eichengreen (2015) and Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 10 -14.
84 Grimes (2009) pp. 156 – 158 and Huang, Wang & Fan (2011) pp. 24 – 26.
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beneficial for the Chinese economy and their ability to dictate the terms of framework
will only get better over time assuming the Chinese economy keeps on growing without
some serious crisis.85
The US-China relationship, on the other hand, would be best described as a “relationship
of financial balance of terror” as the former US Treasury secretary called it.86 While the
Chinese exporting economy is heavily oriented towards US markets87, it is at the same
time the biggest foreign financier of US current account deficits.88 Consequently China
has  accumulated  vast  dollar  nominated  foreign  reserves,  most  notably  US Treasury
bonds.89 The implications of this are twofold: a large drop in the value of the US dollar
would decimate a large portion of China's foreign reserves and a large-scale sell-off of
US Treasury bonds be the Chinese government destabilize the US dollar, which would
in the worst case scenario lead to a global financial and economic nuclear meltdown.90
What  is  missing  from  Grimes'  analysis  is  the  internationalization  process  of  the
Renminbi started in 2012.
As for the other regional actors (the ASEAN nations and South Korea), when means and
capacities are concerned, they are not equipped to provide the leadership and the public
goods  regional  currency  cooperation  and  exchange  regime  formation  requires.  True,
they are capable of propagating new ideas thus influencing the other states' decisions
and  through  other  political  strategies  such  as  forming  political  coalitions  they  are
capable to exercise influence over regional politics.91
The ASEAN nations and South Korea are in a position similar to Japan's: there is a lot of
contingency and uncertainty concerning the impending China's  ascension to regional
preeminence.  They,  too,  would  benefit  from locking China  (and Japan,  too)  into  an
institutionalized framework both financially and monetarily.92
2.3. Summary of the Premises for This Study
When  the  theoretical  basis  and  historical  backgrounds  of  East  Asian  financial  and
85 Grimes (2009) pp. 5 -7.
86 Quoted in Grimes (2009) p. 29.
87 Bloomberg News (2015).
88 Patton (2014) and US Department of the Treasury. US Department of the Treasury data available 
from: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticsec2.aspx
89 Grimes (2009) pp. 156 – 158, Kawai (2008) pp. 95 – 96 and Yoshitomi (2007) pp. 32 – 33.
90 Grimes (2009) pp. 156 – 158, Kawai (2008) pp. 95 – 96 and Yoshitomi (2007) pp. 32 – 33.
91 Grimes (2009) pp. 26 – 30 and 206 – 207.
92 Grimes (2009) pp. 5 -7.
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monetary regionalism are combined, we obtain a set of premises that will be applied
later on this study.
First, as this study is founded on a neorealistic approach, it is expected that the East
Asian nations' actions are motivated by self-interest and they will try to further their
national interest the best they can. This applies just as well to the field of currency and
exchange rate  cooperation.  In  order  to  do  so,  they  will  use the  strategies  presented
earlier: commitment, hedging and leverage. On a monetary system level they have a
further set of approaches: currency manipulation, monetary dependence and systemic
disruption. The ultimate form of power in international currency affairs comes in the
form  of  systemic  power  when  one's  national  currency  has  been  successfully
internationalized  and  holds  a  significant  global  or  regional  position.  However,  as
Henning pointed out, it is important to discern between the effects of systemic power
and the actors'  preference formation.  In  effect  this  means that  an analysis  of  actors'
preferences must precede an analysis of whether systemic power is shaping other actors'
actions. 
Second, the experiences of AFC and the more recent GFC will shape future regional
financial  and monetary  cooperation  in  East  Asia.  Whereas  AFC acted  as  centripetal
crisis,  which  drew all  of  the  regional  nations  together  seeking regional  solutions  to
global challenges, GFC had the opposite, centrifugal, effect where the regional actors
sought to answer new global challenges by national strategies. It would be too much to
say that the later crisis undid all the gains made in East Asian financial and monetary
regionalism sparked by the earlier AFC, but it did bring a new tendency into it.
The hard learned lessons of AFC still form the basis of collective action in East Asian
financial and monetary regionalism. The drive toward national (and regional) insulation
against  external  financial  and  monetary  disturbances  forms  the  hard  core  of  it.  The
experience of AFC, thus, creates a basis for region vs. global styled initiatives and even
opportunities for acts of regional leadership.
The main effect of GFC has been to propel China into a singular trajectory that is partly
decoupled from that  of  the rest  of  the  region.  In  other  words,  the other  East  Asian
nations might still prefer to seek solutions along the regional/global divide while China
will seek them along a national/global line. The trend has recently manifested itself in
many conspicuous forms: the proceeding internationalization RMB, RMB's inclusion
into the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket, the development of local financial
markets etc. Yet it bears to keep in mind that China is still a part of East Asia and the
effects of GFC have not canceled the legacy of AFC even in China.
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Third,  due  to  the  legacy of  the  'ASEAN Way',  solutions  entailing  a  formation  of  a
regional  organization  or  a  body  with  more  than  consultative  status  are  unlikely  to
proceed as this would run contrary to the regional tendencies of non-interference and
loath to delegate power to supra-national institutes. This is especially problematic to
currency and exchange rate cooperation since surveillance and enforcement problems
need to be tackled if the cooperation is to exceed that of policy discussion and dialogue.
Note, though, that surveillance and policy discussion are more likely to succeed than
enforcement as the actors might be reticent to join an institution/organization that has a
strong mandate and a say in the internal affairs of the participants. Furthermore, the
institution/organization might be a lame one as there might be heavy incentives not to
punish its members to just keep the organization up and running.
Fourth,  as  long as  Sino-Japanese rivalry  is  alive  and kicking,  ambitious,  large-scale
initiatives are unlikely to proceed. The rivalry sets strict limits to what kinds of modes
and acts of leadership are possible in the region: neither of them are at the moment able
to grasp a definitive position of leadership but are able to effectively nullify the other's
attempts at  leadership.  They will  both try to lure the other to commit herself  into a
system that is  favorable to them and at  the same time will  refrain from committing
themselves into an initiative that might hand their opponent power. As long as the rivalry
lasts or either of the participants manages to gain an upper hand, cooperation initiatives
are likely to be weak and loose with both major powers retaining some form of veto
option.
Fifth, the balance of power is set to change over time and the expectations of the actors
will affect the actions they take now. In this context the most important expectation is
that China will rise to become first a regional economic and financial superpower and
eventually  a  global  economic  and  financial  superpower.  At  the  same  time  Japan's
fortunes are set to decline as her population will decrease and the leaders seem to be
unable to extricate Japan from the decades long stagnation.  In this  sense time is  on
China's side, but China's swift ascension into regional economic and financial position
of power might still be a premature conclusion: the recent troubles in China's domestics
stock  markets  and  the  economy's  slowdown serve  as  a  good  reminder  that  China's
transformation from an industrial powerhouse to an advanced economy is a long and
arduous  path.  Moreover,  it  is  still  unclear  what  kind  of  regional  framework  (or
organizations and institutions) would suit China's interests the best.
Sixth, Japan is still the financial major power in East Asia and it is in her interests to
lock China into mutually established formal institutions before China gains the material
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capacities and means to dictate the form of future regional projects to her liking – the
sooner, the better. 
At  the  same time Japan's  'special  relationship'  with  US complicates  matters  for  the
Japanese  leaders:  going completely against  US wishes  is  not  an  option due to  their
geopolitical relationship. This means that Japan cannot play hardball with US even in
financial and monetary matters.
Seventh, other regional nations, too, would benefit enormously from binding China into
formal  institutions  as  they  would  reduce  uncertainty  and  contingency  over  China's
impending ascension.
Eighth, all nations in the region would benefit from discussions on how to deal with the
unwinding of foreign exchange reserve positions – especially dollar positions.
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3. Currency Internationalization
Before delving into the actual subject matter of this thesis, the internationalization of
Renminbi, this chapter will present the theory of currency internationalization. It will
serve as a theoretical framework, which will be used in the following chapter to analyze
the motivations and prospects of RMB's internationalization.
3.1. Defining International Currencies
Technically  speaking,  an international  currency is  a  currency that  is  used as  money
outside of the country (or monetary union, as is the case with the Euro) where it is
issued.  Such  a  currency  is  used  in  invoicing  exported  and/or  imported  goods  and
services and in denominating financial instruments traded in global financial markets.93
There exists a standard taxonomy for an international currency, which assigns a total of
six roles consisting of the variations derived from three functions and two levels that an
international currency may have. The functions are the three basic functions of money: a
medium of exchange, unit  of account and store of value.  The levels are private and
public (or private and official, depending on the author). The three roles an international
currency has for private side are foreign exchange trading (medium of exchange), trade
invoicing (unit of account) and investment (store of value). For the public/official side
the three roles are  intervention (medium of exchange),  anchor (unit  of account) and
reserve (store of value).94
Among the currencies that fulfill the above criteria, i.e. currencies that are international,
there exists a hierarchy. A taxonomy of that hierarchy, as presented by Benjamin Cohen
is used in this study.
Writing from the political economic perspective Benjamin Cohen divides international
currencies into three different classes: Top Currencies, Patrician Currencies and Elite
Currencies. A top currency is best exemplified in the post-WWII US dollar or pre-WWI
British pound; it is an international currency which performs all of the six roles on a
global scale and, usually, holds a dominant position in international finance and trade.
The Patrician Currencies, too, are full-bodied international currencies fulfilling all of the
six roles, but are not used as widely and as often as Top Currencies. More importantly,
93 Chey (2012) p. 52, Kenen (2009) p. 9 and Park & Shin (2009) p. 181. 
94 Chey (2012) p. 53 and Cohen (2011) pp. 9 – 10.
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Patrician Currencies are typically used mostly in financial markets or trade invoicing.
The Euro is a prime example of a Patrician Currency – as is the Japanese yen despite of
its recent loss of popularity. Below the Patrician currencies there are Elite Currencies,
which can be described as minor international currencies with sufficient attractiveness to
qualify for some cross-border usage, but in a lesser or more limited scope than Patrician
Currencies. Good examples of Elite Currencies are currencies such as the Swiss franc
and Australian dollar among others.95
3.2. The Benefits and Costs of an International Currency
There are benefits and costs associated to having a national currency (or the monetary
union's currency) internationalized. Moreover, these benefits and costs can be viewed
from two complementary perspectives: that of 'purely' economical perspective and that
of political economy perspective. The former emphasizes mainly the technical benefits
and  costs  associated  to  currency  internationalization  whereas  the  latter  stresses  the
importance  of  power  in  assessing  the  benefits  and  costs  of  currency
internationalization.96
First  the  'purely'  economical  aspect  of  the  accruing  benefits  of  having  an
internationalized currency. The most tangible, if not the largest, benefit for having an
internationalized  currency  comes  from  the  elimination  of  exchange  rate  risks.  The
issuing  country's  exporters  and  importers  are  likely  to  be  able  to  denominate  their
invoices  in  their  own  currency  thus  effectively  eliminating  the  exchange  rate  risks
involved in international trade of goods and services. They are also able to borrow more
cheaply and on a larger scale from the international financial markets. The removal of
exchange rate  risks  also  opens possibilities  for  expanding markets  and seeking new
sources of profit.97
For the banking and financial sector, too, there are considerable benefits to having their
national currency internationalized. The banking sector of the international currency's
home country enjoys a privileged access to its central bank, granting them a distinctive
competitive advantage over other countries' banks as they are able to create monetary
liabilities denominated in their own national currency with relative ease. The financial
95 Cohen (2011) pp. 10 -11.
96 Chey (2012) pp. 54 – 58, Cohen (2011) pp. 4 – 9 and Kenen (2009) p. 14.
97 Chey (2012) pp. 54 – 55, Cohen (2011) pp. 4 – 8, Kenen (2009) pp. 13 – 14 and Park & Shin (2009) 
pp. 183 – 184.
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sector enjoys similar benefits as the domestic firms do: they are able to borrow more
cheaply and on a larger scale than domestic markets would otherwise allow. In addition
the  adaptation  of  their  national  currency  as  an  international  currency  creates  new
potential profit opportunities. The ability to borrow in one's own national currency also
removes the problem of currency mismatches. A larger and more profitable financial
sector may better serve the issuing country's non-financial sector by reducing the cost of
capital and widening the base of financial institutions providing that capital.98
Another benefit  for the private sector is that of seigniorage99.  Both Cohen and Chey
agree, that the interest savings of the US government – the issuer of The International
Currency, the US dollar - gains through seigniorage are relatively insignificant (some
$18 billion in 2006, for example, amounting to 0,1% of GDP).100 However, unlike Chey,
Cohen also estimates that through the increase of effective demand for assets due to
foreign  accumulations  of  financial  claims  denominated  in  the  home money  the  US
Federal government and other domestic borrowers made annual savings amounting to
some one to three percent of GDP.101 As desirable as this all sounds, there is a serious
caveat  to  it:  as  Park and Shin  remark,  the  seigniorage  benefits  are  in  proportion  to
multiple factors such as the size of the issuing country's economy, inflation rate, the size
of  the  relevant  financial  center  etc.,  meaning  that  at  least  emerging  economies  are
unlikely  to  reap  seigniorage  benefits  even  if  they  managed  to  internationalize  their
currencies.102
The  public  sector,  or  the  government,  too,  shares  in  the  benefits  from  having  an
international  currency.  Most  of  these  benefits  come  in  the  form of  macroeconomic
flexibility.  A country  with  fully  internationalized  currency  is  able  to  evade  market
discipline as it is capable to finance payments deficits and finance large budget deficits
with its  own money.  This  translates  into a broader  leeway for the policy makers  to
pursue  public  spending  objectives.  Additionally  a  country  may  deem  its  currency's
internationalization  to  be  a  necessary  part  of  creating  a  financial  center  within  its
98 Chey (2012) pp. 54 – 55, Cohen (2011) pp. 4 – 8, Kenen (2009) pp. 13 – 14 and Park & Shin (2009) 
pp. 183 – 184.
99 “Technically defined as the excess of the nominal value of a currency over its cost of production, 
seigniorage at the international level is generated whenever foreigners acquire some amount of 
domestic money in exchange for traded goods and services. Cross-border accumulations represent an 
implicit economic transfer that constitutes a real-resource gain for the economy as a whole.” Cohen 
(2012) p. 5.
100 Chey (2012) p. 54 and Cohen (2011) p. 5.
101 Cohen (2011) pp. 5 – 6.
102 Park & Shin (2009) p. 184.
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territory.103
Internationalizing one's currency does not come without costs, though. Broadly speaking
the  potential  costs  can  be  classified  into  four  different  categories:  the  inherent
constraints  that  come with currency internationalization,  external problems, domestic
problems and IPE problems. Although such a categorization is possible, it  should be
noted that all of the costs (and benefits) are inter-linked, so what is labeled as external
problem can – and does – have domestic consequences and vice versa.
Currency internationalization comes with two inherent paradoxes: the impossible trinity
(Fleming-Mundell model)  and Triffin dilemma.  The impossible trinity, or trilemma,
dictates that a country can have only two of the following three policies: fixed exchange
rate, free capital movement and an independent monetary policy. If a country is to aspire
the internationalization of its currency it will have to give up both fixed exchange rates
and  an  independent  monetary  policy  as  they  are  simultaneously  incompatible  with
currency internationalization. At the same time the country will be facing what is called
the Triffin dilemma: the country with the top international currency has to supply the
world economy with its currency to lubricate world trade and growth – i.e. it has to run a
deficit. In the long run this might expose the currency to confidence erosion.104
The external  effect  of  currency internationalization  is  mainly  manifested  in  extreme
exchange  rate  volatility.  Depending  on  the  case  the  currency's  exchange  rate  may
appreciate unduly or it may go through a process of rapid depreciation – both of which
are  undesirable  results.  As  an  internationalized  currency  can  come  under  increased
foreign demand when then currency gains popularity, it is liable to appreciate beyond
what the issuing country's domestic economy warrants. On the other hand, the currency
may suffer a precipitous depreciation if international holders of the currency come to
believe  the  issuing country's  assets  may fall  sharply.  The fear  of  sudden US dollar
depreciation was behind all the anxiety about the global imbalances issue.105
On  the  domestic  level  having  an  internationalized  currency  poses  some  serious
conundrums to the policy makers. Much of the chagrin stems from the effect that having
an international currency has on the stability of demand for money, making the setting of
appropriate  target  growth rate for the monetary supply tricky. Moreover,  even if  the
exchange rate  volatility  is  not  as  extreme as  presented  above,  even  a   more  subtle
103 Chey (2012) pp. 54 – 55, Cohen (2011) pp. 4 – 8, Kenen (2009) pp. 13 – 14 and Park & Shin (2009) 
pp. 183 – 184.
104 Chey (2012) pp. 55 – 56, Cohen (2011) p. 15 and Kenen (2009) pp. 14 – 16.
105 Cohen (2011) p. 15.
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volatility will complicate finding the appropriate level for policy interest rates.106
However,  as  Park  and  Shin  point  out,  the  monetary  authorities  dilemmas  may  not
directly stem from having their national currency internationalized, since the problem is
more generally linked to capital account liberalization which is considered a prerequisite
for full internationalization of a currency. In this sense it is not the status of the currency
that causes the problems, but the liberalization of the capital account that precedes it.107
The last implication for domestic effects of having an internationalized currency is that
as the country's residents hold foreign debt and foreigners hold the country's domestic
debt in foreign markets,  the situation may lead to exacerbated volatility in domestic
interest  rates  and  in  the  exchange  rate  when  global  markets  are  beset  by  a  major
financial crash or there is financial turmoil in a country that has a central role in the
global financial system.108
When it comes to the costs of internationalizing a currency the political economic view
has little to offer. Obviously the aforementioned external constraints can compromise the
issuing country's macroeconomic flexibility gains, which in turn translates into losses in
autonomy and, hence, in influence. In a sense, then, the macroeconomic flexibility gains
and costs are a game of give and take in a state of constant flux.109 Perhaps the greatest
cost for having a Top Currency comes in the form of responsibility; along with great
power come great responsibilities and a country with a Top Currency is liable to find
itself in a position where it has to provide public goods to the global economy as well as
exercise leadership uphold the system.
Much of the literature on international currencies tends to suppress the different roles the
varying international  currencies hold and assumes that  the dynamics of international
currencies are static over time. These 'misconceptions', as Benjamin Cohen calls them,
lead  to  a  skewed  assessment  of  the  potential  benefits  and  costs  of  currency
internationalization.110
At the moment there is only one Top Currency, the US dollar, that enjoys all of the
potential benefits mentioned above and, consequently, is exposed to all of the potential
risks. The rest of the currencies hold either a limited amount of roles presented at the
beginning of this section or hold all of the roles only within a limited geographical area.
106 Chey (2012) pp. 54 – 55, Cohen (2011) pp. 8 – 9, Genberg (2009) pp. 2 -3, Kenen (2009) pp. 14 – 16 
and Park & Shin (2009) pp. 184 – 185.
107 Park & Shin (2009) pp. 185 – 186.
108 Kenen (2009) pp. 14 – 16.
109 Cohen (2011) pp. 8 – 9.
110 Chey (2012) pp. 57 – 58 and Cohen (2011) pp. 9 – 13.
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For example the Euro and and Japanese Yen, both Patrician Currencies, hold all of the
six  roles,  but  mostly  in  their  home region  and  even  then  on  a  limited  scale  when
compared  to  the  US  dollar.  Other  internationalized  currencies  hold  only  a  limited
amount  of  the  six  possible  roles  and  in  even  more  limited  scale  than  the  Patrician
Currencies.
Only a Top Currency is able to reap the full benefits of currency internationalization.
This  owes  mostly  to  two  factors:  it  performs  all  of  the  roles  an  internationalized
currency can have and does so on a large scale. Even though other currencies, too, are
used  as  store-of-value  currencies,  only  a  top  currency  has  such  volume  that  its
seigniorage gains reach a noteworthy level. Furthermore, as it is a widely held reserve
currency, it grants the issuer a considerable leverage as many foreign banks hold it in
their foreign reserves. A Patrician Currency may gain a resembling position of leverage
but at a regional level at best. Elite Currencies, on the other hand, are unlikely to gain
any kind of significant leverage as they are mostly used as financial market currencies
and even at the best of times form only a very small portion of global currency reserves.
Of course international currencies of all tiers are used to some degree in denominating
trade invoices and in financial transactions and as such generate benefits to their issuers
in proportion to their usage. With the Elite Currencies it is the private sector that is more
likely to benefit from the international status of their  home currency than the public
side.111
The benefits and costs of an international currency are dynamic and will change over
time. The benefits of currency internationalization are likely to accrue in the beginning
as the currency gains international popularity. However, over time the costs of having an
international  currency  start  to  pile  up.  At  some  point  the  growth  of  the  currency's
overseas circulation will reach a point at which its confidence will come under question.
At  that  point  the  issuing  country  may  be  forced  to  raise  interest  rates  to  raise  the
attractiveness of her currency. Unfortunately depending on the size of the hike it may
decimate all of the seigniorage gains or even turn them negative. In the long run the
decreasing benefits and increasing costs will erode the macroeconomic flexibility and
leverage position of the issuing country possibly setting up the stage for the rise of a
new Top Currency.112
111 Cohen (2011) pp. 9 – 13.
112 Chey (2012) pp. 56 – 57 and Cohen (2011) pp. 12 – 13.
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3.3. Requirements for Currency Internationalization and Sequencing
Having examined the benefits and costs of having one's currency internationalized, it is
time to consider the actual requirements for internationalizing a currency.  There is some
discrepancy over the exact details of what currency internationalization requires from
the  issuer  of  that  currency,  but  a  rough  consensus  exists.  The  requirements  can  be
divided into two broad categories: technical requirements and political requirements.
The technical  requirements  for  currency internationalization  center  around economic
and  financial  institutions  and  conditions  that  the  issuing  country  has.  The  first  and
foremost  requirement  is  that  there  are  no  restrictions  on  international  financial
transactions; domestic residents and foreigners alike can make transactions freely in the
said  currency.  Implicitly  this  means  that  the  country  aspiring  to  internationalize  its
currency has to achieve capital account convertibility113 – if not full convertibility, then
at least a substantial degree of freedom for capital account transactions.114
Achieving  full  capital  account  convertibility  and  the  abolition  of  restrictions  on
international financial transactions in one's currency alone, however, are not enough to
make the currency ready to be internationalized. In addition they have to be backed by
well-developed  domestic  financial  markets  which  are  able  to  provide  liquidity  to
domestic as well as foreign investors who hold their international money mostly in the
form of liquid, interest-bearing assets. Well-developed domestic markets in the issuing
country are also needed to provide a large variety of financial instruments for hedging
against currency and credit risks.115
Bordering between technical and political categories is the requirement that the issuing
country has a large transactional network with a large volume of goods, services and
financial assets denominated in its home currency.116
Situated  on the other  side of  the  demarcation  between technical  and political  is  the
issuing country's  credibility – especially  confidence in  the stability  of the currency's
value. In effect this means that the country needs to have sound financial and monetary
policies preferably backed up by central bank autonomy. What makes this a political
113 “The ease with which a country's currency can be converted into gold or another currency.” From 
Investopedia. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/convertibility.asp#ixzz3qLVG6LMW 
114 Genberg (2009) pp. 5 – 6, Kenen (2009) pp. 10 – 12 and Park & Shin (2009) pp. 181 – 183.
115 Chey (2012) pp. 58 – 60, Genberg (2009) pp. 5 -6, Kenen (2009) pp. 10 - 12 and Shin & Park (2009)  
pp. 181 – 183.
116 Chey (2012) pp. 58 – 60 and Park & Shin (2009) pp. 181 – 183.
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requirement  is  the  fact  that  credibility  is  a  rather  contingent  thing;  though  the
conventional wisdom has it that central bank's independence is an integral part of the
requirements for currency internationalization, in the end it is the investors who decide
what  is  credible  and  what  is  not.  Apart  from credibility  considerations,  the  issuing
country needs also to have economic and financial clout to have the other participants
accept the denomination of bilateral trade in its currency.117
Lastly, there are the geopolitical considerations. Though mainstream economists tend to
dismiss  the effect  that  geopolitics  have on currency internationalization,  they are an
integral  part  of  the  politics  of  international  currencies.  The  successful
internationalization of a given currency is not solely dependent on the global market
forces.  The  acceptance  of  other  governments,  too,  is  required.118 Even  though  the
prerequisites  for  currency  internationalization  for  the  private  sector  are  met,  other
governments  may  choose  to  hinder  or  impede  the  internationalization  of  another
country's  currency  out  of  geopolitical  motivations.  In  this  case  non-action,  or  not
endorsing  the  other  country's  currency's  internationalization,  can  be  constituted  as  a
strategic decision.
Apart from the prerequisites mentioned above there are other, more systemic, factors
that  may  stand in  the  way of  internationalizing  a  currency.  These  obstacles  are  the
incumbent internationalized currencies (especially the Top Currencies) and the fact that
there might not be any demand for a new international currency.119
The  experts  are  somewhat  divided  when  it  comes  to  incumbency  and  the  benefits
derived fro network externalities that Top Currencies enjoy. According to Chey and Park
& Shin Top Currencies give birth to  inertia and path dependency in choice of what
currencies other countries prefer to use. In other words, the dominant position creates
benefits in the form of incumbency. The cost of transition from one Top Currency to
another creates inertia so that a Top Currency will retain its position beyond what its
economic and financial situation would warrant.120
On the other hand Hans Genberg argues that “we might very well be entering an era
where  several  international  and  regional  currencies  will  subsist  as  transaction  costs
decline  due  to  improved  trading  platforms  and  payment  infrastructures.”121 He
furthermore questions whether it is still even possible attain a position enjoyed by the
117 Chey (2012) pp. 58 – 60 and Park & Shin (2009) pp. 181 – 183.
118 Chey (2012) pp. 58 – 60.
119 Kenen (2009) pp. 17 – 18, Genberg (2009) pp. 6 – 8 and Park & Shin (2009) pp. 189 – 190.
120 Chey (2012) p. 58 and Park & Shin (2009) p. 183.
121 Genberg (2009) p. 8.
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US dollar since WW II as the Bretton Woods system created after the war was based on
a system where the US government had the freedom to set its monetary policies as it
saw fit for internal demands while the other countries just had to adjust their policies and
exchange rates pegs. The unique system gave rise to the US dollar as the Top Currency –
something  that,  in  Genberg's  opinion,  is  unlikely  to  be  repeated  in  the  current
situation.122
Finally,  even  if  all  of  the  technical  and  political  requirements  are  attained  and  the
country's policies are geared towards the internationalization of its currency, there is no
guarantee that the currency will in fact become a fully internationalized currency à la US
dollar. The Japanese government's failed efforts to internationalize the Japanese yen in
late 1990s and early 2000s serve as a good reminder.
Even  if  the  policy-makers  of  a  given  country  decide  to  proceed  with  the
internationalization of their national currency after making the cost/benefit analysis they
still have to get the sequencing right. A good reminder of a sequencing gone wrong can
be gleaned from the Asian Financial  Crisis:  at  the time the partial  liberalization and
opening  of  capital  accounts  in  Thailand  was  lauded  as  a  step  towards  financial
liberalization  and  integration  into  the  global  financial  markets.  Unfortunately  this
virtuous act was compromised by the fact that the Thai national currency, the baht, was
still rigidly pegged to the US dollar and the end result was a severe regional financial
crisis. The lesson to be learned here is, that what ultimately triggered the crisis was a
case of bad sequencing of financial liberalization. And without financial liberalization
any attempts at currency internationalization will run quickly into a dead-end; without
the lifting of capital  controls the currency will  not be used extensively as a store of
value123 leaving the currency only partially internationalized.
Unfortunately,  even  history  provides  no  easy  answers  to  the  question  of  how  to
successfully  internationalize  a  national  currency.  The  most  famous  historical
internationalizations  cited  in  the  literature  are  the  internationalization  of  the  sterling
pound in the 19th century, the emergence of the US dollar as the international currency
par excellence after WWII and the creation of the euro.124 All of these cases are highly
dependent on the historical contexts wherein they occurred and as such provide us only
with  limited  information  and  general  rules  on  how  to  internationalize  a  national
122 Genberg (2009) pp. 8 -9.
123 Ito (2011) pp. 6 -7.
124 Frankel (2012) pp. 336 – 346.
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currency. The only thing they all have in common is that all of those currencies were
backed up by vast economies, deep and well-functioning financial markets and enjoyed
market confidence. And their issuer was an international major power.
Hence, history is unlikely to provide clear answers to currency internationalization per
se unless the historical conditions prevailing when for example the US dollar became the
international currency are recreated. However, when it comes to financial liberalization
– a necessary step for currency internationalization – and the correct sequencing for it,
there is a multitude of examples to draw on.
The most crucial part of financial liberalization by far is capital account liberalization.
The measures included in capital account liberalization include the lifting of controls
and restrictions on cross border transfer of funds and third party usage of the currency in
contracts and settlement (both trade and finance) and on denominating private or official
assets in the currency.125
Although  capital  account  liberalization  is  desirable  in  and  of  itself  for  numerous
reasons126 – and not only as a steppingstone to currency internationalization – it does
come  with  an  assortment  of  risks,  especially  for  emerging  markets.  An  untimely
liberalization of the capital account is liable to expose an emerging market to disruptive
swings in short term capital flows and the consequent financial instability.127 There is
even empirical evidence suggesting that the integration of emerging markets into global
financial  markets  leads  to  higher  occurrence  of  crises128,  since  the  liberalization  of
capital  account  heightens  the  speed  and  volume  of  international  spillovers  leaving
countries exposed to external financial shocks and the potential inflows of “hot money”
may create liquidity bubbles destabilizing domestic banks and macroeconomics129.
How well  a  country is  capable to  cope with the liberalization of  its  capital  account
depends on a  set  of various domestic factors:  the robustness of its  financial  system,
strength of its regulatory institutions, soundness of its monetary policy and its choice of
exchange rate regime.130 The state of the country's financial system is of the essence as a
well-developed domestic financial sector is indispensable for absorbing and allocating
capital inflows efficiently. The financial system needs to be backed up by a credible
125 Chow (2011) pp. 20 – 23.
126 See for example Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 10 – 11, Genberg (2009) pp. 5 -6 and Park & Shin 
(2009) pp. 186 - 189 for the potential benefits of capital account liberalization.
127 Chow (2011) pp. 20 -23, Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 10 -11 and Park & Shin (2009) pp. 186 – 
189.
128 Gourinchas & Jeanne (2006) pp. 23 – 24.
129 Chow (2011) pp. 20 – 23, Ito (2011) pp. 1 – 2 and Park & Shin (2009) pp. 186 – 189.
130 Chow (2011) pp. 20 – 23 and Ito (2011) pp. 11 – 13.
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legal  system  and  financial  institutions  capable  of  enforcing  contracts,  insolvency
procedures, top-notch accounting rules, consistent auditing, disclosure practices and an
efficient payment system.131
Some degree of exchange rate flexibility before capital account liberalization, too, is
desirable before capital account liberalization. Flexibility in the exchange rate will help
domestic  financial  markets  to  cope  with  risk  management  and  price  stability  issues
before the capital account is liberalized.132 A flexible exchange rate will also help the
central bank keep its autonomy of monetary policy133, which in turn contributes to the
credibility of the central bank and, as a consequence, to the currency's credibility.134 And,
as witnessed in the Thai crisis leading to the Asian Financial Crisis, rigid exchange rate
regimes and financial liberalization are a toxic mix.
To summarize, financial liberalization has to start by prepping the domestic financial
sector  for  the  eventual  liberalization  of  the  capital  account  since  only  adequate
institutional  capacity  can  ensure  the  country's  ability  to  cope  with  the  associated
volatilities and the materialization of the gains.135 Yet there need not be a rigid sequence
for all of the measures that need to be taken before it. Rather, it is a process with “a
single  holistic  set  of  interrelated  policy  decisions”136.  Liberalization  of  the  capital
account can be a gradual process involving incremental steps such as gradual increase in
exchange rate flexibility, enhancement of the quality of domestic financial sector etc.,
leading  to  the  final  goal  of  full  capital  account  liberalization.  A gradual  approach
towards capital account liberalization with a coherent policy set is not only prudent, but
most likely the most successful approach, too.137
The  last  noteworthy  thing  about  currency  internationalization  and  capital  account
liberalization is that a country which has already liberalized its capital account (and most
likely internationalized its currency to some degree) might find that the additional gains
from further currency internationalization are not worth the effort.138
In his article  Currency internationalisation: analytical and policy issues  (2009) Hans
131 Chow (2011) pp. 20 – 23 and Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 10 – 11.
132 Chow (2011) pp. 20 – 23 and Gao (2013) pp. 82.
133 This is due to the Fleming-Mundell model, which dictates that a country may at best have two out of 
the following three: a fixed exchange rate, free capital movement and an independent monetary 
policy.
134 Gao (2013) p. 82.
135 Duttagupta, Fernandez & Karacadag (2005) pp. 16 – 18.
136 Chow (2011) p. 23.
137 Chow (2011) pp. 20 – 23 and Duttagupta, Fernandez & Karacadag (2005) pp. 16 – 18.
138 Genberg (2009) pp. 5 – 7.
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Genberg states, that there are substantial further benefits to be reaped from currency
internationalization  even  after  achieving  full  capital  account  liberalization.  These
benefits include diversification gains from having a wider investor base, enhanced risk
management opportunities brought about the ability to issue debt in one's own currency
in the international markets and the lowered transaction costs as more transactions are
performed  in  one's  domestic  currency.  However,  analyzing  historical  precedents,
Genberg points out that attempts going  beyond establishing deep and dynamic domestic
financial markets, establishing a transparent rule of law and stable and predictable micro
and  macroeconomic  policies  have  no  guarantee  of  success.  Thus,  although  creating
favorable conditions for currency internationalization are desirable in and of themselves,
any public policies beyond that might be just wasted effort as markets will adopt a new
international currency on a spontaneous basis.139 
3.4. Currency Internationalization and Power
The political dimension of currency internationalization is of a more vague nature than
the economic side of  it  and some researchers dismiss  it  since the potential  political
benefits are hard to quantify.140 This does not, of course, mean that there are not political
– or geopolitical – stakes in play when it comes to currency internationalization.
Although,  macroeconomic  flexibility  provided  by  currency  internationalization  was
introduced as a 'purely' economic aspect of currency internationalization in the previous
section,  it  has  a  flip  side:  macroeconomic  flexibility  also  means  at  least  relative
autonomy from other actors and the global financial system. Autonomy, according to
Cohen, is a synonym of power, as power can be defined also as the ability to not to be
influenced by others just as well as the ability to influence others.141 Moreover, as Cohen
argues,  the  autonomy  conferred  by  macroeconomic  flexibility  “is  an  essential  pre-
requisite for influence,”142 since influence is “inconceivable in practical terms without
first  attaining  and  sustaining  a  relatively  high  degree  of  policy  independence  at
home.”143
With  the  aforementioned  macroeconomic  flexibility  a  country  is  able  to  avoid  the
burdens of adjustments of its external balances in two ways: delaying and deflecting. In
139 Genberg (2009) pp. 5 – 7 and 9.
140 See for example Kenen (2009) p. 14.
141 Cohen (2011) p. 6.
142 Ibid. p. 6.
143 Ibid. p. 6.
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this context delaying adjustment means that the country in question finances its deficits
with its own money. Deflecting adjustments, on the other hand, is a more aggressive
measure by which the country running external imbalances depreciates its currency thus
shifting the burden of adjustment to its trade partners via changes in exchange rates.144
Viewed in  this  light  the  influence  derived from having a  top  class  internationalized
currency manifests itself as both hedge and leverage. The leverage is derived from the
other parties' dependence on the international currency. The more others are dependent
on the international currency, the greater the issuer's leverage gets. Although leverage
can be used in a direct and coercive way as in payments, sanctions and exchange rate
manipulation,  it  can  also  be  used  in  more  indirect  way  which  is  usually  called
entrapment. When other countries become dependent on an internationalized currency,
they develop a stake in upholding the established system and may conform to the issuing
country's  preferences  and  requirements  on  their  own  accord  –  a  form  of  systemic
power.145
This power is further enhanced by the international currency's issuer's ability to deflect
cost  adjustments  onto its  lesser  partners.  Hence the ability  to  deflect,  too,  acts  as  a
leverage. The ability to delay, however, is a strategy of hedging. It grants the issuer the
freedom  to  finance  its  deficits  in  its  own  currency  thereby  removing  the  potential
constraints other actors might try to seek to put on it.
Pointing out the costs of internationalizing a national currency is a harder task for the
IPE approach. This stands to reason, as the internationalization of a currency is mostly
seen as a way to enhance one's power in international financial and monetary relations.
Of the writers cited here, only Grimes explicitly states something about the political
costs of internationalizing a national currency: for him costs are included in the costs of
leadership. An issuer of a regional or international major currency might take the role of
a financial and monetary leader (as has the US), and as such is expected to provide the
public  goods for  a  regional  or  international  financial  system.  This  might  sometimes
mean compromising one's immediate interests in order to uphold the system. But in the
end the systemic benefits always outweigh the occasional costs of leadership.146
To  sum  it  up,   the  international  political  economy  can  be  applied  to  currency
internationalization  to  make  some  predictions  on  the  potential  benefits  of
144 Chey (2012) pp. 6 – 7, Cohen (2011) pp. 56 – 57 and Grimes (2009) pp. 20 – 22.
145 Chey (2012) pp. 56 – 57 and Cohen (2011) p. 7.
146 Grimes (2009) pp. 17 – 20.
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internationalizing one's domestic currency.
First of all, it provides macroeconomic freedom, which is arguably one of the greatest
hedges in financial and monetary power. This is best captured in the issuer's ability to
delay  economic  adjustments.  On  the  other  hand,  it  works  as  a  leverage,  too:  the
deflection of adjustments to one's partner(s) can be used as a leverage.
Second, the more dependent other actors become of a foreign currency as a medium of
exchange,  store  of  value  and  unit  of  account,  the  worse  they  are  entrapped,  thus
conferring the currency's issuer direct leverage over them. This is best manifested in the
exchange-rate weapon, by which the issuer of the international currency is able to exert
direct power all the way into domestic policies of an entrapped country.
Third,  there are less aggressive,  systemic sides to the power conferred by having an
international currency. These are represented by monetary dependence and control over
financial  standards.  When  a  country  has  become  dependent  on  another  country's
currency it follows that they develop an interest in maintaining the currency's stability as
it is their stability as well. As well functioning markets are a prerequisite for currency
internationalization,  a  country  with an  internationalized  currency is  likely  to  have  a
financial center on its territory. Here there is a positive cycle: the more appealing the
currency is (and thus more internationalized) the more it  contributes to the domestic
financial markets and the better the financial markets are, the more appealing they make
the currency. All this adds up to systemic financial power, which manifests itself the
ability to set financial standards, which others will follow.
Fourth, having an international currency may confer 'soft power' to its issuer. This form
of  power  is  close  to  the  third  face  of  power,  but  those  who  espouse  this  view on
monetary power are unable to provide concrete examples on how this form of power
manifests itself – even less how to quantify exercises of soft power. Even if soft power is
described as status and prestige, it is still hard to operationalize in analyzing the power
benefits of internationalizing a national currency.
Fifth the political costs of currency internationalization come if a currency reaches a
position of an international or regional key currency, or a Top or Patrician Currency,
when some form of leadership might be expected from the issuing country. The costs of
leadership come in the form of provision of public goods and the upkeep of the system
wherein  their  currency  is  embedded  in  as  a  key  currency.  However,  in  theory  the
systemic benefits – the power – more than outweigh the potential costs.
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4. The Internationalization of Renminbi
Whereas  the  previous  chapter  explored  the  theoretical  aspects  of  currency
internationalization – pros & cons,  requirements  etc.  – this  chapter  will  apply these
theories to a particular case, the internationalization of the Chinese national currency,
renminbi (RMB).
4.1. The State of RMB Internationalization
It is hard to give an exact date for the beginning of the internationalization of China's
national currency, RMB. If de facto criteria are applied, it can be argued, that RMB has
been  on  a  track  to  internationalization  ever  since  1977,  when  the  Chinese  officials
started  the  economic  reform which  has  continued  up to  this  day  in  an  incremental
manner.147 If  de  jure  criteria  is  applied,  it  can  be  reasonably  argued  that  the
internationalization of RMB started in either 2006 or at the very latest in 2010 when
RMB was once again de-pegged from US dollar  and allowed more flexibility  in  its
exchange rate fluctuation. The argument that the internationalization process started in
2006  is  supported  by  the  fact,  that  a  study  group  of  the  People's  Bank  of  China
recommended officials to pursue a strategy of RMB internationalization in their 2006
publication.148 On the other hand, a case can be made, that until the onset of GFC and the
subsequent exchange rate regime change of RMB, the internationalization of RMB was
not  an official  policy goal  until  the 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP) spanning years 2010
through  2015.149 Regardless  of  which  event  is  taken  as  the  starting  point  for  the
internationalization of RMB, it is safe to say that it has gathered momentum in earnest in
the late 2000s and 2010s as can be witnessed from the measures taken to promote the
international use of the RMB. The latest  steps being the 2015 devaluation of RMB,
which was accompanied by a shift towards more market-based setting of the RMB's
exchange rate150 - one of the prerequisites for a fully internationalized currency and the
inclusion of RMB into IMF's Special Drawing Rights basket of currencies in November
2015151.
147 Huang, Wang & Fan (2014) pp. 20 – 22.
148 Huang, Wang & Fan (2014) pp. 20 – 22 and People's Bank of China Study Group (2006) pp. 12 -13.
149 Cui (2013) pp. 68 – 69, Eichengreen (2013) pp. 149 – 151, Gao (2013) pp. 74 – 77, Gao & Coffman 
(2013) pp. 139 – 140 and Huang, Wang & Fan (2014) pp. 24 – 26.
150 Noble & Wigglesworth (2015).
151 IMF (2015a). https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr15540.htm
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Chronologically the first measure taken is the issuance of offshore bonds in Hong Kong
denominated in RMB. The policy is aimed at expanding RMB use in trade settlement
and  financial  transactions  and  to  retain  RMB  overseas  by  providing  investment
opportunities  for  RMB holders.152 The  next  step  was  the  establishment  of  Bilateral
Currency-Swap Agreements (BCSA) starting with the establishment of a swap line with
South Korea in 2008.153 By 2013 23 swap agreements had been concluded in total.154
The BCSAs created since 2008 differ from the swap agreements of CMIM in the regard
that they are not only used as a form of financial cooperation and liquidity support, but
also to boost bilateral trade and financing.155 Providing others with RMB will also make
it  more  convenient  for  others  to  settle  their  trade  in  RMB. This  option  was further
enhanced in 2009 with a program aimed to increase cross-border settlements in RMB.
The  program  is  called  'Pilot  Program  of  RMB  Settlement  of  Cross-Border  Trade
Transactions' and at the beginning it included 5 cities from the mainland China, Hong
Kong,  Macao  and  ASEAN  countries.156 Later  on  the  program was  expanded  to  all
regions of mainland and to all countries willing to settle in RMB with a policy named
'Administrative  Rules  for  the  Pilot  Program  of  Settlement  for  RMB-denominated
Outward Direct Investment' in 2011. The project started with meager 365 Chinese firms
from the mainland that were allowed to settle their international transactions in RMB,
but by the end of 2011 the program was extended to all firms.157 At the end of 2011 the
pilot program was further enhanced by a new policy directive named 'Administrative
Rules  on  Settlement  of  RMB-denominated  Foreign  Direct  Investment'  aimed  at
widening the RMB recycling channel and the further expansion of RMB use in cross-
border trade and investment. In 2011 the 'RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor'
(RQFII) was launched and and expanded in 2012. The policy's aim is to widen the the
investment channel for offshore RMB recycling by allowing foreign investors approved
by China Securities Regulatory Commission to invest in mainland securities markets
within a certain quota using RMB funds raised in Hong Kong.158 The 2016 – 2020 5
Year Plan aims at expanding the RQFII further by increasing the investment quota and
by creating a so called 'negative list' model, which will “ensure the protection of foreign
152 Cohen (2012) pp. 5 -6 and Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 4 – 8.
153 Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 8-9  Gao (2013) p. 75 and Huang, Wang & Fan (2014) p. 5.
154 Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 8 -9 and Huang, Wang & Fan (2014) p. 5.
155 Cohen (2012) p. 5, Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 8 – 9 and Gao (2013) p. 75.
156 Cohen (2012) p. 5, Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 4 – 5, Gao (2013) p. 75 and Huang, Wang & Fan
(2014) pp. 4 – 7.
157 Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 6 -7.
158 Cui (2013) pp. 71 – 78, Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 4 – 9, Gao (2013) pp. 74 – 77 and Huang, 
Wang & Fan (2014) pp. 3 – 9.
40
investors' rights and better allocate their money”159 by stating to foreign investors which
sectors and businesses are off-limits to them.160
Listing official measures to promote a national currency's internationalization alone will
not  make  much  sense  in  understanding  what  is  the  state  of  the  said  currency's
internationalization. The standard method for estimating how much progress the Chinese
officials have made in internationalizing the RMB is to use the model of three roles and
two dimensions  for an international  currency presented in the previous chapter. The
roles of store of value,  medium of exchange and unit  of account within private and
public dimensions.
First off there is the role of currency substitution. When applied to the private sector, the
appropriate  meter  for  currency  internationalization  is  the  degree  to  which  a  given
currency is used as an investment currency.161 In practice the private use of RMB as an
investment currency consists of the bonds and securities denominated in RMB and held
offshore. The first initiative in this sector was the Asian Bond Funds (ABF) initiative,
which has promoted regional bond and securities issuance to a limited degree.162 After
that there are the dim sum bonds, which have grown steadily since 2007 reaching a total
value of approximately RMB 200 billion by the end of 2012.163 The issuance of bonds
and securities has not been limited to Chinese firms as foreign firms and international
institutions, too, have issued RMB denominated bonds. Furthermore, the current account
has been partially opened allowing foreign institutions to invest in limited amounts in
the Chinese mainland's stock market.164
There are still severe impediments to RMB's potential to be an investment currency. To
begin with, part of the offshore RMB markets were driven by speculative expectations.
In early 2010s much of the growth in offshore RMB denominated bonds and securities
was  driven  by  expectations  on  further  RMB  appreciation,  not  by  'normal'  market
mechanisms.165 Eichengreen  and  Kawai,  however,  find  evidence  that  the  trend  had
started to change by late 2013 and the RMB internationalization through its use as an
investment  currency  is  now  more  driven  by  fundamental  changes  than  speculative
159 Xinhua (2015).
160 Xinhua (2015). See Prasad (2016) pp. 128 – 132  for the complete negative list.
161 Ito (2011) p. 3 and Yu (2012) pp. 3 – 6.
162 Bowles & Wang (2012) pp. 7 – 9.
163 Cui (2013) p. 75.
164 Bowles & Wang (2013) p. 8.
165 Gao & Coffmann (2013) pp. 146 – 147 and Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 5 – 6.
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motives.166167Even greater limitation to the potential  of RMB usage as an investment
currency  are  the  under-developed  financial  markets  and  the  lack  of  capital  account
liberalization  without  which  the  RMB  financial  markets  cannot  aspire  to  rival  the
financial markets of Japan – not to mention the US financial markets.168 The Chinese
stock market  crash in  August  2015 followed by a  series  of  aftershocks was a  good
reminder of the fragility of Chinese financial system.169
The second role is the currency's private use as a medium of exchange. Concretely this
refers to it being used as an invoicing currency and as a currency of trade settlement.
This  is,  arguably, the  field  where  RMB internationalization  has  advanced the  most.
Unofficially the convention of using RMB for trade settlement has been going on for the
past 20 years170, but official promotion for using RMB to settle trade began only in 2009.
After the official promotion began the amount of settling trade in RMB rose to 8.9% of
China's trade in 2011 and has since expanded to over RMB 1 trillion for trade and RMB
85.4 billion for foreign direct invest171. To put this in perspective: in 2011 this accounted
for 0.29% of total world payments and 0.63% in 2013172.
Although this  aspect  of internationalization has been fairly  successful,  there are still
obstacles to overcome if the Chinese officials wish to make RMB fully internationalized
in this aspect. First, there is the size: by the end of 2014 the amount of China's trade
settled  in  RMB  had  reached  25%  of  the  nation's  cross-border  settlements173.  For
comparison, Japan settles 40.2% of its exports and 24.6% of imports in yen174. Then
again, the low levels of Chinese trade settlement in RMB are natural given that the use
of RMB to settle international trade was sanctioned only six years ago.
Additionally  there  are  some  more  troublesome  obstacles  hampering  the
internationalization of RMB in trade settlement. That is, in the beginning the settlement
of trade in RMB strongly skewed in favor of the importing sector which amounted 80-
90% of the trade settled in RMB while exporters chose to settle their trade mainly in
USD.175 This led to a net increase in Chinese foreign exchange reserves, as exporters
166 Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 5 – 6.
167 The unexpected devaluation in August 2015 and the transition towards a market-based exchange rate 
setting should, at least in theory, further stave off one-way bets on RMB's appreciation as it is no 
longer 'common sense', that RMB will inevitably appreciate.
168 Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 10 – 11.
169 Anderlini (2015) and Scutt (2015).
170 Bowles & Wang (2013) pp. 9 – 10.
171 Bowles & Wang (2013) pp. 9 – 19 and Huang, Wang & Fan (2014) pp. 4 – 7.
172 Cui (2013) pp. 71 – 74.
173 Rapoza (2015).
174 Bowles & Wang (2013) pp. 9 – 10.
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accumulated foreign currencies and importers 'bled' RMB out of the country due to the
limited availability of RMB abroad and incentive to hold RMB offshore in anticipation
of currency appreciation.176 Eichengreen & Kawai argue that by late 2013 the ratio had
narrowed down to 1:1.3 (import : export) as the expectations for currency appreciation
subsided.177 The benefits for settling trade in RMB were further mitigated by the fact that
most of the trade was still denominated in USD and not RMB.178 Furthermore, Gao &
Coffman note that most of the trade settled in RMB was conducted as arbitrage between
firms in the mainland and their branch offices in Hong Kong (80% of total trade).179
Despite of the adversity, some analysts are predicting that Chinese trade settlement in
RMB might reach 50% by 2020.180
Although  trade  settlement  in  RMB  has  been  increasing  ever  since  its  official
endorsement in 2009, the results are hampered by the fact that most of the trade is not
denominated in RMB. This means that the Chinese traders and financial institutions still
bear a heavy exchange rate risk when doing international business.
In other words, RMB is still used only relatively little as a  denominating currency,
which is the private dimension's version of unit of account. Estimates put China's total
foreign trade denominated in RMB at approximately 20% of total trade volume by the
end of 2013181 and by 2014 the amount had risen scantily to 21,6%182.  This implies, that
there is still a gap between trade settlement and trade denomination in RMB.
Another form of private unit of account are the foreign bonds and securities, or the dim
sum bonds mentioned earlier, which are denominated in RMB. In 2012 the total amount
of dim sum bonds issued amounted to about RMB 200 billion.183 In 2014 the amount
jumped to over RMB 325 billion.184 This compares rather favorably to, for example, dim
sum bond's Japanese equivalent,  the samurai bonds of which about 2.2 trillion yen's
(about USD 18 billion) worth was issued in financial year 2013.185
Turning  to  the  official  dimension  of  currency  internationalization  there  is  the  first
176 Bowles & Wang (2013) p. 19, Cui (2013) pp. 71 – 74, Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 5 – 6 and Gao
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official role of international currency: international reserve (store of value). No official
figures  are  available  for  the  total  amount  of  RMBs held  in  other  countries'  foreign
exchange reserves as they to keep the composition of their foreign exchange reserves a
secret. Despite of the scarcity of data, there is a consensus among researchers that the
amount of RMB used as reserve currency is negligible at best.186 The best estimate is
forwarded by Ito, who estimates that of the 3.1% of global reserve currencies reported
by IMF in 2011 as “other currencies” the amount of RMB is “anyone's guess”.187
The major hindrances for adaptation of RMB as an international reserve currency are
that it is not freely convertible, it is not a freely floating currency and there is lack of
liquid international RMB denominated assets.188 The inclusion of RMB into the IMF's
SDR basket of currencies along with the reforms enacted to speed up the process are
likely  to  ameliorate  the  situation  somewhat,  but  the  bulk  of  work  must  come from
China's  domestic  reforms.  Another  possible  route  to  further  this  aspect  of  currency
internationalization  comes  from  the  newly  founded  Multilateral  Development  Bank
(MDB) the New Development Bank (NDB), which will  disburse RMB denominated
development  funds at  least  in  Asia189 and for  this  purpose will  need RMB reserves.
Although the other MDB, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) disburses
funds only in USD190, it might start disbursing RMB funds later on191, meaning it, too,
would need RMB reserves.
Much like with the private dimension of currency internationalization, most progress in
internationalizing RMB have been made in the international use of RMB as a medium of
exchange, or to be more exact, as a  vehicle currency.  The Bilateral  Currency-Swap
Agreements  form the  core  of  this  facet  of  currency  internationalization  as  in  these
transactions RMB is used as a vehicle currency.
It  should be noted, that RMB is not used much as an intervention currency directly.
Indirectly,  though,  the  countries  receiving  RMBs  can  actually  prop  their  domestic
currency  by  providing  their  domestic  financial  institutions  RMBs  and  eliminate  the
financial  institutions'  need  to  go  to  the  exchange  markets  and  thus  drive  down the
domestic  currency's  exchange  rate.192 The  direct  usage  of  RMBs  for  currency
186 Bowles & Wang (2013) pp. 4 – 5, Cui (2013) p. 78, Huang, Wang & Fan (2014) pp. 4 – 7 and Ito 
(2011) pp. 6 – 8.
187 Ito (2011) p. 8.
188 Bowles & Wang (2013) pp. 4 – 5, Cui (2013) p. 78 and Huang, Wang & Fan (2014) pp. 4 – 7.
189 The BRICS Post (2015) and Kynge (2014).
190 Areddy (2016).
191 Wong (2016).
192 Gao & Yu (2010) p. 108.
44
intervention is possible, but for the time being very few carry out such interventions as
RMB is not a major anchor currency for most countries.193
A quick calculation puts the total amount of BCSAs concluded since 2008 at over RMB
2.5 trillion (USD 400billion, or so), but all of the agreements have a 3 years maturity, so
some of them have already expired. No data is available to what extent these agreements
have been tapped into. There are also the BSAs included into the CMIM framework, but
those swaps are only used to provide emergency liquidity.194
The last facet of currency internationalization is the currency's public use as a unit of
account. That is, its role as an anchor currency. RMB has started to take a minor role as
an anchor currency – especially in its home region, East Asia. But there is still a long
way for the RMB to become a dominating regional currency and even longer to become
an  international  anchor  currency.  This  matter  will  be  scrutinized  in  the  following
chapter.
4.2. Challenges for Further Internationalization of RMB
Although RMB has gained a lot of ground since its official promotion as an international
currency since 2010 there still remain considerable obstacles to tackle if the “redback” is
to emerge as a regional Patrician Currency or a global Top Currency.
Among the experts on internationalization of RMB there exists a rough consensus on the
contents  of  the  challenges  the  internationalization  will  face,  but  on  the  relative
importance  of  those  challenges  and  on  their  respective  sequencing  there  is  some
divergence.  For  clarity's  sake  the  challenges  will  be  categorized  into  two  different
categories: technical and political. The category of technical challenges contains what
can be labeled as 'neutral' challenges or realities in the sense that they are perceived to
be economic realities of currency internationalization as opposed to political challenges
which are more vague and contested by nature. The technical category will be further
divided  into  domestic  and  foreign  sub-categories  whereas  the  political  category  is
further  divided  into  external  realities  and  domestic  realities.  The  categorization  is
artificial  in  the  sense  that  all  of  the  problems  are  inter-related  facets  of  RMB
internationalization. Ergo, the categorization exists only for analytical clarity's sake.
193 Ito (2011) pp. 4 – 5.
194 Bowles & Wang (2013) pp. 5 – 6, Cui (2013) pp. 76 – 78 and Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 8 – 9.
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Starting with the domestic challenges for further RMB internationalization is a logical
starting point, as domestic economic reforms are on the near future's reform list to aid
further  RMB  internationalization.195 Two  major  challenges  emerge  from  this  sub-
category: domestic financial market reform and interest rate reform.
The reform of the domestic financial markets looms large as a well-developed, deep,
liquid and heterogeneous financial  market  is  deemed to be an essential  criterion for
successful currency internationalization.196 At the moment China's financial  system is
characterized by over-banking and by a lack of mature capital markets. With this state of
affairs foreign investors have only limited interest in holding RMB denominated assets.
Without foreign investors participating in the trade of RMB denominated assets, this
facet of RMB internationalization will not advance.197
Although  the  attainment  of  this  goal  depends  on  the  successful  capital  account
liberalization,  there  are  domestic  reforms  which  can  be  implemented  before  capital
account liberalization.  A potential  measure is to gradually widen the participation of
foreign  investors  in  the  domestic  financial  markets  for  example  within  the  RQFII
framework. Allowing foreign investors to participate in the domestic markets will help
to  improve  the  quality  of  financial  markets  as  their  presence  should  bring  new
techniques and know-how to improve the effectiveness of the markets and provide better
risk management  mechanisms.  Furthermore,  allowing foreigners to  participate  in  the
domestic  financial  markets  will  also  increase  participant  diversification,  which  will
improve efficiency and liquidity as buyers and sellers of various financial commodities
will become more diverse.198
As the Chinese financial markets are still relatively small and shallow, this poses a hen
and egg problem: the system needs foreign participants to make it more attractive to
foreign participants. Hence, some other policy enhancements are necessary to make the
domestic  financial  markets  more  attractive  to  foreign  participants.  Gao  offers  three
policy  measures  that  can  be  taken  to  make  the  domestic  financial  markets  more
appealing  to  foreigners.  First  one  is  to  make  the  central  bank  independent.  An
independent central bank with fixed policy objectives (such as inflation) will make the
financial  markets  more  credible  and  predictable  for  foreign  investors.  Second,  the
regulation  and  supervision  of  financial  markets  falls  into  several  departments'
jurisdiction  making  the  bureaucracy  behind  the  financial  markets  a  byzantine
195 Cohen (2012) pp. 11 – 12, Ito (2011) p. 14 and Xinhua (2015).
196 Cui (2012) pp. 79 – 80 and Ito (2011) pp. 11 – 14.
197 Cui (2013) pp. 78 – 81, Gao (2013) pp. 78 – 82, Gao & Yu (2010) pp. 115 – 123 and Ito (2011) pp. 11 
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construction even for domestic participants. Simplifying and making it more transparent
could  spur  foreign  investors  to  participate  in  China's  domestic  markets.  Lastly,  the
establishment of independent credit rating agencies is indispensable for widening the
base  of  foreign  participants.  Without  reliable  and  transparent  information  on  the
creditability of foreign market's assets, foreign investors will remain vary.199
Although the latest FYP for years 2016 – 2020 includes such measures as the provision
of new financial instruments (hybrid instruments, high-yield bonds, derivatives etc.), a
macro prudential regulatory framework and consumer financial protection200, it still does
not seek to answer the fundamental problems enumerated above and they are likely to
persist for the foreseeable future.
Another challenge arising from domestic realities for further RMB internationalization
are the  interest rates. As the liberalization of interest rates was a prerequisite for the
inclusion  of  RMB  into  SDR  currency  basket201,  the  Chinese  authorities  liberalized
interest rates in 2015 prior to RMB's inclusion into SDR basket.202 However, there are
still  hidden  interest  rate  controls.  The  authorities  still  retain  the  right  to  set  the
benchmark rates, which in theory should have no bearing on market based interest rates,
and state-owned enterprises and local governments still  have the access to them and
continue apply these preferential rates. Add to this the fact that they account 90% for all
domestic investment203 and the interest rate liberalization is still diluted at best. Thus, the
interest rates are not fundamentally market-driven and hence are slow to react to market
sentiments causing sluggishness in domestic financial markets.204
The inflexible  interest  rates  might  create  further  problems, if  they are retained even
when the capital account is liberalized to some degree. If the banks do not have market-
driven interest rates on deposits domestic savers will turn to more lucrative investing
opportunities outside of the country, which will jeopardize the domestic banking sector.
Moreover, the actual liberalization of interest rates will require more flexibility in the
exchange rate  since decontrolling interest  rates  with rigid exchange rate system will
seriously squeeze bank profitability.205
199 Gao (2013) pp. 78 – 82.
200 Yang (2016) pp. 1-3.
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Among the  easier  measures  in  the  'foreign'  or  'external'  dimension  of  further  RMB
internationalization there is the further development of offshore RMB markets. At the
moment  the  offshore  RMB markets  are  relatively  modest,  although  they  have  been
steadily growing ever since the issuance of dim sum bonds in Hong Kong in 2007. But
there is a catch to further development: the more they develop, the more attractive it is
for Chinese firms to to  exit  from the mainland's  banking system, which will  pose a
serious challenge to the domestic monetary and credit control and might even challenge
the predominance of Chinese-owned banks.206
Due  to  the  export/import  mismatch,  the  offshore  RMB  markets  are  also  prone  to
malfunction on account of the inflexible exchange rate regime as RMB denominated
liability holders will hold on to their RMB denominated assets in anticipation of further
RMB appreciation. A potential long-term solution for this problem is the implementation
of a free floating exchange rate regime, but its implementation is far from an easy task.
For further RMB internationalization more Chinese issuers of offshore bonds are needed
to provide enough assets to make offshore RMB markets liquid and functioning and to
make the holding of RMB assets attractive. At the same time the problem of speculation
on  further  RMB  appreciation  (or  depreciation)  and  the  potential  undermining  of
domestic monetary and credit control, too, need to be addressed.207
China's perpetual current account surpluses, too, act as a brake for wider usage for RMB
as a regional currency of settlement; the usual way for obtaining RMBs for settlement
would be through trade, but as China is continuously running current account surpluses
it is constricting others' access to RMB. Instead of turning the current account to deficit,
the Chinese policy-makers have opted to forge bilateral currency swaps to bypass the
problem, but whether this will provide sufficient amount of RMBs to the international
markets to promote the use of RMB as a currency of settlement remains to be seen. Then
again,  a  country  does  not  necessarily  have  to  run  deficits  to  promote  the
internationalization of its domestic currency. China has been running a current account
deficit  with its  regional  trading partners  through the  2000s paving way for  regional
usage of the RMB as a currency of settlement.208 The newly founded MDBs, AIIB and
NDB, could provide another route for providing China's trade partners RMBs.
The implementation of further exchange rate flexibility – or moving eventually even to
206 McCauley (2013) pp. 107 – 113.
207 McCauley (2013) pp. 107 – 113.
208 Chey (2013) p. 8.
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a free floating exchange rate209 – is an inevitable task if the Chinese authorities wish to
further the internationalization of RMB. It addresses large technical challenges facing
the internationalization of RMB: it will give foreign investors an incentive to hold RMB
denominated  assets  as  a  market-driven  RMB  exchange  rate  regime  and  the
accompanying central bank autonomy in monetary policy will provide transparency and
confidence in the monetary policies of the central  bank.210 Further down the road to
internationalization a fully flexible exchange rate regime will facilitate macroeconomic
adjustments and function as a shock absorber when capital accounts are opened.211
Adapting a more flexible exchange rate regime will also help China in reforming the
domestic economic model toward more consumption. Appreciation in real exchange rate
will  raise the prices of locally produced goods and services (where the demand will
grow  the  most  as  the  Chinese  economy  re-balances  itself)  relative  to  international
ones.212 Despite of the recent downward pressure on RMB, a shift to a more flexible
exchange rate also implies an appreciation of RMB in the long term if there are no major
financial  or  economic  crises.  This  appreciation  is  in  itself  desirable  since  a  too
undervalued currency may provoke economic overheating.213 It  will  also deprive the
domestic financial institutions and firms the undervalued currency's shelter forcing them
to  face  international  competition,  which,  in  the  long run,  should  make  the  Chinese
economy more efficient.214
As things  stand  in  2016,  there  is  no  established  schedule  for  a  transition  to  a  free
exchange rate regime for RMB, but the latest FYP released in 2016 includes promises of
improvements to the exchange rate regime and making it freer through changes to the
central parity rate mechanism.215
Related to the exchange rate regime is the RMB's  convertibility and  capital account
liberalization.  At  the  moment  RMB  is  a  'freely  usable'  currency,  but  not  a  fully
convertible currency.216 A freely usable currency, an IMF term, means that the currency
is both widely used to make payments for international transactions and is widely traded
209 Whether greater exchange rate flexibility is enough or whether it has to be a freely floating regime 
remains a point of contest. It could be that more flexibility will suffice if the aim is to promote 
regionalization of the RMB, but internationalization may demand full flexibility, or a freely floating 
exchange rate regime. See for example Gao & Yu (2010) pp. 115 – 123.
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in the principal the principal exchange markets.217 To be a fully convertible currency
China would have to forgo all capital controls. At the moment there is a cap on how
much Chinese residents can take cash out  of  their  country, extensive paperwork for
international companies if they wish to bring in large sums into China and strict quotas
to foreigners for investing in Chinese capital markets – that is to say, RMB is not a fully
convertible currency.218
Full currency convertibility and capital account liberalization are indispensable if China
is  to  develop  financial  markets  that  are  freely  accessible  by  nonresidents,  liquid,
reasonably  stable  and  capable  of  providing  hedging  instruments  to  international
investors.219 There  is  also  a  persistent  asymmetry  in  RMB  inflows  and  outflows
hindering further currency internationalization: the strong demand for RMB in trade and
financial  transactions  caused  by  increased  use  in  cross-border  settlements  and
speculative expectations of currency appreciation can only be answered by broadening
investment channels for offshore RMB recycling to mainland. This asymmetry cannot
be overcome completely without liberalizing capital accounts and making RMB fully
convertible.220
Despite the immense benefits of full capital account liberalization, the road is wrought
with  peril.  If  necessary  reforms  are  not  implemented  before  full  capital  account
liberation and currency convertibility, or if the sequencing is fumbled, the opening of
capital account may provoke a financial and economic crisis.221
The first  step towards capital  account  liberalization and currency convertibility is  to
bolster the domestic financial  markets and reform the institutions relevant to it.  One
approach is  to  start  by  liberalizing  the  domestic  financial  markets  by  implementing
market  determined  interest  rates,  deregulating  the  scope  of  financial  businesses  and
market entry (for foreigners, too) followed by the creation of independent institutions to
supervise  and  regulate  domestic  financial  firms  and  granting  the  central  bank
independence.222 As discussed above, all of these policies need to be matched by other
policies. For example, the liberation of interest rates might be problematic in absence of
greater exchange rate flexibility, which, too, should be pursued prior to capital account
liberalization.223
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Even if these preconditions are achieved, the liberalization of capital account will take
place in phases: the long and medium term flows will be liberalized first and short term
flows last. This is due to the 'hot nature' of short term flows, which are more likely to
render the domestic financial system unstable than are long and medium term flows.224
Going  beyond  the  technical  realities  of  currency  internationalization  there  are  the
political challenges of further currency internationalization. Most of these challenges
can be ascribed to the one-party system of China and the party's unwillingness to carry
out political reforms needed for further internationalization of RMB. They include such
problems as the independence of People's Bank of China, establishment of independent
financial  regulators,  the  commercialization  or  even  privatization  of  the  state-owned
banks  and  the  general  deregulation  of  domestic  financial  markets.  The  question  is
whether  there  is  enough  political  will  in  the  party  to  carry  out  such  wide-ranging
political reforms that will transfer power away from the party's grasp.225
Although this sounds like a tall order, the Chinese policymakers have shown a relatively
large if somewhat prudent tolerance towards reforms – especially if they are economical
reforms. Unfortunately economic reforms might not be the only political reforms that
are required form the Chinese policymakers if further RMB internationalization is to be
achieved. Many writers on the subject of RMB internationalization posit the reform of
the legal system to protect property rights and enforce bankruptcy as one precondition
for successful internationalization of RMB.226 If economic and financial disputes are not
clearly separated from political ones international investors will be averse to partake in
the Chinese financial markets since there is no guarantee of fair and equal treatment for
all participants. Furthermore, the judicial system must be distanced from the standing
committee and operate in a transparent fashion to be predictable so as to provide stable
institutional environment for international investors.227 Some have even gone as far as to
propose reforms of the political system (more transparency and representativeness) as
potential conditions for further internationalization of RMB.228
Another  possible  challenge  for  RMB's  internationalization  is  the  Chinese  economic
model itself. At the moment the system is characterized by high share of investment as
measured in GDP, heavy dependency on resource consumption, large current account
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surplus (even if the flow has ebbed since its peak levels prior to GFC), unequal income
distribution and serious pollution.  So far the formula for economic growth has been
based  on  asymmetric  liberalization  of  the  market:  the  policies  have  been  aimed  at
suppressing the cost of labor, land, energy, capital and water and have subsidized the
owners of the endowments (producers, investors and exporters) at the cost of ordinary
households. Lately, though, there has been a hike in wages due to labor shortages, which
has slowed production, investment and export activities squeezing corporate profits and
has increased consumption power of the households.229 In fact, the Chinese government's
FYP for  2011 to  2015  was  the  first  FYP to  include  specific  measures  to  increase
domestic demand.230 
The latest official FYP, which spans years 2016 – 2020, was released in late 2015 and
contains several measures to further the internationalization of RMB. The first of these
measures was the inclusion of RMB into the SDR basket of currencies which, at least in
theory,  should  aid  RMB's  internationalization.  The  inclusion  was  preceded  several
measures which will help RMB's further internationalization: removal of deposit rate
ceilings (ie. interest rate liberation), further freeing of the RMB exchange rate through
changes  to  the  central  parity  rate  mechanism, by the  opening of  onshore inter-bank
foreign  exchange  market  to  foreign  central  banks  effectuated  by  PBoC,  an
announcement  that  China's  official  statistics  would  conform  to  Special  Data
Dissemination Standards (SDDS).
Furthermore,  the  plan  promised  that  China  would  forge  on  with  capital  account
liberalization and the internationalization of RMB to gradually make RMB convertible
on capital account during by 2020. A list of measures for achieving these goals was put
forth: two-way opening up of the financial industry, further opening up of the Chinese
service sector (including banking and insurance), an increase in the investment quota for
RQFIIs and a promise by China Banking Regulation Commission (CBRC) to continue
open up China's banking industry.231
All of the mentioned reforms are necessary prerequisites for the eventual full currency
convertibility and capital account liberalization, but the lingering unanswered question is
whether the Chinese officials will eventually aim to make RMB fully convertible and
the capital account fully open in the orthodox sense of these terms. For the time being
they have clearly stated that their goal would be their interpretation of full convertibility
229 Huang, Wang & Fan (2014) pp. 17 – 23.
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on capital account, or 'managed convertibility', which would mean that they would still
retain  some capital  controls  to  limit  speculative  capital  flows  and to  restrict  capital
movements  in  order  to  deal  with  balance  of  payments  problems  and  exchange  rate
volatility.232
Whether managed convertibility will be enough to make RMB fully internationalized
remains to be seen. If it proves not to be enough, the question is whether the Chinese
officials will be ready to move from managed convertibility to full convertibility and, by
extension, full capital account liberalization.
4.3. Future Prospects of RMB Internationalization
During the 12th FYP spanning the years 2010 through 2015 the Chinese authorities were
aiming for 'basic' convertibility for RMB by 2015 and were planning to extend this basic
convertibility  to  full  convertibility  by  2020.  This  basic  version  of  convertibility
consisted of allowing foreign investors to freely buy and sell currency for trade related
purposes as well as for a limited range of capital account and financial transactions, but
strict controls over short term capital movements were still held in place.233
A prerequisite for RMB's acceptance into the SDR basket of currencies was that it be
'freely usable' if not fully convertible. Leading up to RMB's inclusion into the basket the
Chinese authorities  worked hard to  make their  currency fit  that  criteria  and become
freely usable.  What  they did not  do,  however, was to  make RMB fully convertible.
Instead  they  have  opted  to  disdain  the  orthodox  conception  of  currency's  free
convertibility  and  have  instead  formulated  their  own  conception  called  'managed
convertibility'.234
According to Zhou Xiaochuan, the Governor of People's Bank of China (PBoC), the
Chinese Government will continue to manage capital  account transactions even after
achieving RMB Capital Account Convertibility by “using macro-prudential measures to
limit  risks  from cross-border  capital  flows  and  to  maintain  the  stable  value  of  the
currency and a safe financial environment.”235 This is in accordance with the 13th FYP
released in 2016, which stipulates that the government's target for the period of 2016 –
2020  is  to  realize  RMB  convertibility  and  to  press  ahead  with  capital  account
liberalization and the gradual internationalization of RMB.236
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Meanwhile  the  experts'  opinions  on  the  future  developments  of  RMB
internationalization are divergent.  Many agree that the likeliest route for furthering the
internationalization of RMB in near future will follow the well-established path of cross-
border usage both as a currency of settlement and, in increasing volume, as a currency of
denomination.237 The aim of this policy is to achieve region-wide acceptance of RMB as
a regional Patrician Currency and lessen the exchange risks to domestic importers and
exporters alike. For this purpose there exists a neat toolkit of policies through which the
usage of RMB as a currency of settlement and denomination can be used: issuance of
government and corporate bonds, encouraging invoicing in RMB through Free Trade
Agreements, establishing new BCSAs and disbursing RMB funds through MDBs such
as NDB. Yet applying diplomacy and foreign policies alone will not be enough to make
the  East  Asian  region  adapt  RMB as  a  currency  of  denomination;  they  have  to  be
pursued  in  connection  with  domestic  reforms  aimed  at  deepening  and  opening  of
domestic financial markets for offshore RMB asset holders.238
These interpretations match with the official line as the promotion of the RMB as a
regional currency of settlement and denomination does not require full convertibility of
the currency nor the full liberalization of the capital account.239
Some  are,  though,  not  quite  as  optimistic  about  the  prospects  of  further
internationalization. McCauley on his part estimates that as the offshore RMB banking
system will  eventually  flow back into  China  through the  interbank connections  and
direct cross-border lending channels thus complicating monetary and credit  controls.
One possible way to tackle this problem is to impose reserve requirements on Chinese
banks, but this would grant advantage to their foreign competitors.240
Bowles and Wang, who attribute the internationalization of RMB to a response to the
perceived failures in international economic and financial architecture brought to fore by
the recent crisis, argue that it is unlikely that China is willing to remove her firewall of
capital controls as long as there exist threats to her financial stability. In this scenario
short  term  crisis  management  will  trump  long  term  policies  for  currency
internationalization. In their view the longer the conditions provoked by GFC last the
less  likely  it  is  that  RMB will  reach  full  convertibility  and  the  capital  controls  be
liberalized.  Instead  China  will  muddle  through  without  fully  internationalizing  her
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currency. Neither  are  they very optimistic  on the prospects  of  greater  exchange rate
flexibility citing previous crisis responses as dis-encouraging precepts.241 Seen from this
point  of  view the  2015 Chinese  stock  market  crashes  do  not  bode  well  for  further
relinquishing of capital controls.
Another  critical  perspective is  offered by Cohen,  who describes  the Chinese policy-
makers' choice of strategy as an effort to try to internationalize the RMB with minimum
political trade offs. The idea is derived from his assessment that three properties are
demanded from a currency if  it  is to be internationalized: 1) economic and political
stability, 2) high degree of transactional liquidity and reasonable predictability of asset
value and 3) broad transactional network to provide networking externalities. In Cohen's
opinion RMB meets only one of the criteria,  the broad transactional network due to
RMB's  wide  use  as  a  settlement  currency  and  increasing  usage  as  a  denominating
currency combined with China's economic scale. Although the policy-makers are aware
that RMB has to offer the other two qualities, too, they are trying to get as far as they
can with RMB's only redeeming quality since enhancing the other qualities of RMB
would require serious political and financial reforms. Cohen stresses that especially the
political reforms may prove to be a task too demanding for the Communist Party.242
It  is a likely scenario that RMB will  become a major regional currency (a Patrician
Currency) that is in wide circulation in China's neighboring countries and in the East
Asian region in general. It will be used extensively as a currency of settlement and as a
currency of denomination. By late 2015 RMB had already reached a sufficient degree of
capital account convertibility to qualify for the SDR basket of currencies even though
RMB is not as of yet a freely convertible currency in an orthodox sense.243 Nevertheless,
it is already largely convertible for purposes of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and
Outward Direct Investment (ODI)244, and the official stance is that during the next FYP
the  officials  will  push  ahead  with  capital  account  liberalization  and gradually  make
RMB convertible on the capital  account.  At least  some are willing to buy into this,
believing that China's capital account could be largely open within next three to five
years with some restrictions on capital inflows and outflows.245
If the official timetable for RMB internationalization holds true, RMB might have the
essentials to become a major regional currency by 2020. Much will depend on how the
241 Bowles & Wang (2012) pp. 11 – 14 and 18 – 22.
242 Cohen (2012) pp. 10 – 13.
243 Aitken (2015) and Kynge (2015).
244 Zhou (2015) p. 5.
245 Prasad (2016) p. 5.
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Chinese authorities manage to navigate the turmoil that started in 2015 as RMB made
the transition to a more flexible exchange rate and was compounded by stock market
shocks in 2015 and 2016. The consequent tightening of capital controls to limit capital
outflows and the persistent downward pressure and RMB could hurt investor confidence
for a while impeding RMB's internationalization.246
For  RMB  to  become  a  global  international  currency,  it  will  have  to  first  achieve
midterm  goal  of  being  a  regionalized  currency.247 Achieving  this  goal  will  not  be
dependent solely on the action taken by Chinese officials, and cooperation with APT
countries  will  be necessary even though the  ensuing process  is  likely to  be  at  least
partially market-driven. Some diplomacy will have to be applied as some long running
regional disputes have to be settled before regional cooperation may begin in earnest.248
Whether RMB will become one of the international Top Currencies and whether it will
eventually challenge US dollar for the title of the international currency depends on how
well the Chinese policymakers are able to tackle the previously mentioned short and mid
term challenges.
The opinion on the prospects of RMB becoming an international currency on a global
scale are fairly unanimous: it will takes years and years, maybe even decades before
RMB will become a truly internationalized currency – let alone challenge US dollar.
And  that  is  presupposing  that  the  current  plans  for  RMB  internationalization  and
reforming the Chinese economic model progress without a hitch.249
As a demonstrative example Huang, Wang & Fan estimate that at the end of 2013 the
RMB held a realistic potential of constituting about 2% of world's foreign exchange
reserves. They elaborate further that if all the policy distortions and obstacles for RMB
internationalization were to be removed, RMB would have the potential of composing
about  10%  of  world's  total  foreign  exchange  reserves.250 This  is  only  a  tentative
demonstration of RMB's current status in the international hierarchy of currencies, but it
underscores the point of just how long the road is for RMB to reach a position where it
might  become  an  international  currency  on  a  global  scale.  And  even  if  all  the
preconditions are achieved there still is no guarantee that RMB can challenge the US
246 Prasad (2016) p. 3.
247 Chey (2013) pp. 12 – 13, Cui (2013) pp. 81 – 84, Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 10 – 16, Gao & Yu
(2010) pp. 119 – 123 and Ito (2011) pp. 14 – 16.
248 Cui (2013) pp. 81 – 84 and Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 10 – 16.
249 Bowles & Wang (2013) pp. 11 – 14, Cui (2013) pp. 81 – 84 and Huang, Wang & Fan (2014) pp. 23 – 
24.
250 Huang, Wang & Fan (2014) pp. 24 – 26.
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dollar. This leads Bowles & Wang to conclude that RMB is most likely not on a path
towards  currency  internationalization,  but  rather  towards  currency  normalization
whereby RMB will claim an international role appropriate to China's importance in the
global economy.251
Even though the internationalization of RMB is China's national project, it need not be
limited  solely  to  Chinese  efforts;  co-opting  other  nations  to  promote  RMB's
internationalization may play a big part in RMB's future. During the 2010s the Chinese
leaders have demonstrated some political creativity by harnessing the emerging nations
dissatisfaction with international organizations such as IMF and World Bank to promote
the internationalization of RMB. Although both NDB established in 2012 by and AIIB
established in 2014 were officially created to complement the existing MDBs252, they
also serve the potential purpose of furthering RMB's internationalization by providing
world economy with RMB denominated liquidity253. For the time being both of these
organizations are limited in size and capacities. They both have started with an initial
authorized capital of $100 billion254, but their disbursing mechanisms and agendas differ
to some degree. 
AIIB  will  focus  solely  on  the  development  of  Asia  with  focus  on  financing  for
development of infrastructure and other productive sectors (energy, transportation etc.)
in  Asia.255 For  the  time  being  AIIB will  only  disburse  its  funds  in  dollars  as  most
member  countries  have  contributed  equity  in  dollars  and  RMB  denominated  funds
would  still  have  limited  use  unless  the  recipients  relied  on  Chinese  suppliers.256
Although the Chinese officials have declared that they will not be using AIIB to promote
the internationalization of RMB257, there is the possibility that later on AIIB will start
disbursing funds denominated in RMB as they have retained the option to raise capital
in other currencies than USD258. Should that come to pass, it would certainly help RMB
along the path for becoming a regional major currency.
NDB, founded by the BRICS nations, is not limited to Asia and will work  as a 'mini-
World  Bank'  to  fund  all  kinds  of  projects  in  the  BRICS  countries  competing  for
251 Bowles & Fang (2013) pp. 20 – 22.
252 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (2016) and New Development Bank (2014).
253 Yangpeng (2016), Huang (2015) and Kuo & Tang (2015).
254 Wildau (2015b).
255 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (2016).
256 Areddy (2016).
257 Wildau & Mitchell (2016).
258 Wong (2016).
57
influence with organizations such as the World Bank and IMF.259 Unlike AIIB, NDB
funding reserves are planned to be denominated in each country's national currency to
limit borrowing costs by using local-currency lending.260 There are also expectations that
the US dollar will be replaced in NDB funding by RMB especially for projects in Asia
(NDB will work in close cooperation with AIIB).261 The organization is still suffering
from some teething-problems as swapping funds raised in, say, RMB to a local currency
so it can be lent to projects in other countries is not without problems.262 Given some
time this  organization,  too,  could become a  convenient  vehicle  for  promoting  RMB
internationalization both in East Asia and globally by providing liquid RMB to world
economy.
To sum it up: if the recent crisis truly has receded and there are no major economic,
financial or other setbacks for the Chinese economy, China might be able to realize the
conditions required for RMB to become a regional Patrician Currency in some five to
ten  years.263 This  estimate  does  not  seem  to  differ  greatly  from  the  official
proclamations, hinting that the official agenda of RMB internationalization is more than
just lip service.  However, becoming an international currency Top Currency will take
years or even decades more. Challenging the US dollar for supremacy, too, is a goal
faraway in the future. Also, due to terminological ambiguity over what constitutes 'full
convertibility' and how dedicated the Chinese authorities are to uphold the stable value
of  currency  and  a  safe  financial  environment  as  opposed  to  full  capital  account
convertibility and the entailing risks, it is hard to predict exactly which way and at what
pace the opening of RMB capital account convertibility and the internationalization of
RMB will continue. The bitter lessons of the stock market crashes of 2015 and 2016 and
the  perpetual  downward pressure  on RMB ever  since  the  2015 transition  to  a  freer
exchange rate regime264 might dissuade the policy-makers from making hasty efforts at
full  capital  account  convertibility  and  they  might  prefer  to  stick  to  their  'managed
convertibility' strategy for the time being.
259 NDB (2014) and Wildau (2015b).
260 Areddy (2016) and NDB (2014).
261 The BRICS Post (2015) and Kynge (2014).
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4.4. Deciphering RMB Internationalization – What Motivates It?
As  was  demonstrated  earlier,  analyzing  the  costs  and  benefits  of  currency
internationalization depends to a large degree on the point of view one takes. A 'purely
economical' assessment will only take into account the easily quantifiable econometric
aspects of currency internationalization whereas a political economic analysis will stress
the  power  considerations  of  currency  internationalization.  Hence  a  set  of  differing
interpretations will be offered here. Note, though, that none of the given interpretations
are  likely  to  provide  a  complete  and  exhaustive  explanation  to  the  motives  behind
RMB's internationalization. Rather the differing views are meant to complement each
other,  to  cover  the  blind  spots  of  each  other  and  offer  a  thorough  insight  into  the
motivations behind the internationalization of RMB.
The  first  explanation  offered  here  could  be  broadly  labeled  as  the  'natural  outcome
explanation'  and it  can be found at  the base of almost every other explanation even
though it is not explicitly stated by everyone writing on the subject. Of the writers cited
here  only  Eichengreen  &  Kawai  and  Huang,  Wang  &  Fan  explicitly  attribute  the
internationalization of the RMB to China's rise as an economic powerhouse.265 However,
it is quite unlikely that other writers will disagree with them as most agree that a sizable
economy with a wide transactional network is a prerequisite for a national currency to
be accepted as an international currency.266 
In this line of reasoning the internationalization of RMB is predicated on the staggering
economic growth that China has undergone during these past 30 years. As a natural
outcome of that growth China has gained significant importance in regional and global
trade and economy. The development is best illustrated in China's direct neighborhood
where states have started to use RMB as a currency of settlement, denomination and to a
certain degree as an anchor and a reserve currency.
The best way to understand the argument for the natural outcome explanation is to take a
look back at the prerequisites of currency internationalization presented earlier. Among
those prerequisites was the ability to provide a vast transactional network. During the
three decades of relentless growth the Chinese economy has become world's  second
largest economy when measured in GDP and has successfully integrated itself into East
Asian and global trade networks. Hence it comes as no surprise that the most progress in
265 Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 3 – 4 and Huang, Wang & Fan (2014) p. 9.
266 Chey (2013) pp. 58 – 60 and Park & Shin (2009) pp. 181 – 183.
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the internationalization of RMB has come through its use as a medium of exchange for
the private sector – or as a currency of settlement. These developments have been aided
by the policies taken by Chinese policy-makers. Especially the programs intended to
create offshore RMB bond markets, such as the dim sum bonds, have made it all the
more appealing to hold on to RMBs acquired through trade as they can be invested for
example into the dim sum bond markets.
Another way of looking at the motivations behind RMB's internationalization is based
on  the  cost-benefit  analysis  presented  earlier.  In  this  line  of  reasoning  the  Chinese
policy-makers  and  officials  have  gone  through  the  previously  presented  calculus  of
currency internationalization and decided that the benefits outweigh the costs and risks
and have decided to proceed with the internationalization of their national currency, but
in a prudent and incremental fashion. Again, only few authors expressly state that in
their opinion the Chinese policy-makers and officials have done the math and decided to
proceed with the internationalization of RMB.267 This does not necessarily mean that the
others disagree with this assessment – rather they stress the importance of other factors.
Earlier  on  the  costs  and  benefits  associated  to  currency  internationalization  were
presented in general terms, but there are always context dependent variables that the
policy-makers and officials have to take into account. In China's case the single most
important country-specific factor is the reform of the Chinese economic model itself.268
Here the picture gets a bit messy: some of the policies enacted in the name of RMB
internationalization can be read as policies aiming to reform piece by piece the Chinese
economic model. For example the increase in exchange rate flexibility is a necessary
step  if  China  is  to  make  the  transition  from  an  exporting  powerhouse  with  an
undervalued currency to  an  economic  model  based  on more  domestic  consumption.
Likewise the liberalization of Chinese financial sector is not only an inevitable part in
RMB internationalization, but a central reform in changing the Chinese economic model
from  an  emerging  market  economy  to  a  more  sophisticated  and  developed  market
economy with enhanced resource allocation through the financial sector instead of state
controlled banking sector as has been the case up to now.
Viewed from this perspective the internationalization of RMB can be read as a measure
Chinese policy-makers have taken to reform their economic model. The whole operation
of internationalizing the RMB can be read,  as Yongding Yu does,  as an incremental
267 For example Gao (2012) p. 72, Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 3 – 4 and Ito (2011) pp. 9 – 10.
268 Eichengreen & Kawai (2014) pp. 11 – 13 Gao & Coffman (2013) pp. 139 – 143 and Huang, Wang & 
Fan (2014) pp. 18 – 20.
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operation to  liberalize the capital  account.  That  is  to  say, the internationalization  of
RMB is actually a by-product of the process to liberalize the capital account itself.269
Depending on how drastic measures the Chinese policy-makers are willing to make, the
internationalization/economic  reform  process  can  develop  even  into  some  kind  of
political reform. For example if more independence is granted to the judicial system and
the  People's  Bank  of  China  (PBoC),  the  process  of  RMB  internationalization  will
become  an  indistinguishable  part  of  political  reform  of  the  Chinese  system.  This,
however, is still only speculative thinking, as no reforms for the judicial system or the
central bank have been put forth so far.
Whereas  the  previous  two  explanations  stressed  the  internal  or  inherent  factors
motivating  the  internationalizing  of  RMB,  other  explanations  attribute  it  more  to
external factors. Here two motivations driving the internationalization rise to the fore:
the  accumulation  of  dollar  denominated  foreign  exchange  reserves  and  the  Chinese
leaders' dissatisfaction with the prevailing international monetary and financial system.
According to this interpretation the internationalization of RMB was a reaction to GFC
and the subsequent  quantitative easing (QE) policies  of  the Federal  Reserve System
(from hereon 'Fed').270 By carrying out the QE, Fed was in effect deflecting the cost of
adjustment onto its trading partners as the QE would inevitably depreciate US dollar's
real exchange rate. This turn of events would erode Chinese exporters' competitiveness
and deliver a huge blow to their foreign exchange reserves. Thus the internationalization
of RMB can be interpreted as an effort to protect domestic importers and exporters from
international  currency  volatility  and  to  reduce  the  country's  exposure  to  changes  in
USD-RMB exchange rate by diversifying China's foreign exchange reserves.271 Or to put
it in other words: to hedge against the US dollar. 
Whereas Bowles & Wang see RMB internationalization first and foremost as a defensive
reaction to insulate the Chinese economy from financial turbulence272, others like Cui
and Gao & Coffmann see it as a more engaged and active reaction. Viewed this way the
Chinese  policy-makers  acknowledged  Chinese  economy's  importance  to  the  global
economy and promoted the internationalization of RMB as a way to address the global
imbalances issue.273
269 Yu (2012) pp. 20 -23
270 Bowles & Wang (2013) pp. 14 – 18 and Cui (2013) pp. 68 – 71.
271 Bowles & Wang (2013) pp. 14 – 18, Cohen (2012) pp. 4 – 6, Cui (2013) pp. 68 – 71, Gao (2013) pp. 
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Closely related to the previous explanation is the view that the Chinese leaders' decision
to proceed with the internationalization of RMB stemmed from deep dissatisfaction with
the prevailing international financial system. Bowles & Wang further elaborate on this
dividing the dissatisfaction into three distinct items: 1) failure of regulations on financial
institutions (especially in US), 2) asymmetric monitoring and surveillance on the part of
international  institutions274 and  3)  the  role  of  US dollar  as  the  international  reserve
currency.275 The  first  two  items  need  no  further  comment  as  they  are  rather  self-
explanatory, but the last item, the role of US dollar as the international reserve currency
needs a bit more elaboration. As US dollar acts as both a national and an international
currency, the Chinese leaders have argued that it is both logically inconsistent and, in the
long run, unsustainable as has become evident with the onset of GFC.276 Instead they
would  prefer  to  have  an  international  currency  that  is  stable  over  time  and  issued
according to transparent rules, managed to meet global liquidity needs and not subject to
the interests  of any single country.277 Zhou Xiaochuan, the Governor of the People's
Bank of China at the time, went even as far as to propose the increased use of SDR as a
super-sovereign  currency  partly  replacing  US  dollar  in  the  international  system.278
Although a bold proposition, it might have been, as Bowles & Wang argue, more a tactic
to divert the discussion away from China's culpability in the global imbalances issue
than  an  earnest  desire  to  adopt  SDR  as  an  international  currency.279 However,  the
Chinese leader's interest in SDR does not seem to have been only a fleeting fancy, as
they have been pushing for RMB to be included into the currency basket in the IMF
board meeting taking place on 30th November 2015.280 Were RMB to be included into
the SDR basket of currencies, it would indeed make sense to promote increased use of
SDR as international currency, as it would help the internationalization of RMB since it
would be a composite of the synthetic currency.
Although the founding of the new MDBs, AIIB and NDB, can be read as only a means
to  promote  RMB internationalization,  there   is  no doubt  that  at  the same time they
present genuine dissatisfaction with the prevailing international financial order. To some
degree this lends credibility to the claims that RMB internationalization is driven by
dissatisfaction with the prevailing international financial order.
274 Ie. too much attention is paid to the performance of emerging and developing countries whereas the 
industrialized and post-industrialized countries are monitored with relative lenience.
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The final explanation/approach for the internationalization of RMB comes from the IPE
perspective.  Given  how  much  importance  to  currencies  is  attached  in  international
politics281 it seems unlikely that the internationalization process of RMB lacks political
motivation. The question is only to what degree the process is politically motivated. A
separation of potential IPE motivations behind RMB internationalization is divided into
two layers: regional and global. This separation reflects the fact that there are several
key differences between regional politics and global politics.
First of the key differences is the level of involvement of the United States. Although
they keep a tight all-around watch over East Asian affairs, US has only a limited say in
East Asia's regional affairs. On the global stage, however, US has a lot more clout as her
interests  are  better  represented  in  international  institutions  such as  IMF and has  the
“exorbitant privilege” of both issuing the de facto international Top Currency and having
the world's most important financial system. 
Another  key  difference  is  the  plain  fact  that  East  Asia  is  without  a  doubt  China's
neighborhood. The only country with comparable economic and financial stature in the
region is Japan, which has been bogged in economic malaise for the past twenty plus
years – a situation which has been further compounded by political stagnation and the
2011 Great East Japan earthquake. But economic size is not the only advantage China
enjoys of in her home region: close economic ties with her neighbors, strong military
presence in  the area,  a large and widely spread diaspora,  shared cultural  values and
history etc. To put it briefly, China is deeply embedded in East Asian culture, economy
and geopolitics.
The prior experiences in regional cooperation in the East Asian region form the last key
difference. Ever since AFC China has been engaged more or less actively in regional
cooperation. Although China's reaction to Japan's proposal for the creation of AMF in
the immediate aftermath of the crisis was at best lukewarm, China has been actively
engaged in the subsequent initiatives such as CMI and CMIM, the Asian Bond Market
Initiative (ABMI), NDB, AIIB etc., creating precedents for regional cooperation. The
formation and institutionalization of regional forums such as the ASEAN+3, EAS etc.,
too, have created a set of institutionalized platforms for discussing regional issues and
policies. Viewed in the light of GFC and its treatment – and especially the build-up of
global imbalances leading into the crisis – it is rather evident that there are no similar
channels and institutions available to China on the global level. The inclusion of China
281 Even the modest 2% devaluation of Yuan in August 2015 caused a series of outbursts protesting it as a
potential declaration of currency war. See for example Karunungan (2015) and Sweeney (2015).
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into the prestigious G8 group could improve the situation a bit, but given the informality
of  the  G8282,  it  is  unlikely  that,  for  the  foreseeable  future,  there  will  be  similar
institutional structures for policy discussion and issue resolution on the global level than
there are on the East Asian level.
Given China's powerful position in regional economic, financial and geopolitical affairs
it  seems  unlikely  that  RMB  internationalization  has  been  motivated  by  defensive
considerations. Hence the considerations are more likely to be offensive in nature.
The  potential  benefits  for  China  come  from  various  forms  of  leveraging  and
commitment/entrapment.  All  of these benefits will  achieve their  full  potential  on the
condition that RMB becomes a fully internationalized currency in the region (a Patrician
Currency). Of special importance is that RMB becomes a widely held reserve currency
and an anchor currency in the region, as these attributes of an international currency
provide the currency's issuer the most power over others who are using the currency.
The greater relative weight other countries give to RMB in their currency baskets – let
alone  if  they  peg  to  RMB –  and  the  larger  amounts  of  RMB denominated  foreign
exchange reserves they hold, the greater potential leverage China will gain over them.
This applies to the private sector, too: the more dependent private actors become of
RMB in their daily business, the more vulnerable they become to leveraging strategies.
When  it  comes  to  leveraging  the  more  overt  coercive  means  come  to  mind  first:
sanctions,  payments  and,  above all,  currency manipulation.  Should  other  East  Asian
countries include RMB in their currency baskets and assign it great relative importance,
they do so at  the risk of exposing themselves to Chinese aggression in the form of
currency manipulation. Given the other East Asian economies' currently relatively small
importance to  China,  as compared to  the US and EU, it  is  unlikely that  China will
exercise such coercive policies. If, in the long run, the ASEAN countries were to surpass
US as China's  leading trade partner, this  scenario could become more relevant  or if
China  wanted  to  exert  monetary  and/or  financial  pressure  during  a  geopolitical
confrontation.
Another  way  the  other  East  Asian  countries  might  expose  themselves  to  Chinese
exercises of monetary power would be to to hold sizable RMB denominated foreign
exchange reserves or just assets nominated in RMB. By doing so they would come well
within the range of the exchange rate weapon and could suffer from the spillover effects
originating from Chinese macroeconomic policies. Taken to the extremes, in the long
282 On the informal nature of G8, see for example Gstöhl (2012) and Huigens & Niemann (2014).
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run the East Asian countries might come to hold RMB denominated assets in excess and
become exposed to Chinese macroeconomic policies – a position very similar to that of
China with her US denominated foreign exchange reserves. However, this is all rather
speculative and such a scenario would take a long time to unfold.
It is hard to pinpoint any concrete leveraging advantages that China could gain over its
regional partners/rivals in the short to middle term. Much of this owes to the fact that the
regional actors (both government and private) would always have a choice: they could
choose between USD and RMB – and even the Japanese yen. As long as the other
regional actors have a choice, it is unlikely that coercive politics will be effective as the
competitive  situation  will  provide  the  users  ample  opportunities  for  hedging against
overtly coercive politics. In this sense it could be even said that it is in the interest of the
smaller countries to have multiple international currencies available to them.
Even though there are no apparent observable power gains in the regional politics in
internationalizing RMB, then perhaps the gains could be of structural nature? Strategies
of commitment provide no insight here as China is not actively seeking to commit any
other  country  to  any  kind  of  currency  regime.   Potential  gains  in  power  from
entrapment, on the other hand, are far more tangible. The more RMB will be used as a
medium of exchange, store of value and unit of account on both official and private
level, the more likely its users are to became dependent on it and to uphold the system
behind it. An important step in internationalizing a currency was the creation of open,
deep and well-functioning financial markets. If the Chinese leaders succeed in this, not
only  will  they  have  met  one  of  the  necessary  criterion  for  internationalizing  their
national currency but also in creating a viable financial nexus in their home region. This
in turn,  can confer  some structural  power to  China as  they are able  to  set  financial
standards in their home region. On top of that, given the relative under-development of
South-East Asian countries' financial markets, the development and opening of Chinese
financial markets might lead to notable financial inter-connecting in the region further
entrapping the regional actors in Chinese structural power.
On the global level the potential explanations for the internationalization of RMB are
more varied than on the regional level and defensive strategies, too, are present owing to
the marked presence of the US and US dollar.
Taking into  account  the  US'  preponderant  position  in  global  financial  and monetary
affairs and the the recent experiences of GFC, the motivations for near and mid-term
action are more likely to be defensive than offensive in nature and involve various forms
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of hedging. The key issue is the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves denominated
in US dollars and the entailing exposure to changes in USD-RMB exchange rate. What
the Chinese leaders want to do is to diversify their foreign reserves and diminish the
inflow of US dollars through trade and foreign direct  investment.  This is  where the
internationalization of RMB comes into picture. The more Chinese trade is settled in
RMB,  the  less  dollars  will  flow  into  the  country.  This  aspect  of  RMB
internationalization was at first hampered by a mismatch between exports and imports at
the early stages, but 
the ratio has been evening out lately. However, getting East Asia to settle its trade in
RMB will not alone solve China's dollar problems: China still runs large current account
surpluses vis-à-vis its largest trade partners, EU and US. Another way to diminish dollar
inflows would be for the foreign direct investment into China to be denominated in
RMB. This  would  require  open,  deep and well-functioning financial  markets  where
Chinese  financial  institutions  and  corporations  could,  for  example,  issue  bonds
denominated in RMB. Such a goal, as has been shown, is still far off in the future. Were
the  Chinese  policy-makers  intent  on  reducing  dollar  accumulation,  a  considerable
appreciation in RMB exchange rate and/or the adaptation of an exchange rate regime
with more flexibility would be more successful solutions, but so far the Chinese leaders
have not been willing to pay the associated price these solutions entail.
Overall, it is likely that the RMB internationalization has not been motivated by short or
middle term power considerations, as the potential  gains in short to middle term are
small. But that does not rule out long term gains in power. Yet these gains will not come
in the form of overt power over (coercive leveraging), but rather from the freedom of
movement  –  the  autonomy  from  other  actor's  influence  that  Benjamin  Cohen
highlighted. The aspects that could contribute to this autonomy the most, according to
Cohen, are the development of China's domestic financial markets and the acceptance of
RMB  as  an  international  reserve  currency  as  these  are  the  aspects  of  currency
internationalization that enhance a state's power capacities the most.283 In this context
they can be labeled as a hedging strategy. In the very long run China might be able to
reap political benefits similar to those enjoyed by the US such as the ability to deflect
and delay adjustments and costs. But that's a big 'if'.
Some consideration to the potential soft power benefits, too, are in place. If the RMB is
accepted as an international reserve currency and, more importantly, as a currency in the
SDR basket of currencies it is likely  to enhance the soft power capacities of China
283 Cohen (2012) pp. 6 – 9.
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through  the  prestige  gained  from having  one's  national  currency  as  one  of  the  key
international currencies.
The last  aspect  to  be considered from the IPE analysis  of  RMB internationalization
comes from the question whether or not the Chinese leaders will opt to use regional
cooperation to further their policy aims. That is, will RMB internationalization be linked
to regional cooperative action or will China act independently.
Prior to GFC William Grimes predicted that insulation from the harmful macroeconomic
policies of US would be the main motivation for monetary and financial cooperation in
East Asia.284 However, he contended that of the East Asian countries “China has the
weakest  interest  in  pursuing  policy  of  regional  insulation,  given  that  its  own
vulnerability is limited by strict capital controls and (mostly) dollar-pegged currency.”285
Two important things have happened since Grimes' initial assessment: 1) the onset of
GFC and 2) the process to internationalize RMB. The onset of GFC seems to have acted
as an eye-opener for the Chinese leaders as they have, arguably, responded to it with the
hitherto unthinkable strategy of internationalizing their national currency. Incidentally,
the internationalization of RMB will inevitably entail further exchange rate flexibility
and the lifting of capital controls at some point. When that happens, the question will be
whether the Chinese leaders want to pursue regional policies to smoothen the initial
disruptions caused by a flexible exchange rate regime during the transitional period.
There could be an opening for some form of regional exchange rate cooperation when
China  makes  the  transition  to  a  flexible  exchange rate  regime,  but  there  are  strong
reasons to believe that this will not turn into a long-term and/or institutionalized regional
exchange rate cooperation.
First of all,  the successful internationalization of RMB will,  in the mid to long term
solve  for  China  exactly  the  same problems  that  regional  exchange  rate  cooperation
would have done: it will help China insulate herself from US' macroeconomic policies,
help reduce China's  vast  US dollar  denominated foreign exchange reserves and will
most likely help even out the trade imbalances between China and US in the long term.
Furthermore, the successful internationalization of RMB in East Asia – especially the
acceptation of RMB as a currency of denomination, settlement and invoicing in regional
business – will  provide China with similar benefits  as regional currency cooperation
would  have  (exchange  rate  stability,  investment  opportunities  etc.),  but  with  the
284 Grimes (2009) pp. 26 – 30.
285 Ibid. p. 27.
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expectation that in this case it will be China who will reap most of the benefits. Judging
from the  neorealist  perspective,  it  would  make  little  sense  that  the  Chinese  leaders
would opt  to commit  themselves  to a regional arrangement that  might  not suit  their
interests in mid to long term. Moreover, the successful internationalization of RMB will
provide China significant relative gains over others and consolidate China's position as
the number one major power in East Asian financial and monetary regionalism.
The second reason why China is likely to opt to proceed with the internationalization of
RMB as opposed to regional exchange rate cooperation can be found in the politics and
history of East Asia. The legacy of ASEAN Way, the modus operandi of regional politics
and the Sino-Japanese rivalry presented earlier will make it very difficult to build the
required institutions  and organizations for regional  exchange rate  cooperation.  There
seems to be little incentive for the Chinese leaders to squander time and resources to
foster regional exchange rate cooperation as there are no guarantees for results. And
even if there were, they would probably be diluted ones. 
Overall,  time is  still  on China's  side and there  seems to be no point  in  committing
oneself  to  a  regional  arrangement  that  would  probably  not  suit  China's  long  term
interests. Adopting a national strategy,  the internationalization of RMB, is likely to yield
the same benefits with the added benefit of more relative gains in power over others.
The  prediction  of  this  section  is  that  China  will  stick  to  her  national  strategy, the
internationalization of RMB, and forsake ambitious efforts at  regional exchange rate
cooperation.
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5. Exchange Rate Regimes and East Asia
To understand how the internationalization of RMB will affect East Asian exchange rate
and currency cooperation it is necessary to first study what rationales for East Asian
exchange rate and currency cooperation have been presented this far and to estimate
how relevant they are at the moment.
5.1. Exchange Rate Regimes and Currency Cooperation in East Asia
This study identifies three possible motives driving regional exchange rate cooperation:
potential  economic  and  financial  gains  from  exchange  rate  stabilization,  global
imbalances and regional insulation against dollar politics.  None of these motives are
mutually exclusive and that they may all be present in the relevant actors' decisions to
varying degrees.
Exchange rate  stabilization.  Most of  the  research on exchange rate  cooperation and
regime formation hails from an implicitly liberal perspective286: the researchers stress the
importance  of  institutions  and  how  all  the  participating  actors  benefit  through
multilateral  cooperation.  In  this  case  the  benefits  come mainly from stabilization  of
exchange rates vis-à-vis each other on a regional scale and/or against an extra-regional
reference  point.287 Although  there  is  no  single  liberal  approach  to  the  East  Asian
financial and monetary regionalism, most of the writers on the subject tend to share a
definite set of premises. To quote William Grimes, they place premium on “increasing
regional integration among East Asian economies creating opportunities for mutually
beneficial multilateral cooperation among governments.”288 Viewed in this light most of
the problems facing regional exchange rate cooperation are collective action problems,
which require mutual cooperation of regional actors if they are to be solved.289
The most salient and oft cited benefit of regional currency cooperation is that given the
economic integration East Asia has undergone in recent decades it has become a highly
286 Grimes (2009) p. 31.
287 The stabilization of exchange rates in East Asia is a common goal shared by all the theorists presented
here. All of the writers are quite explicit about it. See for example Eichengren (2007), Kawai (2007a 
& 2007b), Ogawa & Shimizu (2006) and Williamsson (2005)
288 Grimes (2009) p. 31.
289 Grimes (2009) pp. 31 – 34, Williamsson (2005) p. 12  and Yoshitomi (2007) pp. 36 – 45.
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interconnected economic and financial sphere in which the trade of goods and services
would handsomely profit from the stabilization of regional exchange rates. A reduction
in currency volatility would also serve to boost intraregional foreign direct investment.290
Though  the  path  towards  regional  economic  integration  has  this  far  been  that  of
proliferating free trade agreements (FTAs),291 there is still  a lot that trade could gain
from intraregional  exchange  rate  stabilization,  as  exchange  rate  volatility  noticeably
reduces trade between FTA partners.292 
The case for intraregional exchange rate stabilization is further underscored by the fact
that  due  to  the  development  of  extensive  regional  production  networks  and  supply
chains aimed at the American and European end markets the regional economies have a
much larger convergence in terms of business cycles among themselves than with their
main  export  destination  markets  such  as  EU and  US.293 At  the  same  time  regional
financial  markets,  too,  have  experienced deepening  integration294 due  to  progressing
regional deregulation of domestic financial systems, opening of financial services and
relaxation of capital and exchange controls.295 They are, however, still relatively under-
developed and currency cooperation and exchange rate stabilization could give them,
too, a good boost as the current high levels of exchange rate volatility lead to fewer
transactions in not only goods and services, but in assets as well.296 
The  associated  exchange risks  also weigh heavily  on  borrowing costs  when foreign
currency bonds are issued, lowering further the regional investors' appetite for regional
bonds.297 For example Kim, Lee and Shin point out instability in monetary and exchange
rate regimes as the main culprit for low financial integration within the region.298
Global Imbalances.  The global imbalances, defined here as “a shorthand for the large
current account deficits of the United States and massive accumulation of foreign assets,
mainly dollar assets, by Asian economies”299, problem is largely based on the economic
and financial dynamics between East Asia and US leading up to the GFC after which the
dynamics of global imbalances have changed somewhat.
290 Kawai & Pontes (2014) p. 29, Chung & Eichengreen (2007) pp. 1 – 3, Dieter (2006) pp. 31 – 32, 
Eichengreen (2006) p. 432, Shin & Wang (2007) pp. 82 – 86. Choi (2007), p. 121.
291 Dent (2008) pp. 185 – 206, Higgott (2005) pp. 19 – 21 and Shin & Wang (2007) pp. 78 – 82.
292 Shin & Wang (2007) pp. 82 – 86. The exact amount of reduction being  “up to 4% per a standard 
deviation in currency volatility”. 
293 He & Liao (2010) pp. 16 – 17 and Moneta & Rüffer (2006) pp. 42 – 44.
294 Kim & Lee (2008) pp. 14 – 15 and Park & Shin (2015) pp. 34 – 35.
295 Kawai (2007)  pp. 1 – 3.
296 Eichengreen (2006) p. 432.
297 Kim, Lee & Shin (2008) pp. 33 – 35.
298 Kim, Lee & Shin (2008) pp. 27 – 31 and Ogawa & Shimizu (2006) p. 1 – 4.
299 Eichengreen & Chung (2007) p. vii.
70
On the East Asian side the widening of imbalances was driven by two factors: that of
reserve accumulation (mostly in US dollars) and of maintaining competitive exchange
rates vis-à-vis the US dollar. The imperative for reserve accumulation was deemed a
hard learned lesson from AFC which made it acutely clear to the crisis struck East Asian
countries  that  in  order  to maintain dollar  pegged exchange rate  regimes stable,  they
needed a vast arsenal of liquid foreign exchange reserves, mainly US dollars. At the
same time their economic models and their economic development itself was dependent
on export-led growth, which, too, made stable and competitive exchange rates a policy
imperative. This was made possible by US profligacy (will to consume beyond their
means) which was caused by a combination of high private investment,  low private
savings and low public saving-investment balance and filling in the financial deficit by
borrowing from abroad – especially from East Asia.300 
On the other hand it can also be argued that the East Asian countries deliberately kept
their currencies undervalued and benefited from overvalued US dollar, which then lead
to a massive current account imbalance between East Asian countries and US.301 
The imbalances peaked prior to GFC and have since subsided somewhat as the crisis
altered the dynamics between East Asia and US. In 2014 an IMF report found that the
“global imbalances have narrowed significantly since their peak, and their configuration
has changed markedly in the process.” The study found that by 2013 the US deficit had
shrank by half in dollar terms and almost two-thirds as a percentage of the world GDP
dropping down to 2.4% of US GDP (or 1.6% of world GDP). Based on this some have
argued that the global imbalances issue – or at least the imbalances between US and East
Asia – are a thing of the past302 and the writers of the IMF report, too, concede that, at
least for the time being, the problem has subsided.303
Although the current account flow imbalances seem to have subsided for the time being,
a reversal in policy choices might trigger a renewed burgeoning of global imbalances.
And,  what  is  more  important,  the  East  Asian  nations  still  sit  on  top  of  large  USD
denominated foreign exchange reserves exposing both the private and public balance
300 Yoshitomi (2007) p. 23, Aslam, Beidas-Strom, Terrones & Yépez (2014) pp. 115 – 118 and Chinn, 
Eichengreen, Ito (2011) pp. 2- 8.
301 Ahearne et al. (2007) pp. 3 – 4, Aizenman & Lee (2006) pp. 9 – 10, Chinn, Eichengreen, Ito (2011) 
pp. 2- 8 and  Dooley, Folkerts-Landau & Garber (2004) pp. 2 – 6.
302 See, for example, Eichengreen (2014).
303 Aslam, Beidas-Strom, Terrones & Yépez (2014) pp. 115 – 118.
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sheets to large capital losses due to sudden dollar depreciation. Both of these problems
could be partly addressed by successful regional exchange rate cooperation or regime
formation. Were the East Asian nations to agree on a joint exchange rate regime – or at
least a shared approach – they could let their currencies appreciate in an orderly fashion
against the the US dollar, thus preventing both the widening of current account flows
and foreign exchange reserve accumulation.304
Such an arrangement is indispensable for the unwinding of the aforementioned dollar
denominated foreign exchange reserves, too: a joint policy is needed if the East Asian
governments  are  to  unwind  their  dollar  positions  without  causing  massive  market
turmoil.305 If the process were uncontrolled, there is the possibility that it could lead to a
run  on  the  US dollar  and  seriously  damage  the  US  economy.  This  would  then  be
transmitted back to the East Asian economies through trade losses.306
Insulation and Dollar Politics.  Drawing from realist tradition William Grimes stresses
one  rationale  over  others  in  motivating  East  Asian  currency  cooperation:  regional
insulation. This insulation can furthermore be divided into distinct threats from which to
insulate  oneself:  global  imbalances  and  dollar  politics.307 As  the  former  of  these  to
rationales as already been analyzed above, only the latter rationale, insulation against
dollar politics, merits further elaboration.
As explained previously, being the issuer of the definitive international currency does
come with benefits. Most notably these benefits include the ability to deflect payments
and adjustments onto your trading partners. According to Grimes, Japan has had to deal
the most with the negative effects of US macroeconomic policies ever since 1970s and
would benefit enormously from insulation against them. ASEAN countries, too would
benefit from regional currency cooperation, as it would insulate them against speculative
attacks and regional currency volatility. Grimes asserts that of the regional actors only
China has little to gain from regional currency cooperation and the insulation it would
confer – as the Chinese national currency, RMB, is pegged to US dollar308.309
Though  Grimes  agrees  that  a  joint  regional  strategy  in  the  form  of  currency  and
304 Choi (2007) pp. 123 – 125, Kawai (2007) pp. 113 - 117 and Yoshitomi (2007) pp. 36 – 45.
305 Chung & Eichengreen (2007) pp. 1 – 3, Grimes (2009) pp. 140 – 142 and Yoshitomi (2007) pp. 36 – 
45.
306 Chung & Eichengreen (2007) pp. 1 – 3, Grimes (2009) pp. 140 – 142, Kawai (2008) pp. 95 – 96  and 
Yoshitomi (2007) pp. 32 – 33.
307 Grimes (2009) pp. 118 – 120.
308 This has changed since. The RMB is no longer rigidly pegged to USD, but still exhibits very little 
exchange rate flexibility, so there still is not much in this for China.
309 Grimes (2009) pp. 20 – 22 and 26 – 27.
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exchange rate cooperation would be the optimal strategy to further regional insulation
against harmful US macroeconomic policies, he finds it unlikely as the requirements for
such cooperation exceed the limits of political will and consensus in the region. Neither
does  the  East  Asian  region,  according  to  Grimes'  neorealist  analysis,  possess  the
hegemonic leader required for any ambitious currency and exchange rate coordination
policy.310 Instead he makes a more modest proposal, which will be reviewed later.
5.2. East Asian Exchange Rate Regimes and Blocs
As discussed previously,  in  order to  understand whether  structural  power is  shaping
actors'  choices of exchange rate regime or not one must first  determine the relevant
actors' preferences. The purpose of this section is to provide an understanding of the
East Asian nations exchange rate preferences and motivations through an  analysis of
their exchange rate policies for the time period 1997 – 2015.
Prior to AFC all East Asian countries, with the exception of Japan, had pegged their
currencies to US dollar.311 After the crisis, however, the currency situation became more
heterogeneous with some countries choosing to peg their currencies to  US dollar, some
adopting a free float and the rest a basket of currencies.
After the crisis Japan, kept her pre-crisis policy and stuck to a free floating exchange
rate arrangement. The IMF classification for Japan is an 'independent floater'312 from
2000  up  to  2009  after  which  Japan  is  listed  as  a  'free  floater'313,  despite  of  her
government's heavy interventions in 2003 – 2004314.
South  Korea  has  adopted  similar  policies  as  Japan  and  is  listed  as  having  an
independently floating exchange rate arrangement from 2000 up to 2009, after which the
arrangement switches from 'free floating' to just 'floating'.315 Although the Korean won
310 Grimes (2009) pp. 145 – 151.
311 Girardin (2011) pp. 9 -13, Henning (2012) p. 5, Kawai & Pontines (2014b) p. 37  McKinnon & 
Schnabl (2004b) pp. 198 – 199.
312 “The exchange rate is market-determined, with any official foreign exchange market intervention 
aimed at moderating the rate of change and preventing undue fluctuations in the exchange rate, rather 
than at establishing a level for it. In these regimes, in principle, the authorities may pursue an 
independent monetary policy.”
313 “A major difference between an independent floating regime and a free floating regime is that the 
former may allow frequent currency market interventions while the latter does not.” Kawai & 
Pontines (2014b) p.20.
314 Girardin (2011) pp. 12 – 13.
315 IMF sources offer no explanation to the difference between just 'floating' and other floating 
arrangements. According to Rajan South Korea operates a flexible exchange rate regime with inflation
targeting. (Rajan (2011) pp. 4 – 5.)
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seems to bee an independent floater, some, like Henning, have found evidence that the
won has been tracking the Chinese RMB 'somewhat more closely' since the onset of
GFC, suggesting that the won is in fact at least loosely tracking RMB.316
The People's Republic of China (PRC) held on to her hard dollar peg up to 2005 when it
was announced that more flexibility would allowed in the exchange rate of RMB. De
jure  it  was  announced  that  the  PRC's  exchange  rate  regime  would  be  a  basket  of
currencies (weights unannounced), but as the real exchange rate of RMB showed only
little variance during the years leading up to GFC, PRC's exchange rate regime for those
years is classified as a crawling peg (pegged to USD) by IMF.317
In August 2008, as a response to GFC, China's exchange rate regime reverted back to a
currency peg (US dollar). The peg arrangement was kept until May 2010 when it was
announced that the exchange rate regime would be moved back to a currency basket
with  more  flexibility  than  before  the  crisis.  As  a  result  RMB  has  considerably
appreciated – especially against the dollar – since 2010, but the regime is still classified
as  a  crawling peg.318 On 11th of  August  2015 the  Chinese government  announced it
would move RMB into  a  more  flexible  exchange rate  regime319,  where it  would be
“floating  around  the  equilibrium  level  in  both  directions”320.  Further  exchange  rate
flexibility through changes to the central parity rate mechanism was pledged in the most
recent FYP released in March 2016, but when and how they will  take effect is still
unknown.
For ASEAN countries some form of managed float has been the regime of choice after
AFC. During the interim years between the two crises Indonesia,  Myanmar,  Singapore
and Thailand operated a managed float consisting of a currency basket, and were joined
in 2005 by Malaysia, which followed China's footsteps in de-pegging from the dollar
and made a  transition  to  a  currency basket  system.  After  GFC Indonesia,  Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand have continued to operate a currency basket system whereas
Myanmar  has  opted  to  peg  her  exchange  rate  to  SDR321,  which  itself  is  an  index
composed of various currencies.322 The arrangement was changed in 2012 from a soft
peg to SDR to a managed float.323
316 Henning (2012) pp. 4 – 6.
317 Kawai & Pontines (2014b) p. 3, Henning (2012) pp. 4 – 6, Ma & McCauley (2010) pp. 1 – 2. and Yu 
(2007) p. 55.
318 Henning (2012) pp. 3 – 4, Kawai & Pontines (2014b) pp. 9 – 11 and  Rajan (2011) pp. 4 – 5, 
319 Noble & Wigglesworth (2015).
320 Mayeda & Cao (2015).
321 IMF (2013) p. 15.
322 Kawai & Pontines (2014b) pp. 9 – 11 and Rajan (2011) pp. 4 – 5.
323 IMF (2013) p. 15.
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Between the crises both Laos and Vietnam operated a managed float for a while, but
after GFC have switched to what IMF refers to as a 'stabilized arrangement'. Officially
Vietnam maintains a crawling peg and band around the dollar. Before GFC Cambodia
operated a managed float, but after the crisis returned to stabilized arrangement similar
to Laos and Vietnam.324
Philippines' exchange rate regime differs from other ASEAN countries as her exchange
rate regime's history is similar to that of South Korea. During the period between the
crises Philippines' exchange rate arrangement was that of an independent float, but after
GFC it  has moved to just  a float.  Officially the Philippine administration operates a
flexible exchange rate regime – something that checks out with the IMF classification.325
The final ASEAN country,  Brunei,  has chosen to peg her currency to the Singapore
dollar and is, through the proxy currency of Singapore dollar, pegged to a basket of
currencies.326 The only currency to hold a conventional fixed dollar peg at the moment is
the Hong Kong dollar, which has steadfastly been pegged to the US dollar.327
There is little disagreement over the taxonomy of regional exchange rate regimes among
the experts, but the real difference comes from interpreting them. The differences start
with the choice of methodology and analysis over the approximations of the relative
weights of currencies that the countries have in their currency baskets. This is further
compounded by contrasting interpretations over why the currencies are in the basket and
why they have been assigned such and such relative weights. A handy way to approach
the preferences underlying region-wide exchange rate regime choices is to examine the
debate over whether there exist regional currency blocs or not: if there exists a currency
bloc  (or  multiple  blocs)  or  at  least  broad regional  trends  then  it  would  be  an ideal
starting place for regional exchange rate cooperation as individual preferences would
have already coincided. Admittedly a country-by-country analysis of what goes into a
given country's exchange rate regime preferences would yield more accurate results, but
such studies are not available for all of the countries in question and such an analysis
would be beyond the scope of this study.
In the debate over East Asian exchange rate blocs there are three competing hypotheses:
the dollar standard, the RMB bloc and a regional monetary unit reminiscent of ACU.
324 Girardin (2011) pp. 13 – 15, Kawai & Pontines (2014b) pp. 20 – 23 and Rajan (2011) pp. 4 – 5.
325 Kawai & Pontines (2014b) pp. 20 – 23 and Rajan (2011) pp. 4 – 5.
326 Girardin (2011) pp. 13 – 15, Kawai & Pontines (2014b) pp. 20 – 23, Rajan (2011) pp. 4 – 5.
327 Kawai & Pontines (2014b) pp. 20 – 23, Rajan (2011) pp. 4 – 5.
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The theses  of  East  Asian  dollar  standard post-AFC was presented by McKinnon &
Schnabl in 2004 and Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (henceforth DFG) in 2004.
Both  studies  found  that  most  of  East  Asian  countries  –  with  the  aforementioned
exception of Japan – had reverted to soft pegging to US dollar after the crisis. China,
Hong Kong and Malaysia had hard pegs or currency boards whereas rest of the region
had various forms of currency baskets, but their main component was US dollar. Thus
the region had reverted back to a dollar standard.328
Where these two theses differ is what they claim to be the motivation behind the East
Asian dollar standard. McKinnon and Schnabl described this motivation as 'conflicted
virtue'. They argue, that the role of US dollar is not derived from the strong trade ties
binding East Asia and the US, but rather from the key currency role of the dollar. In
other words, the East Asian dollar standard is attributable to the “dollar's microeconomic
role in facilitating international commerce on the one hand, and its macroeconomic role
as a nominal anchor for national price levels on the other.”329 Furthermore, the countries
are  loath  to  let  their  currencies  appreciate  as  this  would  incur  severe  losses  in
international competitiveness in their export sectors leading to a deflationary spiral in
the domestic economy. This has lead the countries into a situation of 'conflicted virtue':
they  intervene  heavily  to  keep  their  currencies  from  appreciating  and/or  becoming
volatile  –  accumulating  dollar  nominated  foreign  reserves  in  the  process.  A sharp
appreciation of their currencies would 1) impose capital losses on domestic holders of
dollar  assets,  2)  cause  loss  of  relative  competitiveness  vis-à-vis  other  East  Asian
countries and 3) risk macroeconomic slowdown leading to a deflationary spiral. On the
positive side this arrangement brings stability into the East Asian region as  all of the
participating countries have stable exchange rates. On the negative side is the global
imbalances problem: the participating countries accumulate US dollars in excess thus
exposing themselves to the vagaries of US macroeconomic policy.330
The DFG approach reverses the causality of the East Asian dollar standard: it is the East
Asian governments  and their  mercantilist  policies that  cause the US current  account
deficit.  They identify the East  Asian countries  as peripheral  trade account  countries,
which  intervene  heavily  in  the  foreign  exchange  markets  in  order  to  keep  their
currencies undervalued to stimulate export expansion into US markets with a consequent
328 Dooley, Folkerts-Landau & Garber (2004b) pp. 312 – 313 and McKinnon & Schnabl (2004a) pp. 333 
– 338.
329 McKinnon & Schnabl (2004b) p. 181.
330 McKinnon & Schnabl (2004a) pp. 338 – 353.
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stimulus  to  investment  in  export  activities.  Their  foremost  goal  is  economic
development through export led strategy and for this they are willing to hold excessive
amounts of low yielding dollar reserves. On the other hand, the US side is benefiting
from  the  seemingly  endless  credit  line  from East  Asia  granting  the  US  authorities
considerable leeway to run current account deficits.331
Majority of the experts cited here agree that East Asian was in fact on a dollar standard
prior to the crisis of 1997 – 1998 and after the crisis up to about 2005.332 A change in
status quo happened in mid-2005 when the Chinese authorities officially declared that
the exchange rate regime of the RMB would be switched from a hard dollar peg to a
currency  of  baskets  with  more  flexibility  than  previously.  Although  the  promised
flexibility was of limited variety with IMF describing it as a crawling peg, it proved to
be a watershed moment in East Asian currency politics.  This is best captured in the
diversity of interpretations of the East Asian exchange rate regimes post-2005.
The object of debate in this discussion is the emergence of an RMB bloc in East Asia.
The proponents of this thesis argue that the majority of the East Asian currencies track
now more closely the fluctuations of RMB than they do US dollar. Or, in other words,
RMB has more relative weight in the currency baskets than US dollar.333
Henning, on his part, finds that four major ASEAN countries have formed the core of
the  alleged  RMB  bloc.  These  countries  are  Malaysia,  Philippines,  Singapore  and
Thailand with South Korea joining in occasionally. Henning argues this is due to internal
preference formation and the growing economic importance of China in East Asia and
not  a  Chinese exercise of  structural  power.334 During  the dollar  standard  East  Asian
countries  found  it  convenient  to  intermediate  investment  in  external  assets  and  to
maintain export  growth through the accumulation of dollar  assets  and keeping one's
currency undervalued. With the deepening trade relations and FDI integration China has
become more relevant to the aforementioned ASEAN countries. At the same time their
export sectors face more competition from their Chinese counterparts. This has made
giving greater weight to RMB a natural response. As the power relations between China
and ASEAN countries are asymmetrical, the situation is a leader-follower game where
the smaller countries track China's actions.
Subramanian & Kessler, on the other hand find that seven out of ten of the analyzed East
331 Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Graber (2006).
332 Girardin is the exception here as he argues that the majority of ASEAN countries started targeting a 
basket composed of regional currencies (reminiscent of ACU) already in late 1990s. Girardin (2011).
333 For proponents of this thesis see for example Henning (2012) and Subramanian & Kessler (2013).
334 Henning (2012) pp. 13 – 15.
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Asian countries track RMB closer than the dollar with the coefficient 60% greater than
with  US  dollar.  These  countries  are  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Philippines,  South  Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. They find that of the East Asian countries only Hong
Kong and Vietnam track dollar. As for the possible explanation for the RMB bloc they
offer two possibilities: it is driven by trade integration and common supply chains or it is
driven  by  competition  with  China.  They  find  that  the  evidence  favors  the  former
explanation, but note that the latter cannot be completely ruled out.335
Although Subramanian  and Kessler's  study and Henning's  study differ  a  bit  in  their
results, they both identify a core group of countries (Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand and South Korea) as a nucleus of the nascent RMB bloc. What they also have
in common is the reason for such a bloc: trade and financial integration with China.
In  a  later  study  Kawai  &  Pontines  contradict  the  findings  of  both  Henning  and
Subramanian & Kessler contending that they found no evidence of an emerging RMB
bloc. Instead they found that the US dollar still ruled supreme in the East Asian region as
the  major  anchor  currency  for  the  period  of  2000  –  2013.  However,  they  did  find
evidence supporting the claim that the relative weight of RMB has increased in several
of the East Asian currency baskets – in most cases at the expense of the Japanese yen.
The RMB now has statistically important weight in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. They also find it possible that
with the growing importance of the Chinese economy RMB might become all the more
important in regional currency baskets, but much will depend on domestic reforms that
support further RMB internationalization.336
Although Kawai and Pontines do not touch the subject of what are the motivations and
preferences  behind  currency  basket  choices  in  East  Asia,  one  can  surmise  that  the
prominent role of US dollar has something to do with the previously presented dollar
standard; the dollar is an international key currency that fulfills the needs of both East
Asian public and private sectors and a collective uncoordinated effort to use the same or
at least similar currency anchor does bring stability to the regional exchange rates.
This would be in line with Henning's reasoning as he argues that reason for dollar's
continued  dominance  as  the  regional  choice  of  invoicing,  pricing  and  investment
currency is due to the fact, that were RMB to take on more of these roles, it would run
into  Sino-Japanese  rivalry.  This,  in  turn,  would  block  collective  decision  on  joint
335 Subramanian & Kessler (2013) pp. 3 – 4 and 12 – 14.
336 Kawai & Pontines (2014a) p. 37 and Kawai & Pontines (2014b) p. 26.
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pegging  to  common  basket  of  currencies.337 In  Henning's  opinion,  the  continued
dominance  of  dollar  in  East  Asia  has  in  fact  facilitated  the  transition  from a dollar
standard to a regional RMB bloc.338
Kawai & Pontines' findings are backed up by a separate study by Rajan for the time
period of 2000 – 2010. In his study Rajan finds that US dollar had still  the greatest
degree  of  influence  over  East  Asian  currencies.  Rajan  also  finds  that  the  regional
currencies have started to exhibit more exchange rate flexibility during the period, but
still track closely the US dollar – with the obvious exception of the Japanese yen.339
Although the studies mentioned above disagree on the existence of a de facto RMB bloc,
they all at least corroborate the fact that RMB has gained relative weight in the region.
What they also agree on, is the nucleus of this bloc: all of the studies mention at least
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and South Korea as constituent members. In
addition Kawai & Pontines and Subramanian & Kessler both find that also Indonesia
and Taiwan are now giving more weight to RMB and Kawai & Pontines go a bit further
by adding Vietnam, too, to their list.
The aforementioned two thesis, the RMB bloc and the continued dollar standard, are
favored  when  discussing  East  Asian  exchange  rate  regimes.  Yet  there  exists  an
alternative reading of the situation. In his study Girardin claims to have found a de facto
Asian-Currency Bloc (ACU). He claims that 9/13 countries in the region have started
covertly  to  include  a  Regional  Monetary  Unit  (RMU),  reminiscent  of  the  Asian
Currency Unit  (ACU),  in  their  currency baskets.  The core  group of  RMU targeting
countries is composed of Laos, Philippines, Singapore-Brunei Darussalam and Thailand
that  have  been been targeting  RMU as  a  part  of  their  currency baskets  since  AFC.
Unfortunately Girardin does not inquire into why East Asian countries have started to
clandestinely  peg their  currencies  to  basket  of  regional  currencies.  The best  he  can
present is the run of the mill argument that a common currency basket will help them
foster intra-regional trade and finance. Girardin furthermore claims that the cooperation
has this far been implicit, but there might be a case for making the currency cooperation
more explicit and maybe even institutionalized. If the appropriate steps are taken, there
is a possibility that RMU found in the currency baskets of the aforementioned countries
might form a tentative basis for a de facto regional currency unit à la ACU.340
337 Henning (2012) p. 10.
338 Ibid. p. 14.
339 Rajan (2011) pp. 6 – 9 and p. 19 – 21.
340 Girardin (2011) pp. 1 and 17 – 19.
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Unfortunately other researchers seem to not have taken Girardin's theory of a nascent
regional monetary unit very seriously, as no-one has tested his findings. Only Henning
goes as far as to state that the existence of a regional ACU block is unlikely since the
RMU proposed by Girardin lacks official standing and is only “an index in the minds of
exchange rate analysts”.341
Although  experts  on  the  matter  are  unable  to  reach  a  consensus,  a  variety  of
interpretations present themselves. First of all there is the dollar standard. Supposing the
thesis  for  an East  Asian  dollar  standard still  holds  true,  the countries  might  still  be
motivated by the same factors as they were during the 1997 – 2005 period. Namely,
using US dollar  as a currency anchor  is  still  attractive as  it  provides  price stability,
lubricates regional trade and finance and circumvents the political problems associated
in creating a regional anchor currency.
On the other hand, if the allegations about the ascendancy of RMB to a regional key
currency are true, there might be a sea change afoot. Although Kawai & Pontines refute
the  idea  of  an  RMB bloc,  they  do  admit  that  it  has  gained  weight  in  the  regional
countries' currency baskets. It is possible, that in the long run, the influence exercised by
China in East Asian might trump that of US and, by extension, of US dollar. Although
this does not seem to be imminent, such a scenario is certainly not inconceivable. Much
will depend on the actions of the Chinese policy-makers and whether they manage to
internationalize or at  least  regionalize their  national currency,  which would certainly
raise RMB's attractiveness as an alternative to US dollar.
Other interpretations, too, are possible. It could be that the regional actors have decided
to change their exchange rate regime towards a currency basket with more flexibility
than previously. Experts on the subject have long since extolled the virtue of pegging
national currencies to a basket of regional currencies as this would bring stability to
intra-regional  exchange  rates  and,  thus,  foster  regional  economic  and  financial
integration and potentially help solve the global imbalances problem. The amount of
exchange rate flexibility,  on the other  hand might  be a policy object  that is  directly
related to a country's willingness to open and liberalize its financial markets. The biggest
problem in estimating what motivates the exchange rate regime choices is the fact, that
much of it is dictated by the domestic politics. A full assessment of the motivations and
preferences  of  the  East  Asian  region  would  require  an  in-depth  review of  how the
domestic policies interact with foreign politics in shaping a given country's exchange
341 Henning (2012) p. 6.
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rate regime. A subject which all of the sources cited evade as it falls beyond their scope.
5.3. Proposals for East Asian Currency Cooperation and Exchange Rate Regime
Formation
Understanding  the  technicalities,  advantages  and  disadvantages  inherent  to  the
propositions  is  important  as  these  proposals  will  define the  context  and horizons of
future  regional  exchange  rate  cooperation  and  the  discussion  surrounding  it.  These
proposals vary from free floating coupled with inflation targeting all  the way to the
creation of a regional single currency. A definite taxonomy is hard to make as some of
the proposals partly overlap each other, so I have decided to present the proposals in an
order which I have judged to present their feasibility. In assessing the feasibility of the
proposals, data from the previous section is used alongside an analysis of the technical
requirements of each proposal and their advantages and disadvantages.
First off is the possibility that the whole region reverts back to pegging to US dollar.
Although this is a highly implausible scenario and no-one is advocating it, one should
keep in mind that the region was in fact pegged to the US dollar up to AFC and despite
the plethora of exchange rate regimes adopted after the crisis, the US dollar has acted as
a regional anchor currency ever since. Yet, despite of the dollar's continued role as the
regional top currency, at the moment there is a strong tendency in regional exchange
rage regimes to move toward more flexibility and away from the dollar standard as can
be gleaned from the previous section. 
Perhaps the most ambitious proposal for East Asian exchange rate cooperation is the
eventual formation of a monetary union or even a single currency à la euro. None of
the proponents of a monetary union or single currency propose that this be achieved
overnight: rather they envisage it to be a long and gradual process starting form informal
policy coordination which will gradually lead to the establishment of a monetary union
or even a single currency.342 Usually the process starts with the creation of an external
currency basket to stabilize the regional currencies viz-à-viz external major currencies
first and then proceeds to the creation of an internal currency basket or the establishment
of an intra-Asian exchange rate arrangement, reminiscent of EMS (European Monetary
342 Choi (2007) pp. 128 – 133, Eichengreen (2006) pp. 9 – 10, Kawai (2007) pp. 113 – 117, Kawai & 
Takagi (2005) pp. 97 – 98 and Williamson (2005) pp. 1 – 2.
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System, which preceded the creation of euro),  wherein the participants agree on the
stabilization of participating countries' currencies viz-à-viz each other within determined
currency-bands.343 The currency-bands can later on be narrowed down and the exchange
rate mechanism further consolidated or even turned into a single currency344 - it depends
on whether  the  object  of  this  action  is  a  monetary  union  or  a  single  currency.  For
clarity's sake it is also good to keep in mind that the creation of a monetary union does
not mean the inevitable creation of a single currency.345
Adopting a regional single currency can be lucrative for regional countries as it provides
great efficiency gains (no need for exchanging currencies, greater price transparency and
complete  exchange-rate  risk elimination)  and it  furthers  trade  integration among the
participants fostering more regional trade in goods and assets.346 A monetary union, on
the other hand, is a light version of single currency and as such provides only part of the
benefits listed above. Although a monetary union will help stabilize regional currencies
and thus mitigate exchange rate risks, it will not absolve altogether the need to exchange
currencies when conducting trade or business in regional currencies.
The downsides of a single currency and a monetary union have been highlighted by the
recent European debt crisis. The ensuing turmoil has left the monetary union in a state of
crisis and the regional economy in a lurch. The crisis has first and foremost highlighted
how  even  the  EU,  which  has  had  good  institutions  for  monitoring  member  states'
financial affairs, was not able to curb the participating members financial profligacy,
which  then  turned  into  a  crisis  when  global  economy  took  a  downward  turn.347
Furthermore, even countries who had refrained from financial profligacy have found it
difficult to combat depression as they gave up their independent monetary policies and
exchange rate policies in joining the monetary union.348 Then again, this should not have
come as surprise as joining a monetary union by definition means delegating national
monetary  policy  and  exchange  rate  policy  to  a  supra-national  central  bank  whose
monetary policy might not suit all participating countries' needs if they do not constitute
an Optimal Currency Area (OCA).349 Moreover, by giving up independent exchange rate
policy a country participating in  a  monetary union forgoes  the ability  to  regain lost
international price competitiveness through devaluation of the national currency. In such
343 Choi (2007) pp. 128 – 133, Dieter (2006) pp. 44 – 50, Kawai (2007) pp. 113 – 117, Kawai & Takagi 
(2005) pp. 97 – 98, Padoa-Schioppa (2004) pp. 321 – 322.
344 Choi (2007) pp. 130 – 131 and Dieter (2006) pp. 44 – 50.
345 Dieter (2006) p. 47.
346 Kenen & Meade (2007) pp. 20 – 29 and Madhur (2002) p. 3.
347 Eichengreen (2014) pp. 291 – 293.
348 Eichengreen (2014) pp. 291 – 293 and Alcidi & Gros (2013) pp. 3 – 4.
349 Dieter (2006) pp. 39 – 41 and Kenen & Meade (2007) p. 32.
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cases international competitiveness can be gained only trough internal deflation.350
A number of studies concerning the question of whether East Asia constituted an OCA
( whether the existed within the region a symmetry of supply and output shocks between
the potential participants351) or not were conducted during the period leading from AFC
to GFC. A working paper published by the Bank of Japan in 2006 made a meta study,
which found that  12 out of 14 studies so far had identified at least groups of countries
within East Asia that constituted an OCA.352 In a sense, then, there was already in 2006
at least technical grounds for at least a minor currency union in the region. Given that
there have been no major disruptions to regional trade patterns, it can be surmised that
the conditions for an OCA (or multiple of them) might now, nine years later, be even
more  favorable.  Unfortunately  no  recent  meta  studies  have  been conducted,  so  it  is
impossible to estimate if there exists an OCA(s) in East Asia in 2016.
Then again,  establishing whether  or  not  there exists  an OCA in East  Asia  might  be
missing the point: even though some studies have found that East Asia – or parts of it -
is not very far from pre-EMU Europe when measuring whether the region is an OCA353,
there is very little activity to form a monetary union in East Asia. This all points to the
fact  that  a  monetary  union  is  not  merely  an  exercise  of  economical  rationality,  but
requires political and institutional congruence, too. The greatest obstacle for the creation
of a monetary union is the persistent institutional deficit in the region.354Without the
necessary institutions to monitor participating countries,  sharing relevant information
and – in a dire case – to compel a participant to make due monetary adjustments the
monetary  union  can  not  be  implemented.355 Furthermore,  there  would  need  to  be  a
central bank or a lender of last resort to ensure that all of the participants are able to tap
into required liquidity in times of need.356 Another major difference between East Asia
and Europe is the sheer relative size of China, which would skewer policy data and,
thus,  policy-making itself.357 Moreover,  China seems to be asymmetrical in  terms of
supply shocks in relation to other East Asian countries358 and is developing faster than
other regional emerging economies meaning that it could be detrimental for them to let
350 Piton & Bara (2012) pp. 2 – 3, Deakin (2014) pp. 92 – 94 and Gros & Alcidi (2013) pp. 3 – 4.
351 Kenen & Meade (2007) pp. 171 – 175.
352 Watanabe & Ogura (2006) p. 12.
353 Bayoumi & Mauro (1999) pp. 14 – 15, Brandão de Brito (2004) pp. 564 – 566 and Kawai & 
Motonishi (2005) pp. 197 – 199.
354 Eichengreen & Bayoumi (1999) pp. 360 – 364, Eichengreen (2004) p. 2 and Kenen & Meade (2007) 
p. 178.
355 Kenen & Meade (2007) pp. 149 – 150, Lee, Park & Shin (2003) pp. 32 – 33 and Wang (2004) p. 944.
356 Eichengreen (2004) pp. 1 – 5, Dieter (2006) p. 47 and Lee & Barro (2006) p. 10.
357 Kenen & Meade (2007) pp. 175 – 177.
358 Kawai & Motonishi (2005) p. 187.
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their  currencies appreciate at  China's pace since it  might create pressure for internal
devaluations which might  be tricky to implement  in a monetary union359.  Supposing
these  technical  obstacles  could  be  overcome,  there  would  still  have  to  be  domestic
political support within the participating countries to hand over financial supervision and
regulation and monetary policy to a supra-regional central bank.360 In the given situation,
to quote Eichengreen, even efforts at the eventual creation of a regional monetary union
are unlikely due to “absence of economic and institutional convergence and political
solidarity so extensive as to be unrealistic.”361
At the very other end of the spectrum there is the option of free floating with inflation
targeting championed for example by Eichengreen and Goldstein.362 The US officials,
too, have constantly exhorted the East Asian nations to adopt free floating exchange rate
regimes as  they  would help ameliorate  the trade imbalances  between East  Asia  and
US.363
If a country adopts a free floating exchange rate regime with an inflation target it means
two things: exchange rate stability will be given up and the exchange rate will start to
fluctuate  reacting  to  market  forces  and  the  central  bank  of  that  country  will  start
targeting  a  suitable  rate  of  inflation  and price  stability  in  the  medium term through
monetary policy.364 However, this does not mean that the central bank is compelled to
neglect the exchange rate: they still are free to intervene in the FX markets to stop their
currency from fluctuating too fast or too dramatically.365
The main argument in favor of free floating exchange rate regimes is that as economies
mature,  the  manufacturing  and  export  sector  as  an  engine  of  growth  diminishes  in
importance and the need to promote stable exchange rate becomes less compelling. This
is followed by the growth of the service and financial sectors for which stable exchange
rates are far less important and for which inflation targeting policies are more suitable.
Countries with free floating exchange rate regimes are favored by international investors
and it has a buffering effect against external disturbances.366
Eichengreen enumerates two main arguments against floating exchange rate regimes in
East Asia: 1) they would heighten the risk of competitive devaluations in the region and
359 Kenen & Meade (2007) pp. 175 – 177.
360 Eichengreen (2014) p. 305.
361 Eichengreen (2014) p. 307.
362 Eichengreen (2002 and 2004), and Goldstein (2002). 
363 For a good example of this see Martin (2008).
364 Ito (2007) pp. 5 – 7 and Kenen & Meade (2007) pp. 122 – 125.
365 Eichengreen (2002) p. 35, Ito (2007) pp. 16 – 18 and Kenen & Meade (2007) pp. 162 – 163.
366 Eichengreen (2002) pp. 27 – 29.
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2)  they  are  incompatible  with  the  East  Asian  development  model,  which  is  led  by
exports  and  investment  –  both  of  which  are  spurred  by  undervalued  and  pegged
exchange rate regimes.367 
Furthermore, a free floating exchange rate regime coupled with inflation targeting can
lead to high levels of currency volatility, which will in turn discourage exports and cause
financial turmoil especially if the country's liabilities are heavily dollarized.368 Given the
potential  negative  effects  and  the  requirements  (strong  public  sector  financial
management,  strong  financial  sector  institutions  and  markets,  high  monetary  policy
credibility369),  a  free  float  coupled  with  inflation  target  is  better  suited  to  advanced
industrial  economies with deep and well-functioning financial systems as opposed to
emerging small and middle sized economies with fragile financial systems and immature
economic and financial institutions.370
Although Eichengreen refutes the claim that the East Asian economic and development
model  is  not  compatible  with  a  free  floating  exchange  rate  regime  and  inflation
targeting371,  Japan is  still  the only East  Asian country with a  free floating exchange
regime, albeit China's recent transition to a more flexible and market driven exchange
rate  arrangement  can  be  read  as  a  step  towards  an  eventual  adoption  of  a  floating
exchange rate regime.372 The most likely reason for the East Asian economies' aversion
to free floating exchange rate regimes, or fear of floating373, stems from their export-
driven  development  strategies  combined  with  shallow  financial  markets  and
underdeveloped institutions. Political reasons, too, might be at play: the transition from
an  undervalued  soft  or  crawling  peg  would  most  surely  bring  about  economic  and
political upheavals. At any rate, judging from the findings of the previous chapter none
of the East Asian countries are likely to make a transition to a free floating exchange rate
in the near future.
Another proposal by Eichengreen is the creation of a regional parallel currency, Asian
Currency Unit (ACU).374 In essence ACU would be a synthetic regional currency unit,
which  would  be  made  of  appropriately  weighted  average  of  participating  Asian
367 Ibid. pp. 24 – 25.
368 Choi (2007) pp. 133 – 134, Roger (2009) pp. 23 – 27 and Yoshitomi (2007) pp. 42 – 43.
369 Roger (2009) pp. 23 – 27.
370 Choi (2007) pp. 133 – 134, Dieter (2006) p. 41, Eichengreen (2004) p. 4 and  Mishkin (2004) p. 29.
371 Eichengreen (2002) p. 32.
372 Schneider (2015).
373 “Fear of floating” was famously formulated by Calvo & Reinhart as a phenomenon where emerging 
economies refuse to let their exchange rates fluctuate as they would under free floating and rather 
prefer a managed stable and smooth exchange rate regime. See Calvo & Reinhart (2002).
374 Eichengreen (2006) and Eichengreen (2007).
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currencies and let circulate alongside with national currencies. As such it would have the
status of full legal tender in the participating countries, and could be used as a medium
of exchange, unit of account and as a store of value in the participating economies and
between them. In the big picture Eichengreen visions, that ACU would be a forerunner
for East Asian  financial and monetary integration, that would eventually lead to a  Asian
monetary union.375
Eichengreen lists four main merits for ACU: 1) for importers and exporters who are
obligated to quote their prices and/or settle their invoices in a foreign currency would
find the stable ACU a convenient tool for minimizing currency risks, 2) likewise issuers
of foreign debt might find it enticing to denominate their debt in stable currency such as
ACU, 3) it would ease and foster more intra-regional trade and investment and 4) it
would help in the creation of regional bond markets, as the bonds could be denominated
in ACU. Eichengreen's ACU would also circumvent the problems inherent to previously
presented  single  currency/monetary  union:  as  ACU basket  is  a  weighted  average  of
participating currencies, the participating countries need not limit their exchange rate
variability against  other regional currencies – in fact there need not be a peg at  all.
Another major advantage of ACU is that if East Asia is to move towards a monetary
union, ACU will allow them to do that in a market-led gradualist fashion. This approach
will help circumvent the political problems such a project would otherwise encounter.376
Eichengreen identifies the potential financial instability as the main drawback of ACU:
if regional banks and corporations start to accumulate ACU denominated liabilities they
do so at running the risk both currency mismatches and balance sheet fragility. However,
these problems are not insurmountable. Eichengreen proposes that ACU be accompanied
by strong market discipline and supervisory oversight of financial affairs of banks and
corporations. Institutions to watch over private banks' and corporations' financial affairs
are not the only institutions needed: a set of rules and protocols of intervention, too,
need  to  be  devised  to  maintain  ACU's  value  relative  to  the  the  specified  basket  of
regional  currencies.  Lastly,  Eichengreen  notes  that  “authorities  should  move  to  a
managed float to encourage banks and firms to hedge their ACU exposure”. That is to
say ACU has the best compatibility with floating currency regimes.377
Eichengreen's parallel currency proposition has not taken much wind since the initial
proposition in 2006/2007 as there are no further studies on its feasibility. On the other
hand, if Girardin's findings that there exists a regional monetary unit that East Asian
375 Eichengreen (2006) pp. 432 – 436.
376 Eichengreen (2007) pp. 137 – 139 and 145 – 146.
377 Eichengreen (2007) pp. 150 – 152.
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nations are  targeting is  true,  then there might be a  case to be made for the parallel
currency approach as it would imply there is already need and will to create a regional
monetary  unit  or  a  parallel  currency.  Unfortunately,  until  Girardin's  findings  are
corroborated there is no call to revive the parallel currency approach.
Another serious impediment to creating a regional parallel currency rises from political
problems. When it comes to surveillance and creation of supra-national institutions to
enforce that surveillance East Asia is even at best notorious, as was explained earlier,
and this holds true for ACU, too. The creation of ACU requires some serious institution
building, starting from clearing houses and ending in surveillance and monitoring, to
make it a functioning and viable currency option for region-wide use both in trade and
finance. As things stand the creation of ACU seems as unlikely as ever even though
intellectually it is an appealing alternative for regional currency cooperation.
Solutions to East Asian exchange rate cooperation centering around common currency
basket  have this far gained most popularity among experts writing on the subject.378
Especially Japanese economists and the Japanese government itself have shown much
interest in regional exchange rate cooperation through common currency baskets.379 Yet,
when compared to other solutions offered here, proposals centering around a common
currency basket contain more heterogeneity and the proposals differ somewhat from one
another. All of the proposals aim at establishing region-wide exchange rate stability380,
but they differ in two aspects: stability against what and the rigidity of the arrangement.
Broadly speaking,  the reference points  of stability  can be divided into two different
categories: internal reference point (a common currency basket consisting of regional
currencies) and an external reference point (a common currency basket consisting of
extra-regional  currencies).381 Although  most  of  the  proponents  of  a  currency  basket
solution favor a basket consisting of external currencies, a currency basket consisting of
regional currencies is not altogether without supporters.382
The basic idea for an internal currency basket is  to stabilize the regional currencies'
exchange rates viz-à-viz each other.383In order to do so, the participating countries have
378 Notable supporters of currency baskets include Choi (2007), Kawai (2007a and 2007b), Kawai & 
Takagi (2005), Pontines (2009), Ryou & Wang (2004) and Williamsson (2005).
379 Grimes (2009) pp. 138 – 140.
380 Ogawa & Shimizu (2006) pp. 7 – 9 and Volz (2010) pp. 188 – 190.
381 Kenen & Meade (2007) pp. 167 – 168.
382 See for example Ogawa & Shimizu (2006) and Ryou & Wang (2004), who hail for an Asian Currency 
Unit built on a basket of regional currencies.
383 Dieter (2006) pp. 45 – 46, Kenen & Meade (2007) p. 169, Ryou & Wang (2004) pp. 28 – 29 and Volz 
87
to first agree on how much the currencies are allowed to fluctuate against each other and
how to monitor that exchange rate fluctuation.384 In order for the participating countries
to keep their  currencies  within the established currency bands they need to actively
intervene  in  the  FX  market  using  either  regional  or  extra-regional  currencies.385
Although all of the participating countries agree on a common currency basket to which
their  exchange rates are  referenced,  this  does not  constitute  an anchor  for monetary
policy.386 This needs to be overcome either by adopting a common inflation targeting
policy or by having one country take the role of a central bank.387
What makes this arrangement attractive is its ability to provide order and stability to
intra-regional exchange rates and trade relations.388 It is s the ideal solution if the aim of
exchange rate cooperation is to foster intra-regional trade and economic integration, as
pegging  to  an  optimal  currency  peg  is  the  ideal  solution  to  stabilize  trade  balance
fluctuations in a region with internationally diversified trading structure.389 It will also
prevent  the  participating  countries  from  reverting  to  competitive  devaluations.390
According to Ogawa & Shimizu pegging to a basket of regional currencies would be
more effective in reducing fluctuations in the participating countries' effective exchange
rates than pegging to a basket of external currencies would be.391
The major downside of this arrangement is that it  will  not stabilize the participating
countries' currencies against external currencies such as the dollar, yen or euro.392 Then
there's the technically tricky part of quantifying and establishing appropriate exchange
rate grids and to establish the mechanisms to monitor and enforce them.393 Finally, the
adoption  of  this  arrangement  requires  that  there  exists  liquid  markets  for  all  of  the
currencies included in the basket – otherwise it will be impossible to intervene in the FX
markets to keep the currencies within the agreed currency bands.394
The reasons why a common currency basket consisting of regional currencies is not very
popular are very similar to those pertaining to the creation of a single currency and/or
(2010) pp. 190 – 191.
384 Kenen & Meade (2007) pp. 169 – 170, Padoa Schioppa (2004) pp. 321 – 322 and Ryou & Wang 
(2004) p. 28.
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386 Kenen & Meade (2007) p. 170 and Padoa-Schioppa (2004) pp. 321 – 322.
387 Kenen & Meade (2007) p. 170, Padoa-Schioppa (2004) pp. 321 – 322 and Ryou & Wang (2004) pp. 
28 – 29.
388 Dieter (2006) pp. 45 – 46 and Padoa-Schioppa (2004) pp. 321 – 322.
389 Ogawa & Shimizu (2006) p. 13.
390 Ogawa & Shimizu (2006) p. 15 and Ryou & Wang (2004) p. 3.
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monetary union: it requires the establishment of appropriate institutions to monitor and
enforce that the participating countries do not allow their currencies to fluctuate beyond
their respective currency bands and the arrangement would require someone to take the
role  of  central  bank.  The  lack  of  a  legitimate  regional  central  bank  could  be
circumvented  by  the  aforementioned  adoption  of  inflation  target,  but  this,  too,  is
unlikely to happen as most of the regional countries are still manufacturing and export-
oriented  developing  countries  and  inflation  targeting  is  more  suitable  for  mature
economies. Moreover, as most of the regional economies are export-oriented with their
destination markets in Europe and North America, they give more importance to their
exchange rate relative to dollar and euro. Also, dollar's incumbent role in the region as a
medium of exchange and unit of invoicing create heavy incentives to stick to it.
If the possibility of East Asia adopting a common currency basket consisting of regional
currencies seems implausible, then what about a common currency basket consisting of
external currencies, or an  external basket? The most common version of an external
basket is a so-called G3 basket that consists of US dollar,  yen and euro395,  although
Kawai for one does not exclude the idea of a basket consisting of the aforementioned G3
currencies and some regional currencies as well396. In all of the versions of an external
currency basket the participating countries first agree on a set of currencies and relative
weights that are assigned to them and then start either pegging or at
 least tracking the reference rate yielded by that basket.397 In addition they all agree, that
the cooperation can not be strict in its early stages. Both Choi and Kawai propose that in
the  beginning  cooperation  be  loose  and  informal  and  that  the  countries  track  the
reference  rate  at  a  degree  of  rigidity  that  is  accommodated  to  their  economic
circumstances and preferences.398 Williamson, on the other hand proposes that instead of
individually chosen degrees of pegging, the participating countries agree on a loose band
within which they can allow their currencies to fluctuate.399
The main selling point for an external basket is that whereas an internal basket can only
stabilize intra-regional exchange rates against each other an external currency basket
would  stabilize  exchange  rates  both  relative  to  extra-regional  and  intra-regional
395 See for example Choi (2007), Kawai (2007a), Kawai (2007b) and Williamson (2005).
396 Kawai (2007b) pp. 13 – 16.
397 Choi (2007) pp. 128 – 132, Kawai (2007a) pp. 113 - 117, Kawai (2007b) pp. 13 - 16, Kenen & Meade
(2007) pp. 167 – 171 and Williamson (2005) p. 3.
398 Choi (2007) pp. 128 – 132  & Kawai (2007b) pp. 13 – 16.
399 Williamson (2005) pp. 10 – 12.
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currencies  between  participating  countries.400 This  would  have  several  positive
consequences: intra-regional exchange rate fluctuations would be reduced somewhat401,
intra-regional trade would be insulated from the fluctuations of extra-regional currencies
such  as  US  dollar402 and  would  deter  the  participating  countries  from  engaging  in
competitive devaluations403. All this would foster intra-regional trade and encourage the
use of local currencies in it.404 Another argument in favor of a common external basket is
that as all of the participating currencies are jointly pegged to the same reference point
they could all appreciate in an orderly and coordinated fashion against the dollar, thus
helping solve the global  imbalances  problem.405 Williamson also points  out,  that  the
adoption of an external basket of currencies is also compatible with all of the exchange
rate regimes in the region: they need not give up their current exchange rate regimes just
as long as they track at the same time the reference rate and make sure their currencies
do not deviate too much from it.406
Although joint pegging to an external basket would stabilize the participating currencies
against  external  currencies,  it  would not  completely stabilize the regional  currencies
against  each  other  meaning that  there  would  still  be  some intra-regional  fluctuation
hindering regional economic and financial integration.407 Choi proposes that this could
be overcome by adapting a parallel currency as proposed by Eichengreen to stabilize the
intra-regional currencies.408 Others do not see this as a problem, but Williamson notes
that the participating countries' “traders would be without a mechanism for ascertaining
the local currency value of trade contracts that will mature in the future”.409 That is to
say, they will have a hard time hedging against local currency risks.
Overall, pegging to an external basket is the most viable option presented this far. This
owes mostly to its  loose and informal nature in the early stages. On top of that the
current setting of exchange rate regimes seems to be favorable for currency baskets as
many of  the East  Asian countries  are  operating one at  the moment or  at  least  have
experience  of  operating  a  currency basket.  Yet  going beyond general  preference  for
currency baskets and establishing a common currency basket presupposes that there is
400 Choi (2007) pp. 125 – 128, Kawai (2007a) pp. 113 – 117, Kenen & Meade (2007) pp. 169 – 171 and 
Williamson (2005) pp. 8 – 9.
401 Choi (2007) p. 121.
402 Williamson (2005) p. 8.
403 Ibid. p. 8.
404 Kawai (2007a) pp. 113 – 117.
405 Choi (2007) pp. 123 – 125, Kawai (2007b) pp. 11 – 13 and Williamson (2005) pp. 11.
406 Williamson (2005) pp. 10 – 11.
407 Choi (2007) p. 130.
408 Choi (2007) pp. 130 – 131.
409 Williamson (2005) p. 12.
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enough political will to agree on a suitable basket and appropriate relative weights for
the included currencies. Supposing there were enough political will, the next task would
be  the  creation  of  required  institutions  for  policy  coordination,  surveillance  and
enforcement. Even at the early stages there need to be institutional arrangements for
some  financial  and  monetary  cooperation  as  all  of  the  participants  must  have  an
adequate access to borrow designated basket currencies to keep their currencies within
agreed boundaries even if their national FX reserves are not enough.410 This could be
solved through the creation of a reserve pool reminiscent of AMF or the establishment
of a network of bilateral currency swaps à la CMIM. Yet both of these would require
robust surveillance and enforcement or they would be prone to moral hazard problems.
As all of the possibilities for exchange rate cooperation in East Asia are liable to run into
the problem of institutional deficiency or the inherent difficulty of establishing supra-
regional institutions invested with an appropriate mandate, there is a need for alternative
approaches.  For  example  Grimes and Yoshitomi  have  both  proposed that  instead  of
creating binding institutions, the region's countries should instead base their exchange
rate cooperation on informal policy dialogue.411
Grimes, on his part, proposes that instead of choosing a common regional basket or a
similar measure, the regional countries agree on a single common approach. He does not
elaborate  what  it  would  look  like  exactly,  but  presumes  that  managed  floats  with
inflation targets could be a central part of it. The process could then be enhanced by the
creation of suitable venue for discussing exchange rate cooperation and issues related to
it at an informal level. Although he does not suggest that new institutions be created to
achieve these goals, he does propose that the ERPD process be enhanced to bring about
more  transparency to  national  currency policies.  As  China  is  poised  to  increase the
exchange  rate  flexibility  of  RMB  and  liberalize  capital  inflows  and  outflows,  the
neighboring  minor  economies  could  benefit  from such  an  arrangement  as  it  would
clarify their options and deter beggar-thy-neighbor policies.412
Yoshitomi, on the other hand proposes that the regional countries adopt more flexible
exchange rate regimes and a currency basket composed of multiple currencies as a point
of reference with wider band around reference rate. The point of this arrangement is not
to create a currency grid à la EMS leading to a monetary union, but allow the regional
currencies to appreciate jointly against the US dollar. This arrangement, too, would rely
410 Kawai (2007b) p. 15 and Kenen & Meade (2007) p. 169.
411 Grimes (2009) pp. 148 – 149 and Yoshitomi (2007) pp. 36 – 45.
412 Grimes (2009) pp. 147 – 149.
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on the establishment of joint policy goal and build on a informal policy discussion and
information sharing without the creation of institutions for exchange rate cooperation.413
The appeal of these proposals should be obvious: without the establishment of rigid
institutions and exchange rate arrangements there is an increased possibility that some
countries might be interested in implementing them. The problem with these approaches
is that they both were originally designed to address the global imbalances problem by
allowing East Asian currencies to jointly appreciate viz-à-viz the dollar. Since the global
imbalances have subsided from the center stage for the time being, these proposals need
some other policy goal to aim at. Even though the proposed mechanisms for exchange
rate cooperation seem to be sound, there needs to be something to be gained from it.
5.4. East Asian Exchange Rate Regimes and RMB's Internationalization
All of the proposals for East Asian exchange rate cooperation presented in the previous
section were devised during the interim years between two crises (AFC and GFC) that
shocked the region. As such they reflect the times they were devised in: they are all
based  on  a  rather  optimistic  assessment  of  East  Asian  financial  and  monetary
regionalism  in  general  and  the  major  motivation  for  cooperation  to  be  either  the
development of intra-regional trade and/or the solving of global imbalances issue. Also,
the internationalization of RMB is not taken into account in the proposals. A lot has
changed since and in this section the findings of chapter 4 will be applied to the re-
assessment of the prospects of East Asian exchange rate cooperation.
Of all the findings in chapter 4, the one with the most impact on East Asian exchange
rate  cooperation  was  the  assessment  that  China  will  opt  to  proceed  with  the
internationalization of RMB and will abstain from participating in regional exchange
rate cooperation. The latest corroboration for this assessment was the reiterated aim of
the  Chinese  government  to  continue  with  the  opening  of  capital  account  and
continuation of RMB's internationalization included in the latest FYP. The successful
internationalization  of  RMB  will  solve  the  same  problems  regional  exchange  rate
arrangements would and although the benefits for intra-regional trade are unlikely to be
as  big  as  they  could  be  with  a  regional  exchange  rate  mechanism,  the  successful
internationalization of RMB will bring a good amount of exchange rate stability vis-à-
vis China's East Asian trading partners. On top of that, the Chinese leaders can not avoid
413 Yoshitomi (2007) pp. 36 – 45.
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the internationalization of RMB anyway if they are to make China into a first  class
economic and financial major power on the global stage. Committing oneself now to a
regional exchange rate arrangement with the future still unclear might backfire later on,
and  the  Chinese  leaders  will  avoid  committing  to  any  regional  exchange  rate
arrangement as long as they are unsure of what kind of cooperation would suit their
interests  the  best.  Moreover,  the  successful  internationalization  of  RMB  will  confer
China not only relative economic gains but also potential gains in power – something
that a regional exchange rate arrangement is unlikely to do. Instead China will be active
in her home region by promoting the use of RMB as a Patrician Currency as this is an
inevitable phase in becoming a global Top Currency. For the time being the Chinese
leaders  will  seek  to  regionalize  RMB  through  its  use  as  a  currency  of  invoicing,
settlement and denomination in trade and as a reserve currency in regional MDBs such
as AIIB. The use of RMB as a store of value and unit of account for private sector will
come later when/if the Chinese financial sector will be reformed.
If China will not participate, there is only one other candidate for leader's role: Japan.
Yet  it  is  highly  improbable  that  Japan  can/will  provide  the  required  leadership  for
regional exchange rate cooperation. There is a number of reasons to believe so.
First, if Japan were to take on the role of a leader, there would be no counter-balance for
Japanese power and the institutions and organizations would closely reflect Japanese
policy  preferences,  which  might  not  coincide  with  those  of  the  other  participants,
making them reluctant to participate.
Second, the exclusion of China from the arrangement would also undermine the efficacy
of the arrangement. Whereas the participating nations would have restricted their policy
options, China would still enjoy full sovereignty in her policy decisions. For example,
even if  the ASEAN+2 nations (China excluded) could agree on a mechanism for an
orderly appreciation of their exchange rates vis-à-vis US dollar there is no guarantee that
China would do the same – in fact, the Chinese leaders might even be tempted to regain
some export competitiveness by keeping RMB from appreciating.  From a strategical
point of view, participating in exchange rate cooperation is ill-advised. As the monetary
future of East Asia seems uncertain, there seems to be no incentive to commit oneself to
an arrangement that might prove to be counterproductive in the future.
Third,  Japan's  aim  in  regional  financial  and  monetary  cooperation  are  two-fold,  as
explained in chapter 2: to insulate herself from US' macroeconomic policies and the
contain China's rise.  This would only address one of these goals and even that only
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partly. It is quite likely that the costs outweigh the benefits here.
Four, there is a growing trend within the ASEAN nations (and South Korea) to give
more relative importance to RMB. Japan, on the other hand, is more interested in the
yen-dollar exchange rate. The policy preferences of these two factions are too different
to be compatible.
As the two major powers are unwilling to provide leadership for regional exchange rate
cooperation,  ambitious  projects  have  to  be  shelved  until  the  ambiguity  surrounding
RMB's internationalization is cleared, but that might take years or even some decades –
and that's assuming there are no major set-backs. But that does not mean there are no
grounds for some kind of exchange rate cooperation in East Asia. Only that the scale
will be more modest, goals less ambitious, and the mode of leadership will not be based
on a hegemonic position. 
A promising  starting  point  for  East  Asian  exchange  rate  cooperation  would  be  the
nascent core group of an RMB bloc ( Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and
Thailand – from here on Core 5). There is a lot of convergence between the members of
the group: all of the countries employ exchange rate mechanisms that have a managed
currency basket, they have begun recently to give more relative importance to RMB in
their  baskets and China is  both their  primary destination for  exports  and source for
imports (see Appendix 1). Although the countries have a lot in common, they also have
their differences: the ratio of exports to imports varies depending on the country, the
ratio of trade going to Hong Kong414 varies and the relative importance of Japan and US
varies,  too.  The  recently  founded  AIIB  could  potentially  serve  as  a  platform  for
discussion – at least in the initial stages as it includes China, all of the aforementioned
Core 5 nations and some notable extra-regional actors415,who have an interest in RMB's
internationalization.  A  notable  extra-regional  member,  for  example,  is  the  United
Kingdom, which seeks to establish the first RMB clearing house for RMB on her soil in
London.416
Despite the obvious differences, there are still potential gains to be made from exchange
rate cooperation – for both the ASEAN+1 (South Korea) nations and to China as well. If
and when China moves to an exchange rate regime that allows more flexibility in RMB's
414 The amount of trade going to Hong Kong is presented here so as to capture the full picture of trade 
with China. Still, Hong Kong's dollar is strictly pegged to the US dollar complicating the picture.
415 See the status of AIIB membership from AIIB homepage. 
http://euweb.aiib.org/html/aboutus/introduction/Membership/?show=0.
416 Watt, Lewis & Branigan (2015).
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exchange rate,  the  ASEAN+1 nations  will  be exposed to  exchange rate  volatility  in
relation to the relative weight they will have assigned RMB in their currency baskets,
giving birth to exchange rate volatility within the area. Through cooperation the Core 5
nations could minimize the adverse effects of exchange rate volatility within the region
when RMB makes  the  transition  to  a  flexible  exchange rate  regime.  Some form of
exchange  rate  cooperation  could  also  dissuade  the  participants  from  engaging  in
mercantile  currency  depreciations  as  well.  Formal  and  binding  arrangements  are
unlikely to succeed owing to regional politics and history, so the cooperation will have
to be of informal and non-binding nature. In practice this means policy dialogue aiming
at  a  common approach nations  and information  sharing  among the  Core 5 nations..
There is also the possibility of expanding the core group later on. For example Indonesia
already resembles a lot the current core group countries: the country operates a managed
float with a currency basket and has China as its major trade partner. If the arrangement
works out, it could serve as a foundation for future exchange rate cooperation in the
region.
It is also desirable to involve China in the informal policy dialogue as China, too, stands
to  gain  from  exchange  rate  cooperation.  If  and  when  China  decides  to  make  the
transition to a more flexible exchange rate regime, it is in her interests that the transition
period  is  as  orderly  as  possible.  By  having  the  other  regional  countries  track  the
movements of RMB more closely some of the contingency surrounding the transition to
a  more  flexible  exchange  rate  regime  will  be  dissolved.  For  example  it  will  be
guaranteed that the prices of Chinese exports will not appreciate unduly in relation to
those of regional competitors.
But the transition to a more flexible exchange rate regime is not the only motivation for
Chinese participation in exchange rate coordination: it also provides a handy venue to
promote  the  internationalization  of  RMB  in  China's  neighborhood.  The  sharing  of
information and open dialogue will help dispel uncertainty and contingency surrounding
RMB's future course and thus make it more more attractive as an international currency.
At the same time China can promote the use of RMB as an international currency in the
region through a neat toolkit  of other policies:  by issuing government and corporate
bonds, encouraging invoicing in RMB through FTAs and establishing new BSAs.
Admittedly, this  kind of  exchange rate  cooperation falls  short  in  terms of economic
benefits from the other forms of exchange rate cooperation that were presented earlier
on. Then again, none of them were deemed to be feasible. The greatest merits of the
proposal sketched above are that it  evades leadership issues, does not go against the
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grain  of  regional  modus  operandi  of  politics  and  is  based  on  an  already  existing
convergence of interests.
From a power political point of view the greatest loser in this arrangement would be
Japan, who would be completely excluded from regional exchange rate cooperation and
would be forced to watch as the internationalization of RMB increases China's systemic
power in East Asia. Yet it is hard to see what Japan could do to change the situation as it
seems inevitable that China's importance as a regional economic hub and trading partner
to  other  regional  nations  will  only  grow  as  time  passes.  At  the  same  time  the
internationalization or at least regionalization of China's national currency, too, seems to
inevitable – especially as a medium of exchange in regional trade. Of course, a major
crisis,  economic  or  financial,  in  China  could  change  the  situation  and  create  an
opportunity for Japan, but much would depend on the nature of the crisis and on Japan's
capacity to address it.
As  for  the  other  East  Asian  nations,  this  might  the  best  deal  they  can  get.  China's
decision to internationalize her  national  currency seems to have closed the door for
regional exchange rate cooperation that aims to contain the rise of China; it is no longer
possible  to commit China into an arrangement  that would help contain China's  rise.
Instead they'll be better off looking for ways and modes of regional cooperation that will
help  them  to  accommodate  themselves  to  a  new  monetary  situation  that  RMB's
internationalization will bring about. The best way of action at the moment seems to be
to reduce the contingency surrounding RMB's internationalization. Also, band-wagoning
might be a preferable approach to the situation: if the ASEAN+1 nations stand divided,
they are more vulnerable to potential Chinese monetary aggression. Cooperation, even if
loose, could provide them a hedge against Chinese exercises of monetary power later on.
The biggest winner is China, but here short to mid term goals will trump long term
power considerations. Power gains from having an international currency will not be
high on the  priority  list  of  Chinese  leaders,  and they  will  divert  all  their  efforts  to
successfully  reforming  their  economic  model  and  financial  system.  The
internationalization of RMB will be only one piece in their grand strategy – albeit a
central  one.  So, although Japan can no longer contain China's  rise,  neither  is  China
likely to materialize any gains for a decade to come or more. But if China successfully
manages to pull off a full internationalization of RMB to a Top Currency, they stand to
make substantial systemic power gains in the long run.
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6. Conclusions
This study took as its premise that the key element defining East Asia's exchange rate
cooperation  is  the  internationalization  of  RMB.  For  this  purpose  the  theory  behind
currency internationalization was presented and applied to RMB's internationalization .
RMB's internationalization was then analyzed from two complementing perspectives: a
technical assessment of RMB's internationalization process and its future and an analysis
of what has motivated RMB's internationalization.
From a  technical  point  of  view it  was  deemed  that  RMB is  on  a  steady course  to
internationalization and could become a Top Currency within a decade if there are no
hitches. But that's a a big if: not only do the Chinese leaders have to implement many
technical reforms (capital account liberalization, functioning financial markets, flexible
exchange rate regime etc.) before RMB can become a fully internationalized currency,
but  they  will  also  have  to  carry  out  painful  political  reforms  such  as  central  bank
independence,  judicial  system independence  etc.  The  farther  the  internationalization
process proceeds, the harder the reforms will get. At the same time the leaders will have
to deal with a slowing down economy, potential stock and housing bubbles and possible
external disturbances. And even if they manage to pull it off, there still might be a limit
to the extent that RMB will be used as an international currency as there are other Top
Currencies and the US dollar that will not be dislodged from its position as the Top
Currency par excellence for the foreseeable future.
Becoming a regional key currency, or a Patrician Currency, is an inevitable phase before
RMB can move on to become a global Top Currency. It is here, on the regional level,
that the Chinese leaders have done the most work and have made the most progress in
internationalizing RMB. Most of the progress has been made in RMB's use as a currency
of settlement and invoicing on the private side, which has been facilitated by China's
close trade links to her neighbors, and provision of RMBs via BSAs. To a certain degree
this  part  of  RMB's  internationalization  is  equally  a  product  of  natural  outcome
(voluminous bilateral trade, China's current account deficit vis-à-vis her neighbors etc.)
and policy decisions (currency swaps,  free trade agreements,  disbursing RMB funds
through MDBs etc.) and the gains in internationalization have been relatively easy to
come by. But from here on the promotion of RMB as a regional Patrician Currency will
get  considerably  harder  and will  require  both  reforms to the  Chinese economic  and
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financial  model  as  well  as  political  maneuvering  in  regional  politics.  The  Chinese
leaders have already exhibited considerable ingenuity in co-opting other nations to help
in the internationalization. A good example of this are recently founded MDBs, AIIB
and NDB, which might in the future help RMB to become at least a regional Patrician
Currency. Also the  inclusion  of  RMB into  the  SDR currency basket  and the  strong
regional trade ties might be enough to promote the use of RMB as a store of value (a
reserve currency) to a certain degree, but more work and political maneuvering will be
needed if RMB is to become a major reserve currency and a regional anchor currency.
As for the private side well-functioning, deep and open financial markets are needed for
further RMB internationalization. As for the  official side, or the government side, the
inclusion of RMB 
The motivations for RMB's internationalization were analyzed from two differing, but
complementary points of view: a technical point of view and a political point of view.
The latter, political point of view, which followed the neorealist power politic analysis
presented in chapter 2, was further broken down to two differing levels of analysis,
global and regional, as the motivations on these two levels are likely to differ due to
differing balances of power on the respective levels.
From a technical point of view it was argued that RMB's internationalization might have
been  motivated  by  three  different  factors.  The  first  one  is  the  “natural  outcome”
explanation,  according  to  which  the  internationalization  of  RMB  is  an  inevitable
consequence of China's rise to the global economic and political stage. Given the size of
China's economy, it is only natural that as China's trade-ties deepen and volumes grow
so will RMB take a greater role first in her home region and then globally. The second
factor was the “cost-benefit analysis”, which posited that the Chinese leaders have added
up  the  pros  and  cons  of  currency  internationalization  and  come  to  the  result  that
internationalizing their national currency is worth the effort. Although it is hard to prove
that such a decision has been made, the deeds talk for themselves: between 2010 and
2015 the Chinese authorities have implemented an impressive amount  of reforms to
facilitate the internationalization of RMB and renewed their pledge to internationalize
RMB  in  their  latest  FYP  released  in  2016.  The  third  factor  was  that  the
internationalization of RMB is only a part of larger economic reforms carried out in
China – or that it could even be a by-product of them depending on the reading. It is no
secret that the ruling Communist Party is trying to revamp the Chinese economy to an
advanced industrial economy which is less dependent on exports and relies more on its
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service  industry  and  financial  markets.  In  order  to  achieve  these  goals  it  might  be
inevitable that the national currency be internationalized.
The power politics of currency internationalization were first  analyzed on the global
level. The result of this analysis is that on global level the internationalization of RMB is
unlikely to be motivated by offensive aspirations, or, to put it other way, to gain power
over  others.  Given  US  dollar's  preeminent  position  in  international  financial  and
monetary affairs it is unlikely that China can gain any considerable power over others on
the global level for a long time to come.
However, from a defensive perspective there might be a lot to gain in mid to long term.
One of the main motivations offered for East Asian exchange rate cooperation between
the AFC and GFC in chapter 5 was the global imbalances problem and it was proposed
that this could be solved if the East Asian exporting countries allow their currencies to
collectively appreciate in relation to US dollar. This, in turn, would help both even the
current account balances and stop the current account surplus nations from stockpiling
USD  denominated  foreign  exchange  reserves.  It  was  argued  in  chapter  4  that  by
internationalizing  their  national  currency, the  Chinese  leaders  can  attain  these  goals
without committing China to a regional arrangement which they might find troublesome
later on. The internationalization of RMB is, thus, China's national reply to the global
imbalances problem. Although the problem has subsided for the time being, it is quite
likely that the Chinese leaders are keen to reduce the exposure of their FX reserves to
changes in USD's exchange rate by diversifying the composition of their FX reserves. At
the same time, the more RMB is used in settling, invoicing and denominating China's
trade, the better  it will help domestic importers and exporters to insulate themselves
from changes in USD-RMB exchange rate volatility, which is likely to grow as RMB
moves  towards  a  more  flexible  exchange  rate  regime.  In  a  sense,  then,  the
internationalization of RMB is a strategy of insulation and hedging on the global level.
These aspirations were further supported by China's dissatisfaction with the US dollar's
hegemony and the prestige gained from having an international currency.
On the regional level, the analysis yielded opposite results: the motivations for RMB's
internationalization  are  more  likely  to  be  offensive  in  nature  as  the  successful
internationalization of RMB would give China serious leverage over others and could
entrap  the  other  nations  within  Chinese  systemic  power  in  monetary  and  financial
affairs. The power gains will reach their maximum if RMB is fully internationalized in
the region and the other nations will accept it as a reserve and anchor currency. These
gains, too, are unlikely to materialize in the short or mid term as the development of
99
RMB into a fully internationalized currency will still take a long time. Before that – and
most likely even after that – the other East Asian nations will have the possibility choose
between RMB, USD and  JPY providing  them a  nifty  set  of  tools  to  hedge against
Chinese exercises of monetary power.
Both regional and global levels had two things in common: 1) as there are very little
power  gains  in  short  to  middle  term,  RMB  internationalization  is  unlikely  to  be
motivated by them and 2) even in the long term the main gains are more likely to be in
the form of freedom from other actors' power as opposed to gains in power over others.
In the very long run China might  be able  to reap political  benefits  similar  to  those
enjoyed by the US such as the ability to deflect and delay adjustments and costs. But
that's a big 'if'.
The biggest implication of this is that China would opt to go her own way as opposed to
regional cooperation. Successful internationalization of the Chinese national currency,
RMB, would confer China with benefits similar to those gained from regional exchange
rate  cooperation:  insulation  from  US'  macroeconomic  policies  (deflection  and  cost
adjustment), reduction in China's vast US dollar denominated foreign exchange reserves,
evening out of trade imbalances with US and partial exchange rate stability (especially
with China's East Asian trade partners). But with the significant difference that in this
case China would be the biggest relative beneficiary and would make relative gains over
others.  Hence  it  is  likely  that  China  will  pursue  these  goals  through  the
internationalization  of  her  national  currency  as  opposed  to  regional  exchange  rate
cooperation.
Before these findings were applied to East Asian exchange rate cooperation the current
trends of East Asian exchange rate regimes were analyzed in order to better understand
what are the exchange rate preferences of the concerned East Asian nations. The analysis
was carried out in two stages: first by analyzing the individual exchange rate regime
histories of the East Asian nations and then by analyzing whether there exists a regional
currency bloc or blocs.
The  findings  from  analyzing  exchange  rate  regimes  nation  by  nation  are  fairly
straightforward: apart from some outliers, most of the core nations prefer arrangements
centered around a managed currency basket. As the contents of currency baskets are not
disclosed to the public it is not easy to assess what are the relative weights within them.
This problem was addressed in the second stage of the analysis by assessing whether
there exists a currency bloc with USD, RMB or RMU as the major anchor currency
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within  the  region.  The  findings  of  this  stage  were  inconclusive:  although  some
researchers claim to have found an RMB bloc within the region, other researchers have
questioned this claim. The studies in this chapter do, however, concur on one thing: the
importance assigned to RMB in East Asian nations' currency baskets is on the rise. What
they disagree on is the degree of importance it is assigned. The studies identified a core
group of five APT nations (Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and South Korea)
that have started assigning importance to RMB in their currency baskets.
After this the different forms of exchange rate cooperation that have been proposed for
East  Asia  were  presented  and  analyzed.  The  feasibility  of  the  proposals  was  then
assessed by applying the theory and background information presented at the beginning
of this study.
Most of the proposals were deemed to be unfeasible and unlikely to be implemented in
East  Asia  owing  to  the  region's  historical  legacy  and  political  realities.  The  more
ambitious proposals such as a monetary union or a single currency were deemed to be
stillborn ideas in the given political situation in the region, but even the less ambitious
proposals  centered  around  a  parallel  currency  or  a  common  currency  basket  were
deemed unfeasible due to the practical problem of surveillance and enforcement, which
would entail the forfeiture of sovereignty to a supranational institution or organization –
something which the regional nations are loath to do. It was then assessed that the most
likeliest  way to foster regional exchange rate cooperation is  through informal policy
coordination  and  dialogue  as  such  an  approach  would  not  run  into  the  problem of
surveillance and enforcement and would be consistent with the region's modus operandi.
Lastly the previous findings were combined to assess what are the future prospects of
East  Asian  exchange  rate  cooperation.  With  China  opting  to  go  her  own  way  by
internationalizing her  national  currency, this  study argued that  the only candidate  to
provide the required leadership for more ambitious regional exchange rate cooperation
initiatives is Japan. However, for a number of reasons it is unlikely that Japan neither is
capable of providing the required leadership (and public goods) nor are the ASEAN+1
countries  likely  to  follow  Japan's  lead.  This  means  that  all  of  the  more  ambitious
projects have to be shelved until the ambiguity surrounding RMB's internationalization
is cleared. It was then further argued, that this did not mean there are no grounds for
some kind of exchange rate cooperation in East Asia. Only that the scale of it would
have to be more modest, goals less ambitious and that the mode of leadership cannot be
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based on a hegemonic conception of leadership. It was then pointed out that the nascent
RMB bloc consisting of Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand
(Core 5), could form the nucleus of regional exchange rate cooperation.
The assessment of the Core 5 as a promising starting point for East Asian exchange rate
cooperation was based on several points of convergence they have: similar exchange
rate regimes (managed currency baskets), the relatively large weight of RMB in their
currency baskets,  substantial  trade  relations  with  China  and  strategic  motivations  to
hedge themselves against potential Chinese monetary aggression in the future if RMB's
internationalization is successful. It was also argued, that there are short to mid term
benefits that exchange rate cooperation between the Core 5 nations could bring about: it
could help them navigate the inevitable turbulence that RMB's transition to a more freer
exchange  rate  mechanism  entails,  it  would  bring  some  stability  to  exchange  rates
between  themselves  and  dissuade  the  participating  nations  to  effectuate  mercantile
currency devaluations.  Based on the  earlier  assessment  that  initiatives  involving the
formation of binding and formal treaties and/or institutions are not likely to go down
well in the region, it was argued that the process must be of non-binding and informal
nature. In practice this means that the process would be based on consensus seeking
policy discussion and voluntary information sharing. By keeping the process open and
loose, it could also serve as a platform for further exchange rate cooperation as other
nations with similar traits and interests could participate in it.
This study proposes that the involvement of China in the process is desirable. After all,
only the Chinese officials are capable of disclosing relevant information pertaining to
RMB's internationalization – something which should be of great interest  to China's
neighbors and trade partners. Also, at least a tacit discreet agreement between the Core 5
and China is desirable, as Chinese leaders still hold control over the currency's future
and could stop the Core 5 nations if they do something undesirable.
There is also reason to believe that China is interested in participating in the process. As
was pointed out earlier, China is interested in promoting RMB's internationalization in
her home region as it is an inevitable step in making RMB eventually a global Top
Currency. Cooperation with the Core 5 could be beneficial in furthering this goal as it
would not only help further the use of RMB in regional trade, but could also facilitate
the use of RMB as a regional anchor currency and as a store of value. Moreover,  policy
coordination and information sharing could help China to deal with the turbulence that
RMB's transition to a freer exchange rate mechanism entails by bringing stability to
regional exchange rates and by making them track RMB to some degree. The recently
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founded AIIB was deemed as a possible platform for the talks of cooperation, as the
venue includes China, all of the Core 5 nations and a host of extra-regional nations with
an interest in promoting RMB's internationalization.
Admittedly, this form of exchange rate cooperation falls short of the more optimal forms
of exchange rate cooperation presented in this study, but, on the other hand, the proposal
sketched  in  this  study  manages  to  evade  the  pitfalls  that  make  the  other  proposals
unfeasible in the current situation.
Power-wise, Grimes' initial estimate (made in 2009), that it is still Japan that holds the
upper hand in financial and monetary regionalism does not seem to hold true anymore.
True, measured in size, sophistication and openness Japanese financial system is still far
ahead of China,  but it  no longer seems likely that Japan has the means to constrain
China's rise – at least when it comes to exchange rate cooperation. With China aiming
for  full  internationalization  of  RMB  it  would  appear  that  Japan  is  poised  to  lose
monetary supremacy as well.  At any rate, it  seems that the opportunity to shape the
future of East Asia's monetary future has already passed Japan and there is little they can
do to change the situation unless there is a major crisis in China or in the global or
regional economic or financial system.
As  for  the  ASEAN+1  nations  the  situation  looks  actually  rather  favorable.  For  the
foreseeable future it does not look like any one currency can grab a hegemonic position
in the region. Instead the aforesaid nations are left with the possibility to choose from
the  competing  currencies  to  their  liking  providing  them  neat  possibilities  to  hedge
against different forms of monetary power. The Core 5 nations also have the option of
cooperating  together  (a  form of  band-wagoning)  in  case  they  want  to  jointly  hedge
against  potential  Chinese  monetary  aggressions  or  just  insulate  themselves  from the
potential turbulences RMB's internationalization can cause. At the same time they could
foster intra-regional trade by stabilizing their respective exchange rates.
Although  Japan  has  arguably  lost  the  struggle  for  power  at  least  in  monetary
regionalism, this does not automatically mean that China has won. There are still too
many ifs surrounding the reform of the Chinese economy, RMB's internationalization
and the opening of Chinese financial markets to conclude that China will win by default.
China holds the pole position to grab the leading position in regional monetary affairs
and perhaps later on in the financial domain, too. However, in terms of monetary power
the gains will not materialize for some time to come. In short to mid term the Chinese
leaders  will  be  intent  on  navigating  their  economy  through  a  turbulent  period  and
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internationalization of RMB will be only a piece in that strategy. If they successfully
pull off the transition, they might give more intrinsic value to their national currency's
internationalization.
It should be noted that the above presented scenarios are not meant to be as forecasts of
what will happen in East Asian exchange rate cooperation in the future. Rather, they are
a sketch of where, in the current situation, it would be most auspicious to start regional
exchange rate cooperation. As such this study is more a policy proposal than a prediction
of future developments.
Neither has this study covered all aspects that are relevant to RMB's internationalization
and its effects on East Asian exchange rate cooperation. Several questions remain open.
To begin with, the internationalization of RMB itself needs to be researched further: in
order  to  better  understand what  motivates  RMB's  internationalization  (and hence  its
future developments) a thorough analysis of Chinese domestic politics and their relation
to exchange rate policy preferences should be examined. Also the potential economic
and financial disasters that may occur in China need to be factored in as this is likely to
shape China's exchange rate policy preferences. 
The domestic  politics  and their  importance  to  exchange rate  regime preferences  are
important for all  the other regional actors,  too.  A country-by-country analysis  of the
relationship between domestic politics and exchange rate preferences for ASEAN+1 is
required to better understand what kind exchange rate regime would suit their interests.
The main interest here is on their currency basket compositions. By pin-pointing where
there  are  points  of  convergence  and  points  of  divergence,  it  is  easier  to  formulate
initiatives that are approved for exchange rate cooperation.
And, on a more general note, further research into East Asian exchange rate cooperation
should take the emergence of RMB as a regional major currency as its premise. RMB's
rise to become a regional major currency or the failure to do so should be the central
theme for further research on East Asian exchange rate cooperation.
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Appendix 1
Illustration 1: The relative amounts of exports and imports to China, Japan and USA for
ASEAN nations and South Korea for 2013. Note that the figures are 
composed of trade volumes and do not contain foreign direct investments. 
Source: http://atlas.media.mit.edu
Core 5 Exports to China Exports to China and HK Imports from China Exports to Japan Imports from Japan Exports to US Imports from US
Malaysia 13.0 17.0 19.0 11.0 8.1 9.2 6.3
Philippines 21.0 29.7 15.0 13.0 9.5 13.0 9.4
Singapore 12.0 25.0 12.0 2.7 5.5 4.9 8.9
South Korea 25.0 29.1 16.0 6.1 12.0 11.0 8.1
Thailand 13.0 18.0 16.0 9.1 16.0 11.0 5.6
Others
Brunei 0.9 0.9 13.0 42.0 3.8 0.0 7.7
Cambodia 3.1 15.1 24.0 4.9 1.5 25.0 8.0
Indonesia 13.0 14.6 17.0 14.0 9.5 9.3 4.6
Laos 32.0 32.5 26.0 3.5 1.9 1.0 0.3
Myanmar 26.0 26.0 40.0 8.0 5.8 0.3 0.6
Vietnam 9.9 13.2 28.0 9.5 8.3 17.0 4.0
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